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1Introduction: exceptionalism and agency 
in Nicaragua’s revolutionary heritage
Hilary Francis
On 10 January 2017, ten days before Donald Trump took his oath of office, Daniel Ortega was sworn in as President of Nicaragua for the fourth time. These two very different presidents both gave inauguration 
speeches suffused with nationalism, but only one of them claimed that his 
country was exceptional. In his remarks to scattered crowds on Pennsylvania 
Avenue, Donald Trump promised to make America great again (again), but 
in spite of his inflated jingoistic rhetoric, Trump is not, in fact, an American 
exceptionalist. He does not believe that his country is innately different, nor that 
accidents of geography or history have conspired to set the United States apart 
as a nation with a particular role in the world. It was Ortega, not Trump, who 
used his inauguration speech to emphasise, once more, his belief in Nicaragua’s 
exceptionalism, calling this small Central American country of six million people 
a ‘blessed’ nation.1
The contrast between the two indicates something fundamental about the 
nature of exceptionalism: it relies on a sense of a particular moral purpose. Trump 
rejects the concept because he rejects morality. For him, international politics is 
a zero sum game in pursuit of material resources. Therefore, the United States 
cannot be exceptional as long as other countries ‘are eating our lunch’.2 This 
logic leads him to conclude that the Iraq War was a bad idea because Americans 
did not ‘take the oil’ before getting out.3 Daniel Ortega, in contrast, asserts that 
Nicaragua is exceptional precisely because, in spite of an acute lack of material 
resources, the particular moral character of Nicaraguans allows them to overcome 
great odds. Claiming that Nicaragua has ‘the lowest crime rate in Latin America 
and one of the lowest on the planet’, Ortega argues that ‘These goals have 
been reached with limited material resources, because we have infinite moral 
1 ‘Toma de posesion e investidura de Daniel Ortega en 2017’, YouTube video, available at 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qAKUaAWvX9k (accessed 15 Apr. 2019); S. Wertheim, 
‘Trump and American Exceptionalism’ (2017).
2 Wertheim, ‘Trump and American exceptionalism’.
3 Ibid.
H. Francis, ‘Introduction: exceptionalism and agency in Nicaragua’s revolutionary heritage’, in 
H. Francis (ed.), A Nicaraguan Exceptionalism? Debating the Legacy of the Sandinista Revolution 
(London: University of London Press, 2019), pp. 1–19. License: CC-BY-NC-ND.
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resources, that is our strength.’4 Rosario Murillo, who is both vice-president and 
first lady, claims that Nicaragua is a peaceful country in the midst of a ‘world full 
of conflict’ because ‘Nicaraguans have accumulated within themselves a heritage 
of respect, moral strength, and admiration which is unbreakable, unyielding, 
hard-working and heroic, qualities which are recognised around the world.’5
This collection is, in part, a reaction to this government rhetoric. Its chapters 
began life as a set of papers presented at a conference at the Institute of Latin 
American Studies at the University of London in March 2015. At that time, 
several of us were thinking independently about the idea of Nicaraguan 
exceptionalism. The FSLN (Sandinista National Liberation Front) government’s 
claims were always clearly overblown, but they belied a range of phenomena 
which suggested that Nicaragua really was different. Nicaragua was not wracked 
with violence in the same way as her Central American neighbours: homicide 
rates and levels of emigration to the United States were both substantially lower. 
Furthermore, beyond the rhetoric, it was clear that many Nicaraguans outside 
of the party of government – and vehemently opposed to it – also considered 
Nicaragua’s heritage to be unique. They believed that their country’s history 
bestowed on Nicaragua’s citizens a particular set of strengths and traits, even as it 
imposed a particular – sometimes unbearable – burden upon them.
Nicaraguan exceptionalism is unique among exceptionalisms for the 
emphasis it places on the moral duty of the individual. Many cultures of 
exceptionalism rely upon a belief in the particular moral virtues of a nation’s 
citizens, but most combine this with a conviction that certain material factors 
have contributed to this cultural exceptionalism. The United States, it is argued, 
is exceptional because of the vast resources that were mobilised by westward 
expansion. Venezuela is exceptional because of its oil reserves. Cuba is exceptional 
because its strategic importance meant that independence came late and, once 
the revolution had triumphed, the island’s topography ensured ease of control.6 
In the Nicaraguan case a similar retreat to the concrete is impossible. Before the 
revolution in 1979 nobody had suggested that Nicaragua was exceptional nor 
that the nation possessed any intrinsic assets that made the revolution more 
likely. Nicaraguan exceptionalism is seen as the result of human endeavour, 
achieved by sheer force of will.
The lens of exceptionalism gives us a new way to consider an old question, 
much discussed in scholarship on Nicaragua: what remains of the revolution?7 
4 La Voz del Sandinismo, ‘Daniel: Policía Nacional tiene resultados excepcionales’, 9 Dec. 2014. 
5 Y. Prado Reyes, ‘Compañera Rosario’, 12 Dec. 2016.
6 I. Tyrrell, ‘American exceptionalism in an age of international history’, 96 (4) (1991); S. Ellner 
and M. Tinker Salas, ‘The Venezuelan exceptionalism thesis: separating myth from reality’ 
(2007); L. Whitehead, ‘On Cuban political exceptionalism’, (2007).
7 D. Rodgers, ‘Searching for the time of beautiful madness (2009); F. Babb, After revolution 
(2001); R. Montoya, Gendered Scenarios of Revolution (2012). The idea of Nicaraguan 
exceptionalism is addressed explicitly in S. Martí i Puig and D. Close, ‘La excepción 
Nicaragüense?’ (2009); and J.M. Cruz, ‘Democratization under assault: criminal violence 
in post-transition Central America’, PhD diss., Vanderbilt University, 2010.
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Were the sacrifices that brought the Sandinistas to power in 1979 entirely in 
vain? What tangible (and not so tangible) changes survived the upheaval of 
the revolutionary decade? It was clear to us that any credible answer to this 
question required scholarship that was fully grounded in both the past and the 
present, and which gave a detailed account of the connections between the two. 
As a group of historians, sociologists and anthropologists, that task forced all of 
us out of our immediate comfort zones. It demanded that the social scientists 
think in more detail about the historical antecedents for the phenomena they 
described, and it required the historians to write all the way up to the present. 
At the time of writing, the historians especially have reason to curse the hubris 
that pushed us into this endeavour. The present is always a moving target, but 
in 2018 Nicaragua experienced the most intense period of political upheaval 
since the revolution of 1979. The verdict of the Envío editorial team in the 
month after the violence began cannot be disputed: ‘There is a clear dividing 
line between the Nicaragua that existed before these unexpected days of rebellion 
and the Nicaragua of today. We still don’t know how this new country, born of 
this outburst of unrest, will take shape. But we know that nothing will be in the 
same place as it was before.’8
The violence of 2018 ripped Nicaraguan society open in ways that may 
never be repaired. But it also exposed continuities that were a surprise to many. 
In 2007, when Daniel Ortega first returned to power, former vice-president and 
leading dissident Sergio Ramírez spoke of a Nicaragua that was divided into 
three: the deluded who chose to believe Ortega’s promises about a second stage 
of the revolution; the betrayed, who felt that their revolutionary-era sacrifices 
had come to nothing; and the young, who viewed ‘what has come down to 
them from history as a cacophony so confused as to induce only oblivion’.9 
In fact, events of recent months have shown that young Nicaraguans are not the 
apathetic, self-involved consumerist types that their elders had hitherto perceived 
them to be.10 Young Nicaraguans have led the current protest movement – and 
they have done so by drawing widely and creatively on Nicaragua’s revolutionary 
traditions. In their actions and analysis they have made it clear that they are 
keenly aware of their country’s recent past. They have shown that they are heirs 
to a particular sense of agency and duty, a particular moral imperative, which we 
call Nicaraguan exceptionalism. This introduction has three sections. The first 
discusses the evolution of exceptionalist ideas from 1979 until 2017. The second 
looks at the ways in which these same ideas have played out during the protest 
8 Envío, ‘Abril 2018: La insurrección de la conciencia’, no. 434, May 2018, http://www.envio.
org.ni/articulo/5479 (accessed 15 Apr. 2019).
9 S. Ramírez, ‘Nicaragua: through the abyss’, 3 Sept. 2007.
10 M. Córdoba, ‘La apática generación post-revolución sale a las calles y hace tambalear al 
gobierno de Daniel Ortega’, Infobae, 22 Apr. 2018. There is substantial survey data and 
other research which suggest that most young people are not interested in politics. See, 
e.g., F. Maradiaga, ‘Youth analysis for strategic planning’, 28 Nov. 2017.
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movement and government crackdown of 2018. The last explores in more detail 
each chapter’s particular contribution to this volume.
Exceptionalism in the ‘first’ and ‘second’ stages 
of the revolution: 1979–2017
In 1979 the FSLN led a broad-based popular movement which overthrew the 
dictatorship of the Somoza dynasty. The Somozas had ruled Nicaragua for 
43 years, relying on US support and increasingly brutal repression to remain 
in power. When Ronald Reagan’s administration began an undeclared war 
on Nicaragua, the country’s plight became an international cause célèbre. 
International supporters of the Sandinistas were drawn by the conflict’s 
stark injustice – with the might of the United States ranged against a tiny, 
impoverished Central American nation – but they were also attracted by the 
Sandinistas’ policies. A mixed economy, the county’s first free elections in 1984, 
and a commitment to grassroots democracy, via a series of mass organisations, 
all suggested that Nicaragua might be the first example of viable, democratic 
socialism, succeeding where so many others failed before. At the time, academics 
frequently referred to the Nicaraguan experience as a ‘unique experiment’.11
In 1990, with the economy in crisis and the country struggling with the 
impact of a decade of war, Nicaraguans voted the Sandinistas out of office, 
opting instead for a coalition of mainly right-wing parties backed by the United 
States. Sixteen years of right-wing neoliberal government ensued, until Daniel 
Ortega was elected to the presidency in November 2006, and then won further 
elections in 2011 and 2016. He has held office continuously for more than 
a decade, overturning Nicaragua’s constitutional prohibition on re-election in 
order to do so. Ortega’s new period in office has been characterised by an acute 
intolerance for any threat to his hold on power, however slight. In 1990, Ortega 
had agreed to bring elections forward as part of the Central American peace 
process, because he and the FSLN assumed that they would win comfortably. 
The shock of that defeat, and the fact that it took the FSLN 16 years to return to 
office, created the conditions for the paranoia and increasing authoritarianism 
that have characterised the FSLN’s attitude to power since 2007.12
From the beginning, there were clear irregularities in the way that elections 
were run. In the 2008 municipal elections – the first held with the FSLN as 
national incumbent – the number of votes cast exceeded the number of voters 
11 The phrase ‘unique experiment’ is used, to give just a few examples, in R.S. Garfield and 
G. Williams, Health and Revolution: The Nicaraguan Experience (1989), 197; C. Robinson, 
Nicaragua: Against All Odds (1989), 12; D. Faber, Environment under Fire: Imperialism and the 
Ecological Crisis in Central America (1993), 189; T. Walker, Nicaragua: The Land of Sandino 
(1986), 120; H.E. Vanden and G. Prevost, Democracy and Socialism in Sandinista Nicaragua 
(1996), 75.
12 For a visceral account of the Sandinista experience of the 1990 electoral defeat, see S. Ramírez, 
Confesión de amor (1991).
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on the electoral roll in multiple districts in 40 different municipalities.13 In 2011, 
there were widespread irregularities in the electoral process, even though opinion 
poll data suggest that the government could have won comfortably without 
fraud: the FSLN’s goal was not just to win, but to win an absolute majority 
in the National Assembly. IPADE, a respected Nicaraguan NGO with a long 
history of election monitoring, was denied accreditation. International observers 
from the European Union and the Organisation of American States (OAS) were 
accredited in 2011, but their work was significantly undermined: 20 per cent 
of the OAS observers were prevented from observing election-day preparations 
at the polling stations to which they had been assigned, which meant that they 
could not verify that the ballot boxes were empty when they were sealed.14 No 
independent election observers, national or international, were accredited for the 
2016 presidential elections. In any event, the contest was a foregone conclusion 
because Eduardo Montealegre, leader of the main opposition party, was removed 
from office by Nicaragua’s Supreme Court less than five months before the vote.15
This need for absolute control is also clear in the Ortega administration’s 
attitude to peaceful protest. Orteguista officials clearly subscribe to the notion 
that ‘whoever has the streets has the power’ and in the years since 2007 they 
have acted accordingly.16 In 2013 a group of elderly protestors and their student 
supporters staged a sit-in demonstration at the Institute of Social Security (INSS) 
to demand pension reform. They were beaten, threatened and robbed by an 
organised group of assailants who had been transported to the scene in vehicles 
belonging to the Managua mayor’s office. The attacks took place in full view of 
the Nicaraguan police, who did not intervene as the violence unfolded.17 Since 
2013 anti-canal protestors have fiercely resisted the government’s transoceanic 
canal project. Their protests have repeatedly been thwarted by Nicaraguan police 
and groups of pro-government supporters: in 2014 a demonstrator lost an eye 
after police shot him with a rubber bullet, and in 2016 a bridge was destroyed to 
prevent peasant protesters taking part in a march.18 
13 Such discrepancies were not apparent in subsequent elections because the government 
stopped releasing district-by-district statistics. Consorcio Panorama Electoral, ‘Informe 
preliminar elecciones 2016’, 4.
14 Envío, ‘Elecciones 2011: Perdió Nicaragua’, no. 356, Nov. 2011; The Carter Center, 
‘The 2011 Elections in Nicaragua’, Study Mission Report, 7.
15 N. Lakhani, ‘Nicaragua suppresses opposition to ensure one-party election, critics say’, 
Guardian, 26 June 2016.
16 G. Rothschuh, ‘Observatorio de los medios’, Confidencial, 17 Apr. 2018.
17 Envío, ‘The challenge of the others’, no. 384, July 2013; Centro Nicaraguense de Derechos 
Humanos (CENIDH), ‘Violaciones de derechos humanos en el contexto de la protesta de los 
adultos mayores por su derecho a una pensión reducida de vejez’, 27 June 2013; C. Salinas, ‘El 
gobierno de Ortega reprime la protesta de los “viejitos” en Nicaragua’, El País, 23 June 2013.
18 CENIDH, Derechos humanos en Nicaragua: Informe 2013 (2014), 39; CENIDH, Derenchos 
humanos en Nicaragua: Informe 2015 (2016), 42–4; M. Aguilera, ‘Destrozan puente para 
impidir marcha campesina’, Hoy, 30 Nov. 2016; V. Vásquez, ‘Perdió un ojo en marcha 
anticanal, pero continúa en la protesta’, Confidencial, 18 June 2017.
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A pattern of state violence has also been reported in the north of Nicaragua, 
where former Contra combatants have rearmed in opposition to the FSLN 
government. Press and human rights reports indicate that between 2011 and 
2017 the Nicaraguan army killed at least 31 people in at least 14 attacks on 
suspected Contra groups, suggesting a widespread practice of extrajudicial 
execution of armed opponents of the government.19
Nonetheless, in the 11 years before April 2018 the Ortega government was 
able to broadcast its version of Nicaraguan exceptionalism with some success, 
partly because of economic progress. In 2015 IMF executive director Otaviano 
Canuto described Nicaragua as ‘a success story in the making’ and by 2017 
the country had the third highest growth rate in Latin America. The ‘buoyant’ 
economic growth was partly the result of aid from Venezuela, but it was also built 
upon the firm pact established between Ortega’s government and the Nicaraguan 
private sector.20 This economic growth was closely linked to the central thread 
in the government’s claims to exceptionalism: the idea that Nicaragua was the 
safest country in Central America. And while some have questioned the claim, 
the statistics certainly supported it: in 2017 murders in Nicaragua totalled 431, 
or 7 per 100,000 people, a fraction of the 60 per 100,000 reported in nearby El 
Salvador. Huge numbers of migrant children have arrived in the United States 
from Central America in recent years, but hardly any come from Nicaragua, 
even though it is the poorest country in the region.21 The crudest explanations 
for this difference suggest that Nicaraguans have no need to flee violence and 
high crime rates because ‘Nicaragua has good cops’, an approach that has aged 
extremely poorly since April 2018.22 Nonetheless, even if we discount the 
19 L.E. Martínez M., ‘Ejército enfrentó a un solo hombre en Ayapal’, La Prensa, 9 Mar. 
2017; A. Cerda, ‘Ejército letal contra “armados”’, Confidencial, 7 Feb. 2017; CENIDH, 
‘Informe del CENIDH sobre violaciones de derechos humanos en Las Magdalenas, Ciudad 
Antigua, Nueva Segovia’, 17 Nov. 2016; E. Romero, ‘Muere el armado Enrique Aguinaga en 
enfrentamiento con Ejército de Nicaragua’, La Prensa, 30 Apr. 2016; E. Chamorro Mendieta, 
‘Cerrato fue torturado con saña antes de su asesinato’, La Prensa, 24 Apr. 2016; E. Romero, 
‘Seis muertos en combate entre Ejército y armados en Ayapal’, La Prensa, 30 Mar. 2016; 
‘Dos muertos tras enfrentamiento con la Policía en Jinotega’, La Prensa, 21 Aug. 2015; 
CENIDH, ‘Informe del CENIDH concluye: “Fue una acción militar”’, 9 Feb. 2015; W. 
Aragón, ‘Sepultan a ex Contra “Triple H”’, La Prensa, 15 Sept. 2014; ‘Nicaragua: La Contra 
conmemora desmovilizacion mientras siguen asesinando a sus dirigentes’, Nicaragua Hoy, 
27 June 2014; E. Romero, ‘Ejército confirma muerte de “Cascabel”’, La Prensa, 16 Apr. 2014; 
A. Lorío, ‘Asesinan al “flaco Midence”’, La Prensa, 22 Dec. 2013; E. Romero, ‘Repudio en 
pantasma por muertes’, La Prensa, 12 Oct. 2013.
20 O. Canuto, ‘Nicaragua: a success story in the making’, Huffington Post, 11 Sept. 2015; 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, Preliminary Overview of the 
Economies of Latin America and the Caribbean 2018: Briefing Paper; IMF, ‘IMF concludes staff 
visit to Nicaragua’, 5 Dec. 2016. 
21 T. Clavel, ‘2017 homicide rates in Latin America and the Caribbean’, Insight Crime, 19 Jan. 
2018; D. Rodgers, ‘Living in the shadow of death: gangs, violence and social order in urban 
Nicaragua, 1996–2002’ (May 2006), 267–92.
22 J. Replogle, ‘Why Nicaraguan kids aren’t fleeing to U.S.’, KPB2, 29 Jul. 2014; National 
Public Radio, ‘Why Nicaragua’s not in the conversation about Central American migrants’, 
1 Aug, 2014; I. Castro, ‘Migration outlier: how Nicaragua escaped neighbors’ deadly spiral’, 
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Nicaraguan government’s boasts of the country’s ‘infinite moral resources’, it 
is clear that Nicaragua’s recent history follows a distinctive path that requires 
further explanation.
Before April 2018 talk of Nicaraguan exceptionalism was not confined 
to Ortega and his allies; nevertheless, other versions of the discourse carried 
nothing of the confidence and triumphalism expressed by the government. 
Rather, Sandinistas from all walks of life felt a pervading sense of guilt and 
betrayal. The belief that Nicaragua was – and should be – unique led them to 
feel that they had failed, because so many of the dreams of the revolution had 
come to nothing. José Luis Rocha, who discusses agrarian reform in this volume, 
has written elsewhere about his experience as a brigadista in the 1980 literacy 
crusade, giving a lucid account of this pernicious sense of guilt and anger over 
a dream betrayed:
We have journeyed from frankness to dissembling, from a straightforward 
and direct way of doing things to one involving a thousand twists and turns. 
From taking pride in being able to walk for hours, tame a horse, rope a mule 
and milk a cow, we now boast about our new cars, our credit cards and the 
clubs and graduate degrees we are accumulating. What we have is what we 
are. The Miami way of life won out over the revolutionary culture. We lost 
that battle … and it was the most decisive one.23
This same sense of guilt is shared by some of the poorest Nicaraguans, those 
without access to the ‘Miami way of life’. In her 20-year study of the Sandinista 
community of Tule, Rosario Montoya argues that the expectations created by 
revolutionary discourse left the citizens of Tule with a crippling sense of guilt for 
having ‘failed’ to fulfil an impossible dream of the utopian ‘new man’ and ‘new 
woman’ of the revolution.24
The burden of this strain of exceptionalism led many dissident Sandinistas to 
blame themselves for Ortega’s increasing authoritarianism. In an article written 
in 2016, Henry Ruiz, a member of the Sandinistas’ governing junta in the 1980s, 
asked, ‘How did we get here?’ He found his answer in searing self-criticism. ‘We 
are the people most responsible for the fact that Daniel Ortega is where he is, 
all of us who fought against the Somoza dictatorship, all of us of the generation 
that fought against the dictatorship and then little by little allowed this man to 
ensconce himself in power ... Yes, we are guilty, some more than others.’25
In the months since April 2018 that sense of guilt has turned to anger and 
defiance. The impact of the violence itself is shocking enough, but the events 
of 2018 also forced many Nicaraguans to relive the buried traumas of the past. 
The period of silent resentment is over, and this new outpouring of grief and 
Reuters, 28 Aug. 2014; R. Lovato, ‘What explains Nicaragua’s surprisingly low murder rate?’, 
Boston Globe, 12 Jan. 2018. 
23 J.L. Rocha, ‘A passionate memory in times of disillusion’, Envío, no. 230, Sept. 2000.
24 Montoya, Gendered Scenarios of Revolution.
25 H. Ruiz, ‘Daniel Ortega es un tránsfuga político y la tarea hoy es evitar que consolide su 
dictadura familiar’, Envío, no. 414, Sept. 2016.
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anger has made the discourses of exceptionalism more obvious and more explicit: 
fervent patriotism and ideas about duty to country form the backbone of the 
current opposition movement. 
Exceptionalism and the martyrs of April:  
April–December 2018
The violence began on 18 April 2018. Two days earlier, the government had 
finalised reforms to the Nicaraguan Institute of Social Security (INSS). The INSS 
had been struggling for some time and Nicaraguan journalists have discovered 
a range of issues relating to mismanagement and financial impropriety.26 The 
government’s implementation of the INSS reforms was a response to pressure 
from the IMF, but it was poorly timed. In the weeks before, hundreds of students 
had protested against the government’s mismanagement of a forest fire in the 
Indio Maíz reserve in the south of the country. These protests were the most 
significant student mobilisation since the INSS protests of 2013. It is difficult to 
understand, therefore, why the government chose to press ahead with the INSS 
reforms – a known flashpoint – when the momentum of student protests had 
already begun to build.
On 18 April government supporters used familiar tactics, roughing up 
demonstrators and journalists in Managua and León. Photographs of bloodied 
protesters, including pensioners, led to larger demonstrations the next day. 
At this point, for reasons which are still unclear, the state responded with 
unprecedented, lethal force. According to Ligia Gómez, a former Sandinista 
official at Nicaragua’s Central Bank, a meeting of party officials was convened 
at midday on 19 April. ‘Vamos con todo’, they were told. ‘We’re going to give it 
everything we’ve got. We’re not going to let them steal the revolution from us.’27 
Later that day, two protestors and a policeman were killed, but the escalation 
only served to increase dissent. Demonstrations took place across the country 
on the following day, and agents of the state across the country responded with 
lethal force. On 20 April eight people were killed in Managua, two in Ciudad 
Sandino, one in Tipitapa, two in Estelí, three in León, four in Masaya and one 
in Sébaco.28
In the next few months more than 325 Nicaraguans were killed, most at the 
hands of agents of the state.29 Hundreds of thousands of people, particularly 
the young, participated in marches, roadblocks and university occupations. The 
26 ‘El mal manejo de los fondos del INSS’, La Prensa, 3 Jul. 2017; J.A. Silva et al., ‘Se siembra 
alarma entre pensionados’, El Nuevo Diario, 3 June 2008.
27 W. Miranda Aburto, ‘“Vamos con todo”: filtración desvela que Rosario Murillo ordenó 
aplastar las protestas en Nicaragua’, Univisión, 21 Nov. 2018; C.F. Chamorro, ‘Habla 
exsecretaria política FSLN en el Banco Central’, Confidencial, 18 Nov. 2018.
28 Grupo Interdisciplinario de Expertos Independientes (GIEI) Nicaragua, ‘Informe sobre 
los hechos de violencia occurridos entre el 18 de abril y el 30 de mayo 2018’.
29 OAS, IACHR, ‘IACHR warns of new wave of repression in Nicaragua’, 18 Oct. 2018; 
Amnesty International, ‘Shoot to kill’, 18 Oct., 2018, 5. 
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assumption that had prevailed for so long – that most young people had little 
interest in politics – was proved wrong. In many cases, the most intense resistance 
came from traditionally Sandinista working-class neighbourhoods: Monimbó in 
Masaya, the eastern barrios of Managua, Barrio Sandino in Jinotega.30 Foreign 
journalists came to Nicaragua in a trickle rather than the flood seen in the 1980s. 
But they did come. And they saw a rebellion that looked like the mirror image 
of the Sandinistas’ struggle to overthrow Somoza. Multiple articles asked how 
Ortega had become a copy of the dictator he had helped to overthrow, and 
many noted the obvious echoes of the past: the use of adoquines (hexagonal 
paving stones) to make barricades; the ubiquity of the rallying cry ‘que se rinda 
tu madre’ (‘Tell your mother to surrender’, the last words of Sandinista poet and 
revolutionary Leonel Rugama).31 In the New Yorker, Jon Lee Anderson traced the 
historical roots still further, linking Masaya’s trenchant resistance to a century of 
rebellion stretching back to the war of 1912.32 
Nicaraguans themselves were clear that this tradition of rebellion made them 
unique. When Evo Morales tweeted in defence of Ortega, suggesting that, just as 
in Venezuela, the Nicaraguan government was the victim of a US-backed coup, 
Nicaraguan journalist Tifani Roberts derided the possibility of any comparison 
with Venezuela. ‘No one can tame Nicaraguans,’ she said, ‘They don’t bow their 
heads, they won’t allow it, they’re brave, they defend themselves, they do not 
surrender.’33 Here, we suggest that Nicaraguan ideas of exceptionalism stem 
from the experience of the revolutionary decade, but Nicaraguans themselves 
offered a range of theories in their responses to Roberts’ comment. For some, 
Nicaraguans’ defiance came from Sandino; for others, it was the legacy of 
rebellious, indigenous blood. Exceptionalism was no longer confined to those 
who still called themselves Sandinistas.
In the months after the violence began, the discursive tradition of 
exceptionalism meant that many Nicaraguans did not just hope that they might 
overthrow a dictatorship once again – they knew that they must, and would. The 
sense of a duty and moral imperative imposed by the sacrifices of those who came 
before them was palpable and inescapable. In the week after the violence began, 
Nicaraguan poet and revolutionary Gioconda Belli wrote of a ‘judgement day’ 
for Nicaragua’s rulers, and a struggle suffused with the presence the country’s 
heroes and martyrs:
The blood of those who fought for a free country: those who fell in the 
struggle against Somoza and those who have fallen in the last 11 years and 
30 La Prensa, ‘Barrio Sandino, el pequeño Monimbó de Jinotega’, 18 June 2018; E. Reyes, ‘Sitios 
que fueron resistencia del sandinismo y hoy se levantaron en contra’, Maje, 13 June 2018.
31 C. Lane, ‘Ortega is becoming the sort of autocrat he once despised’, Washington Post, 16 July 
2018; J. Webber, ‘A rebel no more, Ortega comes to resemble the dictator he replaced’, Irish 
Times, 22 Aug. 2018; J. Bauluz, ‘Viewpoint: Ortega’s Nicaragua crisis evokes memories of 
past’, BBC, 1 Sept. 2018.
32 J.L. Anderson, ‘“Fake news” and unrest in Nicaragua’, New Yorker, 27 Aug. 2018.
33 T. Roberts, Tweet, https://twitter.com/TifaniRoberts/status/994793874873901057?s=19 
(accessed 16 Apr. 2019).
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above all in this brave week, that blood has returned to live again in this 
new generation of Nicaraguans who are ready to revive the dream of a free 
fatherland. Those exemplary, generous men and women who wanted to light 
up the darkness did not exist in vain. Their ghosts are with us, their legacy is 
with us. Sandino lives. 
The principle that sacrifice denotes political authority has also been passed on to 
this new generation of protestors. In May, 20-year-old student Lesther Alemán 
challenged Ortega on the first day of the national dialogue, which was broadcast 
live. Alemán asserted his right, as a representative of the students, to demand 
Ortega’s departure, because ‘nosotros hemos puesto los muertos’ (‘We have provided 
the dead’).34 His phrasing echoed a dark joke in the 1980s about the power 
of Conservative elites from the city of Granada which suggested that ‘León 
provided the dead, Granada provided the ministers’.35
Leonel Delgado has expressed concern about this ‘sacrificial narrative’, 
and many within the protest movement are aware of the dangers of such an 
approach.36 For this reason, one of the most popular slogans of the movement 
has been ‘Free fatherland and life!’, a reformulation, favoured by Sandinista 
poet Ernesto Cardenal in the early 1980s, of the standard revolutionary slogan 
‘Free fatherland or death!’37 But despite this obvious self-awareness, there is still 
a real danger that the exceptionalism which drives the movement will also be its 
downfall. Exceptionalism lends itself to Manichean versions of history, it pits 
pantheons of heroes against pantheons of villains. The current movement has 
claimed for its own the revolutionary heroes who died before 1979 and consigned 
to the scrapheap anyone who has collaborated with Ortega in recent years.38 But 
in order to avoid repeating the mistakes of the past, this new generation will need 
a much deeper understanding of the exact nature of those mistakes. Many of 
the most reflective, critical voices in Nicaraguan civil society are fully aware that 
the only way forward is to seek a much deeper engagement with more nuanced 
accounts of the past. This book hopes to contribute to that search.
34 El Nuevo Diario, ‘Primer día del diálogo nacional en Nicaragua’.
35 C.M. Vilas, ‘Family affairs: class, lineage and politics in contemporary Nicaragua’ (1992): 
309–41, 324.
36 L. Delgado, ‘Fin de Época’, Situación de Nicaragua, 22 Apr. 2018.
37 El País, ‘Ernesto Cardenal inaugurará en Madrid una exposición de arte’, 4 Dec. 1981.
38 See, e.g., the photo of a mural in Rivas, taken by Tom Phillips, in which the faces of Tomás 
Borge and Daniel Ortega have been defaced, but that of Carlos Fonseca has been left 
untouched. ‘Ghost resorts: Nicaragua crisis ravages nascent tourism industry’, Guardian, 
6 Aug. 2018.
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Debating Nicaraguan exceptionalism
Aside from Robert Sierakowski’s contribution, these chapters were finalised 
just before the violence of 2018 began. They take varying approaches to the 
subject: some are concerned with the question of whether the concrete gains 
of the revolution really were exceptional, others explore Nicaraguans’ own 
exceptionalist beliefs. Throughout, there is a clear connecting thread: a sense of 
agency. Our findings echo the work of Rosario Montoya in the village of Tule, 
where local citizens displayed ‘a commitment to active participation in their 
own lives’ as well as a ‘belief in their capacity to affect the forces that shape their 
lives and society’ which, she suggests, may be the most durable legacy of the 
Sandinista Revolution.39
If asked in March 2018, I would not have said that our approach to this 
legacy was romanticised. Most of the scholars involved in this volume were born 
around the time of the revolution. We began our professional lives long after the 
electoral defeat of 1990, and the scholarship in which we immersed ourselves 
was preoccupied with the failure of the Sandinista project and the reasons for 
that failure.40 Much of what follows conveys the bleak sense of disappointment 
that has characterised many people’s relationship with the Sandinista Revolution 
for many years.
Nonetheless, there is no doubt that rereading this work in the light of recent 
events brings different things to the fore. In his account of the Nicaraguan police, 
Robert Sierakowski draws on Seymour Martin Lipset’s concept of exceptionalism 
as a double-edged sword. In Sierakowski’s version, exceptionalist beliefs in 
Nicaragua inculcated the unswerving loyalty and dedication that produced 
the successes of the National Police in the 1980s and ’90s, but also prepared 
the ground for the violence of 2018. Similarly, Johannes Wilm writes of the 
confidence and self-belief that led the FSLN to act as if it were a much larger 
power on the international stage. A year ago, this posturing was an interesting 
anomaly that sometimes yielded results. Now, it helps to explain a far more 
maladjusted and damaging set of behaviours. In December 2018, for example, 
it looked as though the OAS would invoke its democratic charter against 
Nicaragua. The FSLN government had precipitated this by closing NGOs and 
arresting journalists, seemingly oblivious to the inevitable international reaction. 
Former ambassador José Luis Velásquez noted that the regime ‘was unable to 
39 Montoya, Gendered Scenarios of Revolution, 202.
40 This literature includes, but is not limited to: A. Bendaña, Una tragedia campesina: testimonios 
de la resistencia (1991); Rodgers, ‘Searching for the time of beautiful madness’; Babb, 
After Revolution; J.L. Gould, To Lead as Equals: Rural Protest and Political Consciousness in 
Chinandega, Nicaragua, 1912–1979 (1990); O. Núñez Soto and G. Cardenal, La Guerra en 
Nicaragua (1991); F. Soto Joya, Ventanas en la memoria: recuerdos de la revolución en la frontera 
agrícola (2011).
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recognise’ the climate of international opinion and the predictable consequences 
of their actions.41
It would be a serious mistake, however, to read what follows as nothing 
more than a cautionary tale about the dangers of fanaticism. My own chapter 
compares decision-making in two rural communities, one fiercely Sandinista and 
the other a former bastion of support for the Contras. Both communities exercise 
considerable agency in different ways, but the Sandinista community, here 
called El Junco, has developed a profound tradition of community participation 
and consultation which is clearly rooted in the community’s experience of the 
revolutionary decade. Here as well, the double-edged sword of exceptionalism 
is clearly in play. In 2015, one interviewee in El Junco told me that his parents 
would ‘never ever’ change their support for Ortega, ‘pase lo que pase’ (‘Whatever 
happens’). He was not wrong. Some in the village, at great personal risk, have 
spoken out forcefully against the abuses that began in April 2018. But the 
majority of Junco residents still support Ortega. The supporters include some 
close friends who will not talk to me now. This is an experience shared by many 
Nicaraguans and others with close ties to the country. In a piece in Confidencial, 
Guadalupe Wallace Salinas describes the anguish caused by conflicts with friends 
and family members who are still complicit with or supportive of the FSLN 
regime. ‘Along with the tears,’ she writes, ‘a part of me has gone.’42
It is not straightforward, therefore, to argue that we should listen to these 
voices. But it is crucial. In their May editorial, the Envío team declared, with 
not-at-all-concealed exasperation, that surely now the majority of Sandinistas 
would turn away from Daniel Ortega.43 In fact, many have not, and the reasons 
for this require our close attention – now more than ever. This book shows clearly 
that the revolution failed because it could not deal with diversity. Whether it was 
confronted with young gay and lesbian revolutionaries or poor peasants who 
wanted their own land, the first FSLN government repeatedly imposed its own 
ideas of what was required, rather than engaging with the cacophony of voices, 
histories and ideas that it inherited in 1979.
There is a danger that this same pattern will repeat itself if Daniel Ortega ever 
steps down. Leading intellectuals and opposition figures in Nicaragua have been 
quick to condemn continuing support for the FSLN as the product of ignorance 
and lack of education. The similarity with pronouncements from the FSLN 
in the early 1980s is uncanny. When Félix Maradiaga suggests that the small 
percentage of the population which still supports Ortega needs to be ‘rescued 
from the deceits to which poverty and oppression have condemned them’ he 
sounds a lot like Tomás Borge in 1980, arguing that ‘it was understandable’ 
that peasants supported the Contras, because ‘400 years of exploitation and 
41 J.I. Espinoza, ‘¿Cuáles son las consecuencias que sufriría Nicaragua con la Carta Democrática 
de la OEA?’, El Nuevo Diario, 29 Dec. 2018.
42 G. Wallace Salinas, ‘Nicaragua 2018: annus horribilis y annus mirabilis’, Confidencial, 
29 Dec. 2018.
43 Envío, ‘Abril 2018: La insurrección de la conciencia’, no. 434, May 2018.
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misery which we inherited from Somocismo could not be wiped out in one year 
of revolution’.44 In 2018 Sergio Ramírez went further. The basic problem, he 
suggested, was that Nicaragua continues to be a ‘rural society’ where a lack of 
progress and modernity allows dictatorships to flourish.45
The narrative of exceptionalism divides the world into enlightened fulfillers 
of moral destiny and ignorant types who hold up the march of progress. That 
approach obscures the infinite variety of ways in which Nicaraguans experience 
the present moment and the recent past. It complements and compounds 
an older set of discourses in which Nicaraguan intellectuals construct ‘good 
peasants’, who embody the change they want to see in the world, and ‘bad 
peasants’, who are the scapegoat for the failure to achieve that utopia.46 It is these 
discourses, rather than rurality itself, which have no place in the 21st century.
Five of the eight chapters in this volume relate to the rural experience during 
and after the revolution. Alongside Rocha and Berth’s chapters on food policy 
and agrarian reform come three chapters (from Soto, Cooper and myself ) 
which draw on extensive fieldwork to give an account of the impact of changing 
relationships with the FSLN at the community level. There is no unity in our 
findings. Rather, the key contribution of this work is that it demonstrates 
the profound local and regional differences in the way that the revolution 
was experienced. A truly rich literature on experience of the revolution in the 
countryside, if we ever get one, might look something like the historiography of 
Shining Path and its antecedents in Peru: a complex mosaic of local and national 
power struggles which puts rural people’s subjective experience of change at the 
centre of the story.47
This book is not only about the rural experience, although we cannot claim 
to provide a similarly comprehensive treatment of other aspects of the legacy of 
the revolution. Such an effort would require consideration of the experience of 
Nicaragua’s Atlantic Coast, of the history of the army, and of the development 
of labour politics and trade unions, to name just a few of the most notable 
omissions. But the book’s rural core is complemented by three chapters which 
44 F. Maradiaga, Tweet, 30 July 2018, https://twitter.com/maradiaga/status/ 
1023713856676290560 (accessed 16 Apr. 2019); ‘Twenty-five peasants detained in Quilalí 
[sic] cleared’, Radio Sandino, 4 Aug. 1980, Foreign Broadcast Information Service.
45 F.J. Larios, ‘Sergio Ramírez: “Quiero transformar las cifras en rostros”’, El Nuevo Herald, 
28 Sept. 2018.
46 L. Delgado Aburto, ‘Desplazamientos discursivos de la representación campesina en la 
Nicaragua pre y post-sandinista’, Latinoamérica: Revistas de estudios latinomericanos, no. 58; 
L. Serra, ‘El movimiento social nicaragüense por la defensa de la tierra, el agua y la soberanía’ 
(2016), is a good example of the kind of homogenising, ahistorical approach which is 
common: a single rebellious peasant consciousness is attributed to an inheritance passed down 
from ancestors who fought the Spanish conquistadores and participated in Sandino’s war 
against the US occupation in the 1920s and 1930s, among others.
47 See, e.g., S.J. Stern (ed.), Shining and Other Paths: War and Society in Peru  
1980–1995 (1998); K. Theidon, Intimate Enemies: Violence and Reconciliation in Peru (2012); 
J. Puente, ‘La “massacre” de Ondores: reforma, comunidad y violencia en la Sierra Central 
(1969–1979)’ (2016).
A NICARAGUAN EXCEPTIONALISM?14
set the book within a wider context: Sierakowski’s work on the police, Wilm’s 
research with Sandinista activists in León and Babb’s account of the LGBTQ 
(Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Queer Questioning) movement in Nicaragua 
since 1979. This combination helps us to think beyond an overly schematic 
separation of rural and urban experience. We show clearly that no homogenous 
rural world exists in Nicaragua: there is considerable variety between the rural 
case studies explored here. At the same time, crossovers and connections can 
be perceived between particular rural case studies and particular urban ones: 
we can see similarities between the single-minded devotion of Sierakowski’s 
urban police recruits and the attitude of community activists noted by Wilm 
and myself in León and El Junco respectively. Babb’s LGBTQ revolutionaries 
experience a tension between personal awakening and emotional investment 
in the revolution, tempered by a revolutionary state that coopts, manipulates 
and denies their true identity. There is much in that account which resonates 
with Soto’s haunting, bleak rendition of the experience of Sandinista-supporting 
peasants on the agricultural frontier.
Robert Sierakowski’s account of the Sandinista National Police, which 
opens the book, provides its starkest analysis of the dangers of exceptionalism. 
As elsewhere, there is an emphasis on the perception of power that the revolution 
brought, the changes wrought by a generation of young police cadets who 
saw themselves as ‘the vanguard of the emerging socialist society ... [with] a 
transcendent mission that emphasised sacrifice, solidarity, humanism and human 
rights’. The case of the police service stands out, however: Sierakowski shows 
that this voluntaristic faith was translated into a tangible structural change 
in terms of a commitment to community policing and a strong institutional 
culture which scorned self-interest. This laid the foundations for a system of 
policing which successfully eradicated the endemic violence of the Somoza years. 
Ultimately, however, the success and sacrifice of the 1980s and ’90s only serve 
to demonstrate the immensity of the police force’s subsequent fall from grace. 
Sierakowski argues that the exceptionalist tradition made it easier for Ortega to 
use the police as a tool of state repression.
Fernanda Soto’s account of Sandinista peasants in Mulukukú is equally 
preoccupied with the question of what has been lost, but she also turns her 
attention to what might still remain. Soto begins with the story of a recent 
murder, the alleged killing of a prominent landowner by a mozo, or labourer. 
Could it be, she asks, that it was because of the revolution that ‘mozos are not 
like they were before’ – less deferential, less willing to suffer provocation in 
silence? Her answer to that question sets the tone for much of what follows: 
many of the achievements of the revolution proved to be ephemeral, partly 
because of the incalculable impact of the Contra War, but also because present 
and past interactions with the FSLN have reaped a harvest of inequality and 
corruption. However, she notes that, despite their wartime experiences, most of 
her informants continue to support the revolution, which ‘opened a space for 
Nicaraguans to imagine themselves and their society in new ways’.
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The sense that personal empowerment is the revolution’s chief legacy is 
reinforced by Christiane Berth’s chapter on the Sandinista food policy. Berth 
rejects the standard view, which attributes Nicaragua’s nutritional crisis to the 
cuts of the neoliberal era after 1990. In fact, she argues, calorie intakes had already 
plummeted to the levels of the 1950s in the last years of the revolutionary decade. 
In the honeymoon years immediately after the revolution, the Sandinistas had 
sought to achieve self-sufficiency in basic foods, and the Nicaraguan programme 
was promoted by NGOs and international organisations as a model for food 
policy in the Global South. Ultimately though, this effort was unsuccessful, 
and Nicaragua’s record regarding food policy cannot be regarded as exceptional. 
A number of factors, including the pressure of the Contra War and the economic 
blockade, as well as policy errors and increasing tensions between the Sandinista 
government and the peasantry, led to an increasingly severe subsistence crisis in 
the years after 1985. Berth argues that the present FSLN government’s policies 
are a pale imitation of the programmes of the revolutionary era, because they 
do not include any attempt to make profound changes in economic structures 
or land distribution. Nonetheless, she suggests that civil society activism in 
Nicaragua, particularly the campaign for a food sovereignty law in the early 
2000s, is evidence of the continuing existence of a vibrant network of peasant 
organisations, a direct legacy of the revolution itself.
In his chapter on Sandinista relations with the Eastern Bloc, Johannes Wilm 
seeks to define and explain the ways in which agency is understood within 
Sandinismo. Drawing on interviews with Sandinista activists in León and 
elsewhere, Wilm deploys the Nicaraguan term ‘protagonismo’ to describe this 
set of ideas. He makes a direct link between Sandinista activists’ protagonismo 
and their faith in Nicaraguan exceptionalism, and shows how activists’ belief in 
Nicaraguans’ superior political consciousness and organisational skills lead them 
to perceive their country as one that can act as the equal of any major power. 
In the eyes of these activists, Nicaragua is exceptional compared to the other 
countries of Central America, countries which are still bound to the United 
States by the chains of economic dependency. Wilm is careful to note that he 
is concerned with perceptions of exceptionalism, rather than the question of 
whether these beliefs reflect reality. Nonetheless, he suggests that the Sandinistas’ 
enduring confidence on the world stage has had a tangible effect on the country’s 
foreign relations: in recent years, just by insisting on its right to a strong alliance 
with Russia, Nicaragua has obtained something that seemed impossible.
In his account of Nicaragua’s agrarian reform, José Luis Rocha suggests 
that the events of the revolutionary decade have left rural Nicaraguans with a 
particular sense of agency and capacity for organisation. But he takes pains to 
point out that this legacy is not the result of a deliberate plan executed by the 
FSLN government in the 1980s, but rather the product of a number of shifts 
in policy forced by opposition to the government in the countryside and the 
circumstances of the Contra War. The initially slow pace of agrarian reform, and 
a tendency to privilege large state farms over small-scale peasant production, 
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created tensions between the government and landless peasants, which helped to 
accelerate support for the counter-revolution in rural Nicaragua. In later years, 
the distribution of small plots to peasant producers was emphasised, which 
helped to reduce rural support for the Contras. The piecemeal and contradictory 
nature of the reforms, combined with the pressures of war, meant that changes to 
land tenure were only partial. In many instances these were easily reversed after 
the Sandinistas’ electoral defeat in 1990. Despite this, Rocha argues that agrarian 
reform did have lasting, tangible legacies which continue to make Nicaragua 
exceptional. A culture of cooperativism and the strength of peasant organisation 
have created particularly fruitful conditions for the development of fair-trade 
schemes in recent years. An existing knowledge of, and predisposition towards, 
‘democratic’ cultivation has made Nicaragua a world leader in the fair-trade 
coffee market.
Rocha’s overview of the revolution’s legacy in the countryside is followed by 
two case studies which explore the impact of the revolution at the community 
level. My own chapter considers structures of decision-making in two rural 
communities: one is predominantly Sandinista and the other had strong ties 
to the Contras in the 1980s and has historically always voted for parties of the 
right. It suggests that the revolution allowed rural Sandinistas to develop a strong 
culture of local organisation and decision-making, a culture that persists to this 
day. However, it also points to the divisive effect of this legacy: communities 
that supported the Contras developed very different structures for decision-
making, and these different legacies, in addition to the experience of the war 
itself, continue to set communities apart.
In his ethnography of the Segovian village of Gualiqueme, David Cooper 
argues that community members’ sense of the legacy of the revolution is 
predicated upon a particular set of beliefs about what constitutes social change 
and how it is achieved. For Cooper, community residents are not primarily 
concerned with the wider social hierarchies that preoccupy NGOs and activists 
who work with the community. Rather, they think in terms of inclusion and 
exclusion, and hope to strengthen Gualiqueme’s links with redistributive 
networks in the wider world. Seen in this light, Cooper suggests, the villagers’ 
continuing support for Daniel Ortega’s social programmes, and their continuing 
faith in the positive legacy of the revolution, make perfect sense. Villagers prize 
their ongoing relationship with Ortega and the FSLN because of the party’s 
ability to bind the community more tightly with wider flows of material wealth.
In the book’s final chapter, Florence Babb explores the revolution’s equivocal 
record in relation to the LGBTQ movement. She argues that by the early 1990s 
Nicaragua was ‘a regional leader in LGBTQ activism and cultural development’, 
but she also notes the considerable difficulties that LGBTQ people continue to 
face in Nicaraguan society today. Babb suggests that this ambiguous outcome is 
rooted in the two faces of Nicaraguan exceptionalism. The revolution brought 
new encounters and freedoms that provided many with opportunities for self-
discovery. The experience of organising in the revolution also allowed activists 
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to develop ‘the strategic tools necessary to develop a way of struggling for sexual 
rights’. At the same time, the heteronormative ethos of the revolution, and 
the emphasis on state-based development, placed restrictions on autonomous 
initiatives for change, restrictions which are also apparent in the actions of the 
current FSLN administration.
In his prescient conclusion to this volume, written before the outbreak of 
violence in 2018, Justin Wolfe notes the fragility of the apparent consensus 
forged by the FSLN. He wonders whether the legacies of the revolution will 
provide the necessary springboard for change when the status quo inevitably 
crumbles. At the time of writing, Nicaraguans are bitterly divided on that 
question. For every young protestor who claims the ideals and tactics of the 
revolution as their own, there is another Nicaraguan who regards the violence 
of 2018 as yet another reason to obliterate all traces of the Sandinista past once 
and for all. Future debates about the legacy of the revolution will be belligerent 
and near-impossible to resolve, but they are nonetheless preferable to the silence 
about the traumas of the 1970s and 80s that has prevailed for the last thirty years. 
Any new consensus will require a nuanced and unflinching attempt to reckon 
with Nicaragua’s recent history. We hope that this book will contribute in some 
small way to that essential task.
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1. ‘We didn’t want to be like Somoza’s Guardia’: 
policing, crime and Nicaraguan exceptionalism
Robert Sierakowski
In late April 2018, for the first time since the end of the Cold War, political violence in Nicaragua made international headlines. Thanks to smartphones and social media, people all over the world could watch in real time as the 
country’s police forces and armed paramilitaries worked together to crush a 
wave of popular protest against the Sandinista government of Daniel Ortega. 
Livestreamed videos showed killers with their faces covered by bandanas and 
balaclavas, firing weapons of war while storming neighbourhoods, universities 
and even a church. Often the masked groups were filmed riding aboard 
government-owned Toyota Hilux trucks which travelled in large convoys 
protected by police vehicles.
Peaceful student demonstrations, which began as protests against cuts 
to social security, soon expanded to calls for Ortega’s resignation due to the 
government’s heavy-handed response to the protests. With the police and 
paramilitaries firing live ammunition at barricades, outgunned youths fought 
back with the weapons at their disposal, largely rocks and homemade morteros 
(mortars), an artisanal ‘weapon’ traditionally used in Nicaraguan social 
movements. In this David and Goliath struggle, youthful demonstrators 
sometimes had only slingshots with which to respond to government bullets. 
Over the coming months, Sandinista agents – both police and allied civilian 
militias – killed hundreds of Nicaraguans, wounded thousands and chased 
thousands more into exile. Most of the victims were young men in their twenties, 
while others among the dead included teenagers and even young children shot 
down by the police and paramilitaries. In addition to an estimated 300 civilians 
murdered by Ortega loyalists, approximately 22 police officers were killed by 
violent elements of the opposition. The three months of repression marked the 
deadliest wave of mass killing outside of wartime in the history of the republic. 
For outside observers, the events fit comfortably in their view of Latin American 
instability and human rights violations. Many commented on the irony that 
history seemed to be repeating itself: a political party that had first come to 
power in a youth-led uprising against a repressive dictatorship was now carrying 
R. Sierakowski, ‘‘We didn’t want to be like Somoza’s Guardia’: policing, crime and Nicaraguan 
exceptionalism’, in H. Francis (ed.), A Nicaraguan Exceptionalism? Debating the Legacy of the 
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out eerily similar violence to keep itself in power. Ortega, it was repeated, had 
betrayed the 1979 Revolution.
For those familiar with Nicaraguan history, the widespread police violence 
and state backing for death squad attacks proved perhaps even more shocking. 
Until April 2018, Nicaragua was seen as an exceptional ‘island of peace’ in 
Central America, a region in which criminal violence carried out by street gangs 
and drug traffickers are an ever-present part of daily life. Nicaragua is the second 
poorest country in the western hemisphere, but its police force has consistently 
been recognised as a regional leader in the areas of public safety, human rights 
and community policing. Whereas the ‘Northern Triangle’ of Guatemala, El 
Salvador and Honduras registered homicide rates of 26.1, 60 and 42.8 murders 
per 100,000 people respectively in 2017, in Nicaragua, the figure dropped 
to a record-breaking low of 7 per 100,000. Even the far more economically 
developed Central American country of Costa Rica had a higher homicide rate 
at 12.1 per 100,000.1 While the Nicaraguan police force was considered the 
‘most efficient and least corrupt’ in the region, that of Guatemala, El Salvador 
and Honduras competed for first place in hemispheric rankings of corruption.2 
Opinion polls from 2014 suggest that crime was a distinctly secondary problem 
for the vast majority of Nicaraguans. Whereas 53.4 per cent of Salvadorans, 
46.2 per cent of Hondurans, 37.6 per cent of Guatemalans and 18.7 per cent of 
Costa Ricans chose ‘crime’ as their most pressing concern, an infinitesimal 3.5 
per cent of Nicaraguans did so.3 In 2015, The Economist went so far as to write 
that Nicaragua’s police force, with its community policing and success against 
organised crime and gangs, was ‘in danger of giving socialism a good name’.4 
In this chapter, I argue that the outrageous scale of repression in 2018, as 
well as the decades-long reputation for low levels of crime, can be traced to 
the emergence of the country’s law enforcement structures in the aftermath 
of the 1979 Sandinista Revolution. After coming to power, the Sandinista 
National Liberation Front (FSLN) replaced the Somoza dictatorship’s corrupt 
and repressive Guardia Nacional (National Guard, GN) with the country’s 
first national police force, Policía Sandinista (Sandinista Police, PS). Former 
guerrilleros motivated by revolutionary enthusiasm – including, importantly, 
many young women – took on leadership positions in the new force. This pivotal 
moment, I argue, helped to establish a new mística (a self-sacrificing morale 
of service and voluntarism) within the police force, with a socialist vision of 
1 T. Clavel. ‘Insight Crime’s 2017 homicide round-up’, InSight Crime, 19 Jan. 2018. For earlier 
data, see World Bank, Crime and Violence in Central America: 1–2.
2 W. Grigsby, ‘¿Tenemos la Policía que nos merecemos?’, Envío, no. 290, May 2006.
3 M.F.T. Malone, ‘Why do the children flee? Public security and policing practices in Central 
America’, 3. Drawing on AmericasBarometer data from 2014, Malone shows that trust in the 
police and belief that their rights will be respected is also greatest among Nicaraguans. 
4 The Economist, ‘A broken system: crime in Latin America’, 12 July 2014.
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community policing, as well as an aversion to bribery.5 At the same time, the 
revolutionary police force was deeply politicised and drew on dense networks 
of informants for intelligence gathering and maintaining order, established 
on the model of Cuba and other communist countries. Today’s Nicaraguan 
Policía Nacional (National Police, PN) is the direct institutional successor of the 
Sandinista Police of the 1980s and heir to its legacies.
Having lived through the dramatic violence and repression of the 
dictatorship against young people in the late 1970s, the Sandinista Police 
sought to become ‘the antithesis of Somoza’s Guardia’. While for many years 
the institution proved widely successful in this endeavour, the police’s role in 
repression during the summer of 2018 revealed an organisation that closely 
mirrored Somoza’s GN in its utter loyalty to a political party and a ruling family. 
Formerly a capable, professional body with a reputation for community policing, 
the PN degenerated into a personal police force willing to countenance the 
most heinous abuses in defence of Daniel Ortega and his government. Just as 
Ortega had transformed Sandinismo from its revolutionary roots into a corrupt, 
clientelistic and personalistic political machine, so the PN itself became an arm 
of the repressive regime. 
Crime and policing before the revolution
Prior to the Sandinista Revolution, Nicaragua was dominated for more than four 
decades by the Somoza family’s dictatorship. The ruling dynasty began under the 
regime of General Anastasio Somoza García, the head of the National Guard 
created by the United States during its last military occupation of the country 
(1927–33).6 After the withdrawal of the United States, Somoza converted the 
National Guard into his own personal army, carried out a military coup and 
established a dictatorship. Following Somoza García’s assassination in 1956, he 
was succeeded as president by his sons Luis and Anastasio Somoza Debayle. Over 
their many decades of rule, the Somoza family used extensive official corruption 
to gain control over much of the country’s economy, accruing fabulous wealth. 
The GN was not loyal to the Nicaraguan nation or people, instead it operated 
as the Somoza family’s praetorian army. Given its reputation for violence, many 
foreign observers assumed that the GN ‘maintained law and order’ and effectively 
repressed crime through harsh policing.7 However, such characterisations are 
profoundly inaccurate. One of the reasons for this substantial misinterpretation 
is the fact that, as one legal scholar put it, there has been ‘remarkably little 
5 As José Miguel Cruz puts it in his comparative study, Nicaragua ‘insulated’ its police 
force ‘to some extent from criminal organisations and enabled it to construct a different 
relationship with the population’: ‘Criminal violence and democratization in Central 
America, 7.
6 R. Millett, Guardians of the Dynasty.
7 W.R. Duncan, Latin American Politics, 49.
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written about criminal justice in pre-revolutionary Nicaragua, particularly in 
the decades of control by the Somoza family’.8 
During those long years of dictatorship, Nicaragua was, in fact, exceptional 
for its high homicide rate. The country consistently ranked in the top three most 
violent nations in the world – alongside Colombia and Mexico – and, for several 
years during the 1960s, had the single highest homicide rate recorded by the 
United Nations. Between 1961 and 1967, the country’s murder rate rose from 
23.1 to 30.9 per 100,000 people.9 Nearly all of this bloodshed was not political 
but ‘social’ in nature, often alcohol-fuelled and the result of fighting between 
young and middle-aged men, whether as individuals, family groups or members 
of pandillas (gangs).
Ironically, given its reputation for iron-fisted abuse of political opponents, 
Somoza’s National Guard proved utterly ineffective at crime control. On the 
contrary, GN officers fostered an entire ‘illegal’ economy of vices run by regime 
loyalists, including prostitution, drug trafficking, gambling and bootlegging. 
The Guard tolerated these purportedly illegal activities, profiting greatly from 
kickbacks and netting thousands of córdobas in bribes each month.10 Though 
officially ‘apolitical’ and prevented from voting in Somoza’s faux elections, in 
practice all GN members were required to identify with Somocismo and support 
the dictator’s Liberal Party. 
Rather than imposing regimentation on Nicaraguan society, the Somoza 
regime fostered disorder by enabling regime loyalists to act with impunity, as 
the country’s growing poverty, unemployment and inequality gave impetus to 
criminality. In 1965, the US ambassador identified an inability to control crime 
as the GN’s greatest failing, writing that gangs ‘operated with ease in Managua 
and some of the other larger towns’.11 Another Embassy employee asserted 
two years later, ‘Law and order is non-existent in Nicaragua … it is officially 
recommended that one carry a gun if one [goes] out of the city of Managua … 
the Guardia Nacional were never really trained for police work [and] are no good 
at all as policemen.’12 American experts sent in 1970 to report on the situation of 
the GN were likewise shocked by the rising levels of violence:
Murder and aggravated assault appear to be the major criminal threat in all 
parts of the country ... There has been an increase in geometric proportions of 
common crime of an increasingly brutal character. Homes and persons have 
been violated and whole sections of Managua have become a no-man’s land at 
8 R.J. Wilson, ‘Criminal justice in revolutionary Nicaragua, 317–18.
9 United Nations and Statistical Office, Demographic Yearbook, 1960, Table 19; 1966, Table 
20; 1967, Table 24; S. Hunter Palmer, The Violent Society, 28–9; La Prensa, ‘Atribuyen a 
Nicaragua primer lugar violento’, 11 May 1968.
10 J. Pérez, Semper fidelis: el secuestro de la Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua, 46.
11 M.D. Gambone, Capturing the Revolution: The United States, Central America, and Nicaragua, 
1961–1972, 140.
12 Patrick Nicholas Theros, interview by Robert J. Alexander, Managua, 26 June 1967, in Robert 
J. Alexander Interview Collection, 1947–1994. Microfilm (Leiden, Netherlands: IDC, 2002), 
Reel 10, Frame 841. 
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night … The homicide ratio of 29.4 per 100,000 reported in 1967 was very 
high by Latin American standards and represented a 12% increase over 1964. 
A very large proportion of the population regularly go armed.13
Faced with this scourge of criminal violence and homicide, the military-based 
GN proved unable to respond. 
Particularly in the wake of the 1959 Cuban Revolution, US interest in the 
GN was focused on the promotion of counter-insurgency tactics and Cold War 
anti-communist ideology. Rather than law and order, and criminal justice, police 
and intelligence efforts were targeted at the growing revolutionary threat posed 
by the FSLN, a left-wing guerrilla group seeking to topple Somoza. The FSLN 
formed only the tip of the iceberg of a mass movement for political and social 
change, encapsulated in a vision of moral regeneration and an end to extreme 
poverty. Leading protests against the Somoza regime were student groups, 
radical labour unions and Christian organisations inspired by Catholic liberation 
theology and its ‘preferential option for the poor’. Among their proposals, the 
FSLN promised that, with the revolution, ‘Organised Crime Will Disappear 
Forever: sex trafficking, prostitution, dice tables, “illegal” gaming, the red light 
districts and all those businesses controlled by the military and the accomplices 
of Somocismo … will be swept away by the FRENTE SANDINISTA.’14 
In the face of growing popular protests and clandestine guerrilla activity 
during the late 1970s, the GN responded with ever-increasing state-sponsored 
repression and violence, ranging from tear gas to bullets and bombs. In 
Managua, the highly repressive Colonel Alesio Gutiérrez served as chief of police 
and was responsible for the systematic torture of political prisoners. In the wake 
of the September 1978 armed insurrection led by the Sandinistas, the Guardia 
began carrying out large-scale massacres of the youth of the cities in so-called 
Operaciones de Limpieza (clean-up operations). As many who lived through 
this period recall, it soon became ‘a crime to be young’.15 In the countryside, 
the Guardia similarly committed mass killings in those areas where the FSLN 
was operating. This indiscriminate and chaotic terror, however, generated a 
countervailing force as the urban youth threw in their lot with the guerrilla 
army in an open civil war against the GN. Guardia units and paramilitary death 
squads murdered thousands of Nicaraguans over the coming months. On 17 July 
1979, a cornered Anastasio Somoza Debayle finally fled the country. Without 
13 D.R. Powell and K.B. Youngs, Report of the Public Safety Program and the Nicaragua National 
Guard, 20–1.
14 Lucha Sandinista, ‘¿Por qué lucha el FSLN junto al pueblo?’, June 1978.
15 M. Solaún, ‘Atrocity Summary’, US Embassy Cable 4541, 22 Sept. 1978; M. Solaún, 
‘n/a’, US Embassy Cable 5053, 13 Oct. 1978; M. Solaún ‘Draft Nicaragua Human Rights 
Report’, US Embassy Cable 5871, 15 Nov. 1978, Wikileaks PlusD Database; Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights, Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Nicaragua: 
Findings of the ‘On-Site’ Observation in the Republic of Nicaragua, October 3–12, 1978, 43; G. 
Black, Triumph of the People: The Sandinista Revolution in Nicaragua, 132–3; J.A. Booth, The 
End and the Beginning: The Nicaraguan Revolution, 173.
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the dictator at the helm, his Guardia collapsed, as members of its units fled for 
the borders to escape the FSLN and popular indignation.
‘Guardians of the people’s happiness’: revolution and 
policing, 1979–1990
In the wake of the revolutionary upheaval, the Sandinistas took control of a 
country in great turmoil with an economy largely in ruins. During this early 
period, the triumphant guerrillas – mostly in their teens and early twenties – 
were incapable of stemming criminality and maintaining public order. Managua 
and other large towns were rocked by ‘armed robberies of houses and businesses 
by those who took advantage of the material limitations and lack of experience in 
police work … in the wake of Somoza’s departure’.16 During 1980 alone, 38,781 
crimes were recorded, a rate of 106 per day. The vast majority of these offences 
went unpunished.17 
With the National Guard gone, the Sandinistas were uniquely positioned 
to start from scratch and completely reimagine what a Central American 
police force could be. To meet the threat of social chaos head-on, the FSLN 
established the new Sandinista Police mainly made up of former guerrilla fighters 
in September 1979. ‘We didn’t know how to be police,’ national Chief Aminta 
Granera recalled two decades later. ‘We only knew that we didn’t want to be 
like the Somozan Guard.’18 Importantly, the Sandinista leadership made an 
early decision to split the police and army into separate bodies – one military, 
one civilian – rather than continuing the constabulary model of the Somoza 
period. On 9 August 1980, Decree 485 officially instituted the Sandinista 
Police, declaring the institution responsible for the prevention, neutralisation 
and solution of crime.19 Placed under the control of the Ministerio del Interior 
(interior ministry, MINT) and led by FSLN Comandante Tomás Borge, the PS 
created new divisions in areas such as traffic control, public safety, surveillance 
and prisons. Former guerrilla commander René Vivas Lugo was named the first 
national police chief.20 
Given the GN’s lack of efficacy at police work or controlling common crime, 
the PS found almost no material legacy on which to build. Digging through the 
paperwork of the GN’s police stations across the country, they found few detailed 
police records, no systematic archives of criminals nor even a single study of basic 
crime statistics.21 The PS needed to quickly educate a thousand women and men 
16 La Prensa, ‘Empeora la ola de delincuencia’, 7 Dec. 1979.
17 V. Núñez de Escorcia, ‘Justice and the control of crime in the Sandinista popular revolution’, 
11.
18 Economist, ‘A surprising safe haven: crime in Nicaragua’, 28 Jan. 2012.
19 Corte Suprema de Justica, Nicaragua, La justicia en la revolución: memoria del seminario 
jurídico Silvio Mayorga, May 1981,196–7.
20 Barricada, ‘Reestructuran Policía Nacional Sandinista’, 28 Oct. 1980.
21 Barricada, ‘Batalla contra la delincuencia’, 24 Dec. 1980.
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in order to carry out these basic tasks. During its first months of existence, the 
new force was trained and equipped by the Panamanian government of General 
Omar Torrijos.22 However, rather quickly the PS came under the influence of 
the FSLN’s closest regional ally, Fidel Castro’s Cuba. Since their own revolution 
two decades earlier, Cuba had established a model of community policing and 
surveillance that the Sandinistas now adopted in developing their new police 
academy.23 
Though increasingly professional in orientation, the PS was highly politicised 
and inspired by the era’s revolutionary fervour. Shortly after its foundation, 
Comandante Borge referred to the PS as the centinelas de la felicidad del pueblo 
(guardians of the people’s happiness) and declared, ‘love and good relations with 
the people is what should distinguish the Sandinista Police’.24 Members were 
taught to see themselves as ‘new men’ and ‘new women’ who were to serve as the 
vanguard of the emerging socialist society. Police officers conceived of themselves 
as possessed of la mística revolucionaria, characterised as a transcendent mission 
that emphasised sacrifice, solidarity, humanism and human rights.25 Police chief 
René Vivas declared in 1980, ‘the fundamental work that we face is to politically 
and morally prepare each of our members and turn them into true servants of 
the Nicaraguan people’.26 A remarkable institutional culture developed which 
celebrated service and scorned self-interest, from petty bribery to large-scale 
enrichment. The new PS, the ruling party proudly stated, ‘will be an example 
for the world’.27 
Most of those who joined the new force during the 1980s were enthusiastic 
young people who had participated in the struggle against Somoza and were 
passionate about achieving social transformation. Notably, a large number of 
young female revolutionaries now enlisted as police officers, while their male 
counterparts gravitated in larger numbers to the newly formed army (Ejército 
Popular Sandinista, EPS). By 1985, fully 45 per cent of PS members were female. 
Between 1985 and 1988, former FSLN guerrilla leader Doris Tijerino Haslam 
– who had been tortured by Somoza’s GN – served as the first female national 
22 La Prensa, ‘Nueva Policía’, 11 Aug. 1980; F.J. Bautista Lara, Policía, seguridad ciudadana y 
violencia en Nicaragua: breves ensayos y un testimonio, 19; Policía Nacional de Nicaragua, Una 
historia que merece ser contada: Modernización institucional con equidad de género en la Policía 
Nacional de Nicaragua, 1996–2005, 15–16.
23 Policía Nacional de Nicaragua, Sistematización del Modelo Policial Comunitario Proactivo de 
Nicaragua, 13–14. The Police Academy was later named after Walter Mendoza Martinez, 
a Sandinista guerrilla killed shortly before the fall of Somoza. 
24 La Prensa, ‘Nueva Policía’, 11 Aug. 1979.
25 B. van de Velde, ‘Revolutionary policing: a case study about the role of La Mística and El 
Espíritu in the Nicaraguan police institution and in the lives of its fundadores’, Master’s diss., 
Utrecht University, 2011.
26 Patria Libre, ‘La Policía Sandinista cumple con la revolución: entrevista con el Comandante 
René Vivas’, May 1980, 32. 
27 Barricada, ‘Policía Sandinista será un ejemplo para el mundo’, 15 Aug. 1980.
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police chief in the world.28 With women representing a significant proportion of 
the new police force, the contrast with neighbouring nations, where the police 
corps continued to be almost universally male, was remarkable. Of course, for 
a society steeped in centuries of machismo and decades of military dictatorship 
under the GN, interacting with young female police officers was a paradigm 
shift. Visitors to Nicaragua after the revolution remarked on the ‘night and day’ 
change they found, with the police no longer being feared as threatening who 
expected bribes.29 Police chief Doris Tijerino boasted in 1986 that, ‘bribes have 
been completely eliminated whereas before, for example, no one was ever fined 
for a traffic infraction’.30 The PS dramatically curtailed human rights abuses and 
the use of violence in everyday interactions with the public. 
Neighbourhood watch groups known as Comités de Defensa Sandinista 
(Sandinista Defence Committees, CDS) participated actively in the fight against 
crime. These had emerged during the revolution itself, as neighbours organised 
to support the guerrillas with food, water, information and medical supplies. 
Now they began patrolling their communities 24 hours a day in vigilancia 
revolucionaria (revolutionary guard duty) to bring crime under control and 
keep a watch out for ‘counterrevolutionary sabotage’.31 In May 1980, the PS 
launched Operation Death to Criminality with the aim of eradicating gangs, 
closing illegal brothels and shuttering the cantinas that had been focal points of 
violence since the Somoza era. In Managua, 140 cantinas were shut down for 
‘constant scandals and not following liquor laws or standards of hygiene and 
morality’.32 More than 30 brothels located in the Mercado Oriental, the city’s 
primary market, were shut down and many were burnt to the ground.33 ‘El Palo 
de Gato’, for instance, an infamous Managua brothel formerly controlled by the 
GN and a scene of violence for decades, was among those publicly demolished. 
The FSLN newspaper Barricada announced plans to use the remains of ‘El Palo’ 
to construct a school for literacy classes.34 The government tackled prostitution 
28 Barricada, ‘Doris: primera jefa de policía del mundo’, 3 Apr. 1985. She would pay particular 
attention to crimes of sexual violence, with the PS allegedly solving 23 out of 25 rape cases 
that took place between Sept. and Dec. 1985, La Prensa. ‘Declaraciones de la Comandante 
Tijerino, acerca de abusos sexuales’, 11 Dec. 1985.
29 L.A. Mansilla, ‘Nicaragua: la insurrección y la guerra victoriosa. Entrevista a Octavio Cortés’, 
38. A 1,000 córdoba fine and a punishment were imposed on anyone who attempted to bribe 
a police officer. Those officers who did accept bribes faced removal from the force. Barricada, 
‘Multa y arresto a quien intente a sobornar policia’, 16 Jan. 1980; Barricada, ‘Policía ejemplar 
rechazó soborno’, 1 Sept. 1980. 
30 G. Beretta, ‘Nicaragua: una mujer en un puesto de decisión. Entrevista a Doris Tijerino’, 22.
31 W.G. West, ‘Vigilancia revolucionaria: a Nicaraguan resolution to public and private 
policing’, 147–71; Barricada, ‘Fuerzas auxiliaries ayudarán a la Policía’, 17 Aug. 1980. 
32 Barricada, ‘Cierran 140 cantinas’, 6 June 1980; Barricada, ‘Cierran cantinas en un operativo’, 
5 Sept. 1980. 
33 La Prensa, ‘Policía desata guerra a la prostitución’, 21 June 1980. 
34 Barricada, ‘De centros de vicios a locales escolares; se acabó el Palo de Gato’, 14 May 1980.
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and alcoholism as social ills and provided many former prostitutes with new 
training and employment opportunities.35 
These community-based policing campaigns worked in tandem with the 
social reforms instigated to dramatically improve the crime situation. In 1981, 
there were 26,624 volunteer vigilantes in 84 different Managua neighbourhoods, 
helping to reduce crime by more than half compared to the previous year.36 
Between 1981 and 1982, the crime rate halved again, to a rate even lower than 
pre-revolutionary figures.37 By November of the following year, according to the 
FSLN’s official organ, the Defence Committees had more than 60,000 vigilantes 
revolucionarios in Managua volunteering to patrol the streets.38 Between 1980 
and 1983, the number of crimes committed per 100,000 people fell from 106 
to just 29.39 As part of these operations, La Prensa reported that the police 
had broken up powerful street gangs in the Managua barrios of San Judas 
35 T. Borge, ‘Intervención ante los CDS de Managua, 26 de febrero de 1981’, in his Los primeros 
pasos: la revolución popular sandinista (Siglo XXI, 1988), 129.
36 Barricada, ‘Las masas han reducido a la mitad a la delincuencia’, 29 Nov. 1981.
37 Barricada, ‘Disminuyeron delitos por la vigilancia revolucionaria’, 7 Apr. 1981. Barricada, 
‘Recuento de la lucha contra la delincuencia’, 3 Dec. 1982; Núñez de Escorcia, ‘Justice and 
the control of crime in the Sandinista popular revolution’, 11.
38 Barricada, ‘Ya tenemos 60 mil vigilantes en Managua’, 21 Nov. 1982. 
39 A. Granera Sacasa and S. Cuarezma Terán, Evolución del delito en Nicaragua, 1980–1995, 24.
Figure 1.1. ‘Courtesy and respect for the law are inseparable’. ‘A man who does not respect 
a woman is a coward. A man who does not respect a young female police officer (una 
muchacha policía) and does not follow her instructions is twice as cowardly and also an 
enemy of the law.’ (Tomás Borge) (Image: Barricada, 14 Sept. 1980)
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and Altagracia.40 This success coincided with the FSLN’s similar use of mass 
mobilisation to carry out improvements in healthcare and education for poor 
Nicaraguans, such as the 1980 National Literacy Crusade which considerably 
increased literacy rates in the country. 
The darker side of this community-centred approach was the PS’s adoption 
of illiberal surveillance and intelligence-gathering methods. Nicaraguan police 
officers were regularly sent to communist countries such as the Soviet Union, 
East Germany and Bulgaria to receive training.41 The security forces of those 
governments, like that of Cuba, were infamous for heavy-handed monitoring and 
spying on their populations. These techniques included widespread tapping of 
phone lines, the opening of mail and the use of thousands of government loyalists 
and paid informants to spy for the state. While this approach was effective in 
controlling the activities of organised crime and counter-revolutionary groups in 
Nicaragua, the government regularly infringed the civil liberties and privacy of 
dissidents and other citizens. At times, the PS and Defence Committees worked 
hand-in-glove with the government’s Dirección General de Seguridad del Estado 
(secret police, DGSE), operating as the ‘eyes and ears’ of the ruling party and 
targeting opposition activists for arrest.
As the decade proceeded, Nicaragua became a battleground in the Cold 
War. American President Ronald Reagan used the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) to provide financial and military aid to the rebel Contras (or 
contrarrevolucionarios), many of whom were former GN soldiers, to destabilise 
Nicaragua. To beat back the invasion, the FSLN instituted a military draft for 
young men aged between 17 and 24 and dedicated more than half of its annual 
budget to military defence. With the economy under great strain due to the 
bloody civil war and a US embargo, the country saw spiralling inflation, rising 
poverty and the roll-out of rationing. Many Nicaraguans refused to attend CDS 
meetings or volunteer for vigilancia, accusing these institutions of abuses against 
their neighbours. Amid political polarisation, citizens denounced the Sandinista 
Police for harassing opposition protesters, while permitting riotous attacks by 
pro-government mobs.42 During these years of economic crisis, the country 
witnessed a steady rise in crime and violence, as robberies, prostitution and 
drug use once again became ever more prevalent in the cities.43 Boys and young 
men in Managua’s shantytowns again formed gangs and clashed violently with 
youths from other barrios, although not on the scale of the Somoza period.44 The 
40 La Prensa, ‘Cinco mil delitos comunes en primer semestre de 1982’, 2 July 1982.
41 D. Kruijt, Guerrillas: War and Peace in Central America, 109; R. Vivas Lugo, ‘Todos los 
gobiernos han instrumentalizado a la policía para sus intereses’, Envío, no. 351, June 2011.
42 La Prensa, ‘Policía sandinista culatea al pueblo’, 11 July 1988; Demokratizatsiya, ‘Tropical 
Chekists: the secret police legacy in Nicaragua’, 429.
43 Sacasa and Terán, Evolución del delito en Nicaragua, 25–6; J.L. Rocha, ‘Why no Maras in 
Nicaragua?’, Envío, no. 301, Aug. 2006.
44 L. Grove, ‘Rebels without a Cause in Managua’, Washington Post, 10 Aug. 1986.
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overstretched and underfunded PS appeared incapable of keeping up with the 
social and political consequences of external aggression and civil war.
Revolutionary police under neoliberal governments,  
1990–2006
With continuing economic dislocation and the highly unpopular military 
draft still in place, the Sandinistas were voted from office in February 1990, 
effectively bringing Nicaragua’s revolutionary period to an end. The victory of 
Violeta Chamorro, the candidate of a united opposition, over FSLN standard-
bearer President Daniel Ortega, precipitated the enactment of a series of 
sweeping political and economic reforms. During the transition, the future of 
the Sandinista police and army became a critical bone of contention. For some, 
these arms of the party-state needed to be abolished and replaced by new, clean 
institutions. However, the FSLN assured the survival of the police and army in 
the post-revolutionary era by agreeing to ‘depoliticise’ and ‘institutionalise’ these 
one-time partisan bodies that were now under the civilian control of the newly 
elected government. Interestingly, creative tensions between the ‘reformed’ police 
and the conservative governments of the 1990s and 2000s helped to produce an 
internationally recognised model of public safety and efficient policing.
The Sandinista Police was now renamed the Nicaraguan National Police 
(PN) to emphasise its allegiance to the country as a whole rather than to a 
particular party. Police uniforms and insignia were changed and responsibility 
for law enforcement was transferred from the Ministerio del Interior to the 
Ministerio de Gobernación. Subsequent laws in 1992 and 1996 further solidified 
the police’s new ‘civilian, professional, apolitical, nonpartisan’ character. The 
operations of the police force were constitutionally linked directly to the 
functioning of the judiciary, rather than state security.45 Despite efforts to 
introduce non-partisan officers, the transition was limited as Sandinista officers 
continued to be hegemonic in both law enforcement and the military during the 
years of opposition rule. By retaining its control over these armed institutions, 
the Sandinistas continued to possess a power base within the state even after 
defeat at the ballot box.
The first significant test for the PN came in the early 1990s when Sandinista-
led student and trade union protests exploded in response to neoliberal economic 
reforms. When some in the PN leadership refused to crack down on their 
former comrades-in-arms, the Chamorro government removed them from their 
positions. In 1992, under US pressure, 12 top Sandinista figures, including PN 
chief René Vivas, were purged from the police force and replaced by pliable 
officials more willing to use force.46 In the violent strikes that took place 
45 R. Cajina, ‘Reforma del sector seguridad ciudadana, transición política y construcción 
democrática. Ley 290 y Ley 228’, 35–57; O.J. Pérez, Civil-Military Relations in Post-Conflict 
Societies: Transforming the Role of the Military in Central America, 74–5.
46 La Prensa, ‘Cambios en la Policía’, 5 Sept. 1992; La Prensa, ‘Estados Unidos elogia jefatura 
civil de la policía’, 9 Sept. 1992.
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between 1992 and 1995, at times the PN carried out harsh abuses in the course 
of their bloody clashes with left-wing protesters, which left a small number of 
demonstrators and police dead.47 Still, Tomás Borge insisted in retrospect, ‘the 
police survived the efforts of the ultra-right to make it a deadly force … Its 
essence was unchanged; the police force remains good despite all the efforts 
to change it; it still has a Sandinista mística.’48 Herein lay a contradiction that 
would have long-term consequences: the fact that the police were still opposed 
to Guardia-style repression against social protests was at least partially due to its 
latent loyalty to the political party leading the upheaval. 
Some long-time members of the police, however, felt that significant budget 
cuts and the new political context had led to a decline in solidarity within the 
force. The PN shrank substantially in size and closed its academy between 1990 
and 1994. Female police officers complained that amid the individualism and 
careerism of the period, they were passed over in favour of their male colleagues, 
while ambitious officers lacking the ideological commitment of the PS’s founding 
generation ascended to leadership positions. The government slashed salaries 
further and there was a notable and much-commented-on rise in petty bribery 
by traffic cops. While some individual members of the police force engaged in 
drug trafficking and vice rackets, such corruption never reached the scale of 
neighbouring countries.49
The period following the FSLN’s exit from power and the end of the civil war 
also saw rapidly increasing crime and homicide rates which, starting in 1993, 
began to spiral out of control.50 Mass layoffs in the privatised state sector, as well 
as the abrupt demobilisation of thousands of young men from both the EPS and 
the Contra forces, helped to foster mass unemployment in the country. By 1995, 
the police were recording an average of at least one murder and one rape reported 
every 24 hours.51 At the start of the decade, 47 youth gangs were operating 
in Managua, such as the Comemuertos (Eaters of the Dead), a well-armed and 
violent group active in the Reparto Schick neighbourhood. By 1999, there were 
more than a hundred gangs exceeding 6,000 members.52 
47 Barricada, ‘Presidenta ordena uso de la fuerza’, 10 July 1990; Barricada, ‘Matan a jefe 
policial’, 22 Sept. 1993; La Prensa, ‘Saúl Alvarez víctima de la violencia; cayó a los pies de un 
periodista’, 22 Sept. 1993; Barricada, ‘Informe de CENIDH es contundente’, 2 June 1995.
48 Cajina, ‘Security in Nicaragua: Central America’s exception’, 4–5.
49 La Prensa, ‘Escándalo narco sacude al gobierno’, 6 May 1998; Grigsby, ‘¿Tenemos la Policía 
que nos merecemos?’
50 La Prensa, ‘Hampa se apodera de Managua’, 7 May 1993; La Prensa, ‘No habrá control de ola 
delictiva en 1994’, 2 Nov. 1994. 
51 La Prensa, ‘El crimen: acontecer diario’, 15 July 1995; Barricada, ‘Una violación cada 24 
horas’, 10 Apr. 1995.
52 D. Rodgers, ‘Youth gangs and violence in Latin America and the Caribbean: a literature 
survey’, 19; J.L. Rocha, Violencia juvenil y orden social en el Reparto Schick: Juventud marginada 
y relación con el estado, 9–10; J. Hernández Pico, ‘Juventudes en territorios de violencias’, 
Envío, no. 398, May 2015.
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In its upsurge of post-war violence, Nicaragua was far from unique. During 
these same years, a parallel increase in criminal gangs was underway in El 
Salvador and Guatemala as their lengthy Cold War-era armed conflicts also 
came to an end. Gangs like the Mara Salvatrucha-13 (MS-13) and the Mara-
18 quickly emerged and gave cause for significant social and security concern 
in Central America. This development was at least partially a result of patterns 
of transnational migration. Large numbers of poor and rural Guatemalan and 
Salvadoran refugees had fled their countries during the 1980s to Los Angeles, 
California, where many of their undocumented children became immersed 
in that city’s violent youth gang culture. Upon deportation from the United 
States during the 1990s, these young men helped to bring new forms of criminal 
violence back to Central America. 
While El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua had all experienced 
high homicide rates dating back decades, Nicaragua alone was able to reduce 
levels of criminality during the 1990s. Importantly, many of those who fled 
Nicaragua to the United States in the 1980s were members of the middle and 
upper classes who settled in Miami and were granted political asylum due to 
American opposition to the FSLN. Thus, large-scale deportations of alleged 
criminals from the United States were not among the challenges faced by the 
Nicaraguan security forces as they battled the expansion of crime in the 1990s.53
More important than migratory patterns, I argue, is the fact that the 
Nicaraguan police drew upon its revolutionary legacy and responded to the 
explosion of youth gangs using completely different strategies to those employed 
in the neighbouring republics. In those countries, where the police forces of 
the previous military dictatorships remained largely unreformed, the state 
used heavy-handed Mano Dura (iron fist) tactics which, at times, came close to 
targeting urban youth and the poor as a means of social cleansing. In addition to 
significant human rights violations against impoverished barrios, an unintended 
consequence of this state repression was the increasing militarisation of street 
gangs. Substantial sectors of the Northern Triangle police and security forces 
continued their complicity with the criminal activity and international drug 
trafficking which had begun under right-wing military regimes. In Nicaragua, 
on the other hand, the PN emphasised prevention and rehabilitation over 
outright police violence, even during Liberal President Arnoldo Alemán’s 
declared ‘war against gangs’ in 1999.54 These Nicaraguan gangs, known as 
pandillas, were neighbourhood-based groups that had never evolved into the 
feared transnational maras operating elsewhere in the isthmus. The founders 
of the Nicaraguan police force still ‘didn’t want to be like Somoza’s Guardia’, 
53 Rocha, ‘Why no Maras in Nicaragua?’ 
54 La Prensa, ‘Declaran la guerra a pandillas’, 7 July 1999. According to José Luis Rocha, the 
PN was divided between Sandinista officers who aimed to continue the community-oriented 
model and ‘economic elites’ who pushed for more of a Mano Dura approach. J.L. Rocha, 
‘The political economy of Nicaragua’s institutional and organisational framework for dealing 
with youth violence’, 3.
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and the PN maintained its opposition to harsh policies targeting the youth and 
working-class barrios.
Despite having the smallest security budget and the lowest police salaries 
in the region, criminality in Nicaragua quickly fell to levels more comparable 
with Costa Rica’s than the countries of the Northern Triangle.55 Maras from 
Honduras and El Salvador were unable to make inroads into Nicaragua. 
By 2007, the Nicaraguan government reported that only 20 gangs were 
operating in the country.56 As they had done since the 1980s, the Nicaraguan 
police recognised the need to address youth criminality at the level of its social 
causes. The police worked with ‘at-risk’ youth via their schools, families, churches 
and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) like el Centro de Prevención 
(CEPREV).57 ‘Warring’ groups of teenagers signed peace treaties, and youth 
sports leagues were established to provide a recreational outlet. In the process, 
the PN came to rely upon nearly 100,000 volunteers in its crime prevention 
efforts, including university students, psychologists and former gang members. 
Given its legacy of experimental ‘open’ and ‘semi-open’ prisons and cultural 
and literacy programmes for prisoners during the 1980s, Nicaragua also 
increasingly bucked ‘the regional punitive trend’, with notably lower sentences 
handed down to prisoners than in neighbouring countries.58 With many prisons 
run by former revolutionaries, ‘participation in reeducational programmes, 
which range[d] from schooling to cultural and church activities’ was ‘often 
rewarded with considerable sentence reduction’.59 In their efforts to dismantle 
the street gangs, the PN could also draw upon intelligence provided by the 
dense organisational network of grassroots party activists at the community and 
neighbourhood levels forged during the revolutionary years. These one-time 
‘eyes and ears of the revolution’ continued to serve as informants who provided 
detailed reconnaissance on gang activities to their Sandinista handlers in the PN.
Instead of the former Eastern Bloc countries, the PN now received training 
from Sweden, Spain and even the United States.60 These years also witnessed a 
significant shift in the contributions of women to the police force. New attempts 
were made to provide services directly to women and children, beginning with 
the innovative Comisaría de la Mujer y la Niñez in 1993, which expanded over 
55 Barricada, ‘Policía nica es la peor pagada; entre los demás cuerpos de Centroamérica y Belice’, 
3 Aug. 1997.
56 Ministerio de Gobernación y Policía Nacional de Nicaragua, ‘Atención y tratamiento a las 
pandillas’ 6.
57 Policía Nacional de Nicaragua, Sistematización del Modelo Policial Comunitario Proactivo de 
Nicaragua; J.L. Rocha, ‘From telescopic to microscopic: three youth gang members speak’, 
Envío, no. 311, June 2007.
58 J. Weegels, ‘Prisoner self-governance and survival in a Nicaraguan city jail’, Prison Service 
Journal, 229 (Jan. 2017).
59 Ibid. As Weegels notes, this has not prevented the ever-present violence or overcrowding, 
but it has mitigated it to some extent. 
60 R. Vivas Lugo, ‘Todos los gobiernos han instrumentalizado a la policía para sus intereses’, 
Envío, no. 351, June 2011.
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time into a nationwide network of special female-run police stations that dealt 
exclusively with sexual, family and gender-based violence.61 The PN went beyond 
merely integrating women, even establishing a Gender Council to assure all 
women on the force they would have the same opportunities for advancement 
as male officers.62 Rather than serving solely as secretaries, receptionists and 
cooks, women participated at all levels in all branches and divisions. At the 
top level of the organisation’s leadership, Eva Sacasa was appointed general 
commissioner and Aminta Granera, first commissioner.63 A prominent female 
leader, First Commissioner Granera was one of the most popular public figures 
in the country for a long time. From a well-to-do family based in the city of 
León, she studied sociology, philosophy and theology at Georgetown University 
and, after briefly studying to become a nun, joined the Sandinista guerrillas. 
During the late 2000s and early 2010s, Granera received much of the credit for 
the PN’s success. 
With its efficacy in staving off the spread of organised crime, the PN was 
celebrated both domestically and internationally for its accomplishments and 
its model of community policing. Even conservative President Enrique Bolaños 
began to sing the praises of the erstwhile Sandinista Police in his bid for foreign 
investment. He proudly repeated that Nicaragua was ‘without a doubt, the 
safest country in Central America and maybe in all of Latin America’, if not ‘the 
safest country in the hemisphere’.64 While such claims certainly overreached, 
Nicaragua was now widely considered a Central American exception when it 
came to questions of policing, crime, violence and public safety. 
Perverting the police: Daniel Ortega returns to  
office, 2007–18
In 2007 Sandinista leader and perennial presidential candidate Daniel Ortega 
returned to the presidency after 16 years out of office. The man who returned 
to office bore little resemblance to the radical militant of the 1980s. In 2000, 
he had entered into a power-sharing alliance with his right-wing foe, Liberal 
President Arnoldo Alemán. With the judiciary packed with party loyalists,65 
Alemán avoided jail time on corruption charges, and Ortega likewise was able 
to ensure that he would not face trial for sexual abuse allegations brought by 
his stepdaughter. While still using the language of ‘socialism’, the FSLN leader 
cut deals with the private sector and foreign investors, and was denounced for 
61 La Prensa, ‘Crean Comisaría de la Mujer’, 9 Mar. 1993; Barricada, ‘Inauguran comisaría de la 
mujer y la niñez’, 26 Nov. 1993.
62 La Prensa, ‘Mujeres policías crean su consejo’, 9 Mar. 1996; Policía Nacional de Nicaragua, 
Una historia que merece ser contada: Modernización institucional con equidad de género en la 
Policía Nacional de Nicaragua, 1996–2005. 
63 La Prensa, ‘Policía tendrá dos nuevas comandantes el 5 de septiembre’, 26 Aug. 1995.
64 La Prensa, ‘Somos el país más seguro’, 6 Sept. 2004; El Nuevo Diario, ‘Bolaños ve ‘avalancha 
de inversiones’ en Nicaragua’, 6 Dec. 2005. 
65 E. Martínez Barahona, ‘A politicized judiciary’.
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the massive personal enrichment of his family and inner circle. Despite charges 
of creeping authoritarianism and corruption, the new Sandinista government 
soon earned widespread backing among the population due to the country’s 
economic success and increased social spending in comparison to the neoliberal 
governments. 
Despite corrupt high jinks at the highest levels of government, the PN 
continued to be lauded internationally for its role as a muro de contención (shield 
or wall) preventing the spread of drugs northwards and maras southwards. 
The levels of common crime and homicide rates continued to fall. During the 
2006 presidential campaign, US Ambassador Paul Trivelli warned in secret that 
former president Ortega had provided protection to Colombian drug-traffickers 
in the 1980s and could do so again if re-elected.66 Following his return to 
office, however, Ortega and the PN proved to be loyal partners of the US Drug 
Enforcement Agency (DEA) in its interdiction operations along the Atlantic 
Coast. Trivelli reported that, contrary to his predictions, during Ortega’s first 12 
months back in power, the Nicaraguan government had:
achieved its highest level of annual narcotics seizures to date and proved 
to be an effective choke-point against traffickers of illegal narcotics, arms, 
and immigrants transiting through the region. Nicaragua also utilizes a 
community-policing model that has been successful in preventing the rise of 
national-level gang activities.67
Coming (in private) from an ambassador so vehemently opposed to the 
Sandinista government, this was high praise indeed. 
Under Ortega’s government, however, the PN’s allegedly apolitical and 
nonpartisan nature was progressively destroyed. As we have seen, from its very 
foundation the police force had identified with a particular political project. 
This allegiance was maintained, despite ‘professionalisation’ and loyal service to 
administrations from different parties. With the return of the FSLN to power, 
however, the PN began to lose any institutional independence. As Ortega set 
about establishing an expansive network of patronage and corruption among 
party loyalists, the police were not immune to his perversion of the Sandinista 
legacy. Rumours abounded of police officers and other government supporters 
promised immunity for their illicit activities (such as drug trafficking), much 
as in Somoza’s time. It became increasingly clear that to be a police officer 
required one to display allegiance to Daniel Ortega and his wife, Rosario 
Murillo. Ortega quickly placed loyal officials in top positions, forced those 
who wavered into retirement, and illegally allowed allies to remain in office 
beyond their constitutionally mandated limits. Reforms to the Constitution 
and to the new Police Law 872 in 2014 officially defined Nicaragua’s policing 
66 P. Trivelli, ‘Nicaragua’s most wanted Part I: the crimes of Daniel Ortega and his family’, US 
Embassy Cable 1002, 5 May 2006, Wikileaks PlusD Database; P. Trivelli, ‘Nicaragua’s most 
wanted Part II: the crimes of the Sandinistas (FSLN)’, US Embassy Cable 1003, 5 May 2006, 
Wikileaks PlusD Database. 
67 P. Trivelli, ‘Central American security requirements: Nicaragua’, US Embassy Cable 2593, 
14 Dec. 2007, Wikileaks PlusD Database.
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as following ‘a preventative, proactive and community-based model’, thus 
codifying the approach developed over three decades of practice. However, the 
2014 law, which declared him to be Supreme Chief of the PN, also greatly 
expanded Ortega’s hold over the police force. Rather than reporting to the 
interior minister, the PN now took its orders directly from the President of the 
Republic. Sidelining broader civilian control, Ortega gained the personal ability, 
among many other new powers, to assign and retire police chiefs, extend officials 
in their roles for years without limit, and to assign members of the police force to 
serve in civil institutions.68 The loyalty of the police was now to the head of the 
political faction to which its high command was universally aligned. Within the 
police, the worst aspects of its Sandinista legacy were accentuated in the form of 
a fanatical loyalty to ‘el Comandante’. Campaign posters for the FSLN and pro-
government iconography began appearing in police stations and the Sandinista 
hymn was sung alongside the national and police anthems. 
A similar process of cooptation of government branches took place as 
Ortega loyalists dominated the military, the judiciary, the electoral system, the 
municipalities and the legislature. As Ortega was unconstitutionally re-elected 
twice in questionable elections (with First Lady Rosario Murillo becoming his 
vice-president in 2016), the repoliticisation of the PN under party control ran 
parallel to a generalised deterioration of its efficacy as an impartial force of law 
and order. While common crime rates continued to decline, a series of violent 
incidents led critics to challenge the effectiveness and autonomy of the police in 
its response to political conflicts. On repeated occasions, the PN stood idly by 
while armed government supporters – including paid gang members – attacked 
representatives of the political opposition during social and electoral protests. 
In 2014, during demonstrations against plans for an interoceanic canal on the 
Atlantic Coast, as well as mobilisations against the mining industry in Mina El 
Limón, the PN was called in to ‘impose order’. Its excessive intervention was 
described by analyst and former police officer Elvira Cuadra Lira as constituting 
‘intimidation, illegal detentions, denunciations of torture, and the militarization 
of communities’.69 In 2016, even the internationally celebrated police stations 
for women and children mentioned above were closed on the orders of a man 
who had been himself disturbingly accused of sexual abuse.70
Commissioner Aminta Granera’s unconstitutional role at the head of the 
PN for more than a decade was further evidence of political distortions. As 
68 E. Cuadra Lira, ‘Reformas del sector seguridad en Nicaragua – cambios significativos en el 
paradigma de la seguridad’; R. Orozco, ‘¿El país más seguro de Centroamérica? La politización 
de las instituciones es el mayor riesgo a nuestra seguridad’, Envío, 33, no. 390, Sept. 2014; R. 
Orozco, ‘La Policía Nacional se ha desnaturalizado para garantizar la seguridad del régimen’, 
Envío, no. 402, Sept. 2015.
69 E. Cuadra Lira, ‘El nuevo protagonismo militar: Fuerzas armadas y poder’.
70 These branches later reopened in a far less-specialised form. La Prensa, ‘Comisarías pasarían 
a Auxilio Judicial como parte de cambios en la Policía Nacional’, 29 Jan. 2016; La Prensa, 
‘¿Adiós a las Comisarías?’, 31 Jan. 2016; La Prensa, ‘Demandan al Gobierno a que reabra las 
Comisarías de la Mujer’, 15 Sept. 2017.
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noted above, Granera had become a much-loved public figure as a result of 
the police’s renowned efficacy. Indeed, some even floated the idea of her as a 
potential presidential successor to Ortega. However, a secret US Embassy cable 
(released by WikiLeaks) of an interview between Granera and US Ambassador 
Robert Callahan provided a rare insight into the conflicts within the Ortega 
government. According to Callahan’s report, Granera allegedly told the American 
Embassy that Ortega was ‘completely crazy and a threat to the country’, and that 
her popularity was the only thing that protected her from being purged for a 
more compliant loyalist.71 Interestingly, for years after this conversation was 
made public, Ortega maintained Commissioner Granera in her position at the 
head of the PN, even after she had attempted to resign and much of her power 
had been transferred to Ortega confidant, Francisco Díaz. There were whispers 
that she had begun personally profiting from her role, in much the same way as 
other high-ranking Sandinistas had enriched themselves during FSLN’s tenure. 
Others believed that she was being blackmailed or otherwise held hostage in her 
position. Indeed, she served in that job for well over a decade, far exceeding the 
five-year tenure followed by all previous police chiefs.72 She would only depart 
– in disgrace – after the 2018 wave of political violence.
In fact, the political opposition increasingly targeted the figure of Granera 
for criticism. In July 2015, police carrying out anti-drug trafficking operations 
in the neighbourhood of Las Jagüitas in Managua opened fire on a vehicle 
they mistakenly believed to be transporting cocaine. In the process, they killed 
an innocent young woman and two children.73 The incident shocked the 
Nicaraguan public and raised serious questions as to the tactics the PN was 
using in its successful ‘War on Drugs’. The tragedy was quickly politicised. As 
a weeping Granera begged for forgiveness and promised to punish the officers 
for their use of deadly force (while following orders), protesters called for her 
resignation. In November 2017, another tragic event took place in La Cruz de 
Rio on the Atlantic Coast, in which the army killed a family of five, including 
two children, during what police described as an anti-narcotics operation. 
La Prensa, claimed that the targets of the operation had been armed government 
opponents.74 Seen together, such militarised actions suggest that excessive force 
and repression by the army in the country’s rural borderlands had become a 
clandestine counterpoint to the internationally recognised ‘preventative, 
proactive and community-based’ policing in the cities. In response to accusations 
that civilian deaths at the hands of the government amounted to extrajudicial 
71 R. Callahan, ‘Merida initiative: Nicaragua formally joins, but Police Chief Granera in dire 
straits’, US Embassy Cable 433, 27 Apr. 2009, Wikileaks PlusD Database. 
72 La Prensa, ‘Orteguismo va por toma total de Policia’, 7 Apr. 2011; Cuadra Lira, ‘Reformas del 
sector seguridad en Nicaragua’.
73 La Prensa, ‘Policías masacran a familia inocente’, 13 July 2015. 
74 La Prensa, ‘Padre e hijos, víctimas del Ejército en La Cruz de Río Grande’, 17 Nov. 2017; 
La Prensa, ‘Policía Nacional justifica la masacre del Ejército en la Cruz de Río Grande’, 
15 Dec. 2017.
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killings, the Nicaraguan government submitted a January 2018 report 
acknowledging a series of deadly operations, while lauding the achievements of 
the past decade. ‘In Nicaragua’, they reminded readers,
there are no cartels, no organized crime structures, no maras, no clandestine 
runways that facilitate the land[ing] of planes carrying drugs, we are not a 
country that serves a storage-point for drugs, and we do not have the levels of 
criminality found in our neighbouring countries.75
Despite wariness about the emerging details of deadly police and military 
operations against alleged criminals, few Nicaraguans understood how deep the 
rot within the PN went. 
The extent to which the Ortega government had perverted the police into 
a personal, praetorian force was definitively revealed in April 2018 when it was 
confronted with its first major political crisis. Although it is still unclear precisely 
who gave the order to do so, the PN’s anti-riot forces began firing live rounds 
against opposition protesters. A force launched with the simple goal that it ‘didn’t 
want to be like Somoza’s Guardia’, now flooded into the streets alongside illegal 
paramilitaries to unleash deadly force against the protesting students, who were 
described by the government as ‘demonic’, ‘terrorists’ and ‘vandals’. With no 
apparent sense of irony, the government referred to the deadly assaults against the 
demonstrators’ roadblocks as ‘clean-up operations’, the same term used by the 
GN for its own actions when recapturing cities from the young rebels in 1978 
and 1979. In Nicaragua, it had once again become ‘a crime to be young’. The web 
of Sandinista informants that had been used so effectively in community policing 
was now utilised to identify and target those students who had participated in 
marches or built barricades in each neighbourhood. Unlike the Somoza period, 
the government did not declare a state of siege and the army remained in their 
barracks (although there were rumours that well-trained soldiers were among 
the paramilitary forces). However, the PN’s long-time commitment to human 
rights, civil liberties and due process, which had been significantly eroded during 
the decade of Ortega rule, was now jettisoned outright in its struggle to defend 
‘El Comandante’.
Conclusion
By the end of 2018, an ostensible calm had returned to Nicaragua, with the 
disgraced Ortega holding on to power and hundreds of protesters, branded 
‘terrorists’, behind bars and facing the prospect of long prison sentences. 
Hundreds of parents remained without justice for their murdered children, 
with not a single police officer or paramilitary facing charges for the crimes 
committed. The Nicaraguan government blamed all of the events that took place 
after the outbreak of the protests on a US-backed conspiracy, and dismissed 
human rights reports compiled by the Organization of American States and the 
75 Gobierno de Nicaragua, ‘Libro Blanco: incidencias de elementos delincuenciales de Nicaragua 
en el período 2007–2017’ Report presented to Diplomatic Corps, 16 Jan. 2018. 
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United Nations. With Aminta Granera finally removed from the leadership of 
the PN (following a second resignation attempt in April) and whisked out-of-
sight in the wake of the bloodbath, Francisco ‘Paco’ Díaz – related to Ortega 
through the marriage of their children and accused of human rights violations 
– was officially promoted to head the institution. Masaya police chief Ramón 
Avellán, widely criticised for brutal repression in that tense city, was promoted 
to the post of PN sub-director. Many police officers who bloodied their hands 
in the crackdown now felt that their futures were bound up in the survival of 
the Ortega government. In contrast, the hundreds of police officers who refused 
to join in the repression and remained loyal to the founding values of ‘love and 
good relations with the people’, now faced harassment, arrest and – allegedly – 
worse at the hands of their former comrades.
Sooner or later, the Ortega government will fall from power, but it is unclear 
whether Nicaragua’s once-exceptional record of public safety and low crime rates 
will return. Indeed, the very government that opened 2018 with the boast that 
‘we do not have the levels of criminality found in our neighbouring countries’, 
spent the rest of the year obliterating that positive legacy through its actions. 
It is entirely possible that police actions have so damaged the rule of law that 
Nicaragua will emerge from the crisis accompanied by a dramatic rise in social 
violence. Those government supporters given complete impunity to commit 
human rights violations on behalf of Ortega are unlikely to hand over the heavy 
weaponry provided by the government. Evidence exists to show that some of 
these groups are already making the transition from political violence to other 
forms of profitable criminal activity. 
Unquestionably, a cycle in the history of law enforcement in Nicaragua 
has ended. For all its vaunted success, particularly during the 1990s and early 
2000s, the PN ultimately failed in its most fundamental aim: to never ‘be like 
Somoza’s Guardia’. Many PN achievements trace their origins to the Sandinista 
Revolution, with its mística and its vision of its officers being the ‘guardians 
of the people’s happiness’. However, its deep commitment to a particular 
political party meant that, just as Ortega perverted the Sandinista legacy to 
suit his aims, the worst aspects of police culture were dramatically enhanced. 
The Nicaraguan police officers were exceptional for many years thanks to their 
revolutionary roots, standing head and shoulders above their Central American 
neighbours when it came to crime, human rights and community relations. 
However, with the return of the FSLN to political power, this exceptional 
historical origin proved a liability. It is doubtful whether any other police force 
in Central America today would be willing to commit such extreme violence 
against protesters on behalf of an individual political figure or party. The PN has 
irretrievably destroyed its reputation through its role in political repression and, 
just as a wholesale reform was necessary after the fall of the Somoza regime, the 
Nicaraguan police force will need to be wholly transformed again following a 
political transition.
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2. ‘The revolution was so many things’
Fernanda Soto
That day we woke up with electricity. In 2006, in Mulukukú, such luxuries could not be regarded as good news – it meant a wake was taking place.1 In the early morning, all the members of the household gathered in the 
kitchen.2 We all wanted to know who had died the previous night. Guillermo, 
while serving himself a cup of coffee, announced the news: ‘Somebody killed 
Don Julio Hernández.’ Don Chinto, a neighbour who had just arrived from 
downtown Mulukukú, added: ‘I heard a mozo killed him. Well, that old man was 
arrogant.’3 Guillermo, taking his place at the kitchen table, said: ‘Mozos are not 
like they used to be, when people would yell at them and they would keep silent.’
Julio Hernández was one of the richest men in town. Some said he had made 
a lot of money by not paying back loans he received during the 1980s and by 
taking his poor neighbours’ land. His death seemed an act of poetic justice: as 
punishment for all the harm he had done, one of his workers had finally killed 
him. According to Don Chinto ‘He shot him three times and then fled to Paiwas 
… the police are after him but I doubt they will get him.’ After hearing the story, 
I wondered: was it because of the revolution that ‘mozos are not like they were 
before’?
That question stayed with me during most of 2006, when intense discussions 
about the Sandinista Revolution dominated public debate. Memories 
were particularly relevant at that time, an electoral year when it seemed the 
Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) might return to power (as it 
eventually did). As Nicaraguans debated whether or not they should vote for 
the FSLN, their choices were guided by their memories of the revolutionary 
years, memories that were highly contested. Sandinistas, particularly those 
linked to the FSLN, described the revolution as a moment of profound positive 
change, while opponents described those years as the dark night of Nicaragua’s 
1 In 2006, Mulukukú was not yet connected to the national power grid, and the town had 
electricity from 9 am to 9 pm.
2 I was living with a group of nuns and we shared our meals with the people who worked with 
them in a local educational programme they ran.
3 All the names used in the article have been modified. In Nicaragua a mozo refers to a rural 
labourer. 
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history. For those who saw its legacy as positive, the revolution had led to 
the construction of new political subjects characterised by solidarity, strong 
organisation and a politicised analysis of the world. Those on the opposite side 
referred to another legacy, one of economic backwardness and authoritarian 
rule.4 For both Nicaragua was exceptional, that is, exceptionally better or worse 
than other Central American nations.5
Having myself been raised in a Sandinista family, I grew up with positive 
and romantic renditions of that past. Those memories were problematised later 
on, while working in the countryside. There I heard about the ‘many other 
things’ the revolution was, which are part of the ‘forgotten’ episodes of the 
hegemonic Sandinista memory. They are kept outside of the Sandinista narrative 
because some preceive them as a possible threat to the party and, thus, to the 
revolution itself. This does not mean that they are absent from public debate. 
On the contrary, in 2006 reports of these episodes were ubiquitous in Nicaragua, 
repeatedly reiterated by the FSLN’s opposition.6 As you will see in this chapter, 
a few Sandinista supporters also gave voice to more critical memories, but they 
tended to do so only in private.
For Beatriz Sarlo, the forgotten episodes that are remembered ‘establish a 
hierarchy of value: what matters and what doesn’t matter’.7 For her, giving 
a significant place to politics entails discussing such hierarchies.8 The forgotten 
episodes buried in the memories of the Sandinistas draw attention to the 
hierarchies that were at play in the past and, thus, to the politics of memory 
in Nicaragua. I agree with her that to give a significant place to politics when 
analysing Sandinista memories entails discussing its hierarchy of value. To reflect 
about what is remembered, who remembers and how they ought to remember 
in public can guide us in that endeavour. First and foremost, those questions 
invite us to discuss who gets to define such arrangements and the issues that 
move them.
Alongside the forgotten, we find the ‘silent lessons’ of the revolution: they are 
what we – individually and collectively – make of that moment. These lessons 
4 E.g., since 2006 government campaigns have referred to the post-2006 period as Nicaragua’s 
second Sandinista Revolution. They emphasise words like ‘solidarity’, ‘unity’ and socialism 
as well as Christianity (as religious values are equated with revolutionary ones). The FSLN’s 
political opponents, in contrast, highlight government corruption and repression. Roberto 
Orozco, an independent researcher, analysed the assassination of peasant leaders in the Ayapal 
region; he says: ‘Remember that the population is denouncing arbitrary detentions, selective 
assassinations, disappearances. All this is sending a message about the serious situation lived in 
Ayapal; this is a surge of activities, and they [the FSLN] are applying the same prophylaxis (as 
they say in their jargon) used in the eighties.’ I. López and E. Romero, ‘Asesinan a productor 
de Ayapal que denunció en La Prensa maltrato del Ejército’, La Prensa, 18 Apr. 2016. 
5 Carlos Vilas offers a ‘balanced’ political analysis of that decade in El legado de una década. 
6 Among the opposition parties was la Resistencia, known as the Contras (counterrevolutionary 
forces) in the 1980s, and the Conservative party – the Movimiento Renovador Sandinista 
(MRS) – formed by Sandinistas who had broken with FSLN. 
7 B. Sarlo, ‘Los intelectuales, la tierra fértil del kirchnerismo’; 21.
8 Ibid.
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are sometimes maps, but they can also be thought as binoculars that we use to 
gaze at the landscape and choose the safest route to take. We can get a glimpse 
of these lessons by paying attention to what people say – or do not say – about 
the past, but, mostly, by taking a close look at how they choose to voice these 
memories.9 These lessons speak about our relationship with the past and today’s 
dominant hierarchy of value.
I understand the forgotten and the silent lessons not as providing evidence 
of the failures or achievements of the revolution, but as part of the fabric of 
social change. Together they tell us a story, one about plans that unfolded in 
unforeseen ways and the red flags that appeared along the way. They reveal the 
untouchable creeds of the revolution: a belief in the primacy of the vanguard, 
in the responsibility to uplift the ‘poor’, the conviction that all opposition 
from below was the result of ‘a lack of revolutionary consciousness’, and the 
overconfidence of revolutionaries who assumed they knew it all. They also speak 
about people touched by solidarity and generosity, by dreams, faith, hope and 
the committed attempt of thousands to change Nicaragua’s society.
This chapter is about the ‘many other things’ the revolution brought. 
It relates the stories of three peasants (a woman and two men) who supported the 
revolution. These accounts of the harshness of revolution in the midst of a war 
and its aftermath are permeated by the expectations awakened by revolutionary 
discourse and memories tarnished by the revolution’s inability to live up to those 
expectations. They are also stories of social change, which offer a more nuanced 
and complex perspective on the past. This introduction is followed by a historical 
contextualisation of the region in which I collected the narratives, the three 
testimonies and the conclusion.
The revolution in the countryside
November 2006 marked what Sandinistas in Nicaragua have called the 
beginning of its second revolution. In 2006, after 16 years of what were known 
as neoliberal governments, the FSLN (popularly known as El Frente) was elected 
to rule the country. Seven months before the elections I moved to Siuna and 
then to Mulukukú.10 The first is an ex-mining town in the Northern Caribbean 
Autonomous Region of Nicaragua, 318 km to the north-east of Managua. The 
second is a mid-size peasant town, 70 km southwest of Siuna. Mulukukú was 
famous during the 1980s because it was the base for the largest military training 
school of the Sandinista People’s Army (EPS by its Spanish acronym). People 
from this region, like most rural habitants in Nicaragua, did not overwhelmingly 
9 Michel-Rolph Trouillot writes a valuable and intellectually remarkable analysis of the making 
of silences in and about Haiti’s history, and their impacts on the present for both Haitians and 
those of us and born on this side of the Atlantic: Silencing the Past: Power and the Production 
of History. 
10 Both towns are now capitals of municipalities that hold the same name. 
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support the revolution. On the contrary, most joined or were sympathisers of the 
Contras (the counterrevolutionary forces).11
During the 1980s, for many Nicaraguan peasants the revolution meant a 
substantial increase in state interference in their lives. While programmes such 
as the literacy campaign were welcomed, agrarian reform was a source of conflict. 
The Sandinista government wanted to transform peasant practices – deemed 
‘backward’ – and modernise the countryside through the formation of state-
owned agricultural enterprises and rural cooperatives.12 State policies pushed 
peasants into rapidly changing their organisational strategies.13 However, the 
logic of collective work promoted by the state was in direct opposition to local 
conceptions of prosperity based on the idea of intense individual work, especially 
among small farmers and peasants.14
The Siuna-Mulukukú region was no exception. At the time, it was part of 
the agrarian frontier, a region of recent colonisation where peasants deforested 
the area in order to have access to land for agriculture and ranching. As Larson 
stresses, historically the agrarian frontier has been characterised by a lack of 
infrastructure and minimal state presence.15 In Siuna-Mulukukú, the spatial 
organisation of communities (in some places it can take an hour to reach your 
closest neighbour) reflected a preference for less collective forms of life, shaped 
by ‘conquest narratives’ that emphasised the domestication of nature by men’s 
hard labour.16
In the 1980s, rural inhabitants of the agrarian frontier felt that cooperatives 
not only threatened their well-being but also disrespected their way of life. 
Not surprisingly, peasants in those regions were reluctant to participate in 
cooperatives. Only Sandinista sympathisers (many of whom had collaborated 
with the guerrillas) and landless rural workers willingly joined the first 
cooperatives. 
By 1982, as a result of pressure from the Sandinista state, cooperatives had 
been organised in most rural communities of Siuna-Mulukukú. They were 
small, made up only of community members, and they followed the Credit 
11 Alejandro Bendaña has compiled testimonies of the peasants who joined the Resistencia and 
the reasons that moved them to do so in Una tragedia campesina: testimonios de la Resistencia.
12 See: INRA, ‘Marco estratégico de la Reforma Agraria’. Paper presented at the Latin American 
Sociology Congress, Departamento de Propaganda y Educación Política del FSLN, Managua, 
1981; V. Rueda Estrada, Recompas, recontras, revueltos y armados: posguerra y conflictos por 
la tierra en Nicaragua 1990–2008; M.J. Saldaña-Portillo, The Revolutionary Imagination in 
the Americas and the Age of Development, 109; E. Baumeister, Estructura y reforma agraria en 
Nicaragua (1979–1989). See also the chapter by Jose Luis Rocha in this book.
13 CIERA, La mosquitia en la revolución.
14 See L. Horton, Peasants in Arms: War and Peace in the Mountains of Nicaragua, 1979–1994, 
for a similar analysis about people from another rural community in the agrarian frontier of 
Nicaragua.
15 A. Larson, Tendencias actuales de la frontera agrícola: las contradicciones entre conservación y 
desarrollo, 7. See also ibid. for a description of the agrarian frontier in the northern region 
of Nicaragua. 
16 F. Soto, Ventanas en la memoria: recuerdos de la revolución en la frontera agrícola.
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and Saving Cooperatives model (CCS by its Spanish acronym): their members 
shared a government loan but worked their land individually. In 1983, with 
the increase of Contra armed groups in the countryside, the government 
decided to move people to larger cooperatives that were closer to roads or towns. 
The goal was to offer protection, facilitate access to basic services like healthcare 
and education, and to exert better control over the population. At that time, 
cooperatives in Siuna were no longer centred on productive activities – they 
became Cooperativas de Auto-Defensa (Self-Defence Cooperatives).17
If the government had faced difficulties in convincing people to work 
collectively, it was even harder to persuade them to leave their land and move 
to Self-Defence Cooperatives. Most had to be forced to do so. The Sandinista 
army led the displacement, exacerbating frictions between peasants and the 
army. The first to move were those peasants who had already been threatened by 
the Contras, followed by those who feared the army. Many others believed the 
process was a plot to take their land away and either decided to stay put on their 
ranches or to join the Contras.
Lupe, a peasant who stayed in his community until mid 1984, said: 
We decided to stay because nobody likes to leave their things. Initially the 
community had 44 families. I know because I was a teacher at the time and 
I did the local census. But by 1984 only four families were still there. But, 
how could we [his family] leave if my father and I had put all our lives in that 
land?18
Even though compulsory military service was not officially introduced until 
September 1983, male cooperative members in rural areas like Siuna were drafted 
as early as 1980, in order to create the Sandinista Peoples’ Militia. They formed 
the first battalions sent to the Coco River and the Puerto Cabezas region in 1981 
(where the ‘Red Christmas’ Operation took place) and many of them remained 
in the Sandinista army until 1990.19 The military draft only increased tension in 
the region and accelerated rejection of the revolution. Many peasants preferred 
to join the Contras voluntarily, rather than be forced to join the Sandinista army. 
By 1984 most men were fighting and only women, children and elderly people 
lived in the Self-Defence Cooperatives. Unable to produce their own staples and 
dependent on state aid for food, medicines and tools, they were also the main 
target of Contra attacks.
The region’s rural areas became a war zone and most people migrated to 
towns, cooperatives or Honduran refugee camps. At great personal risk, some 
families decided to stay on their ranches to defend their property. They had no 
access to education or healthcare (as teachers and nurses were targeted by the 
Contras), they could not move freely around their property, and they lived in 
17 See the chapter by David Cooper in this book.
18 Interview, 26 May 2007. 
19 This is the popular name for the Sandinista operation that forced the displacement of 
39 Miskitu communities from the Río Coco, in the wake of counterrevolutionary attacks 
along the border with Honduras. 
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constant fear of being taken by either army. To survive, they had to navigate 
between the two armies, the Sandinistas and the Contras.
By the mid 1980s it had become clear that those in the region who supported 
the Sandinista government were a minority. Many of these Sandinistas had been 
guerrilla collaborators who were satisfied with the social programmes offered by 
the government. And while most resisted leaving their ranches for as long as they 
could, in the end they agreed to join the cooperatives in the hope that when the 
war was over, the revolution would fulfil its main promise of a better life for all. 
In 2006 Don Chepe, a guerrilla collaborator, summarised their experiences in 
the 1980s and 1990s:
During the war both sides suffered and we could not work in peace. In the 
’90s we worked but we lacked direction, we lacked support, although there 
were fewer armed people bothering us. We hope now [with the FSLN 
victory] that they fulfil what they promise. We hope that little by little we can 
see changes.20
As in the past, hopes were placed in the FSLN – but people like Don Chepe were 
the exceptions and they were the ones whom I was interested in understanding. 
I wanted to know why some peasants supported the revolutionary process and 
the FSLN in a region where most either joined the Contras or fled to Honduras. 
Their stories differ from the idealised, hegemonic Sandinista memory which 
cast solidarity as an ever-present aspect of processes promoted by the revolution. 
Nevertheless, the more negative parts of their accounts do not invalidate their 
positive memories of that time, nor have they precluded their continuing support 
for the revolution.
‘Many things’
Concha
Concha, the daughter of a guerrilla collaborator, was 12 years old when her 
family migrated to Siuna. They were originally from Boaco, but had to leave their 
land because ‘there the poor could not live in peace’. In the 1970s all her family 
supported the Sandinista guerrillas. She proudly recalls: ‘My two sons were very 
small and they also supported the Frente.’ In 2006, Concha was a 65-year-old 
widow, her husband having died during the war. When recalling her life in a 
Sandinista cooperative she said:
People from the cooperative lied to us. When the Frente lost the election 
they told us that the Contra would come to kill everybody and a lot of people 
left in fear. I was one. I left my chickens, my cows, my corn. Eight days later 
I went back and didn’t find anything. The cooperative leaders had taken all 
our things … Yes, it is true we had to share but not in that way …
... and let me tell you, we did not live a peaceful life in the cooperative because 
we were a lot of people and we did not have food. Yes, the Frente gave us some 
20 Interview, 6 Dec. 2006. 
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supplies but it is not the same as when you grow your own food. We lived in 
frail houses, we got all wet during winter [rainy season]. We decided to stay 
there to try to survive [the war]. The ones who were smart, the bosses in the 
cooperatives, they sold our corn, they stole our cows and did so many other 
things, I know what they did and I don’t forget who they are.21
For Concha the years in the cooperative were hard. The leadership was corrupt 
and took advantage of its power to make money from collective resources. She 
later added: ‘I don’t blame the Frente for what happened in the cooperative, 
I blame the cooperative leaders. They were the ones who took away all we had, 
they were the ones who lied to us.’ Her story was quite different from official 
stories, narrated by men, about the Sandinistas cooperatives. These referred 
to solidarity, companionship, communal support and protection. In contrast, 
women like Concha recalled the difficulties they had faced during that time. 
In the end, it was they who had spent the most time in the cooperatives.
Jacinta, a nun with whom I lived in Mulukukú and who had worked in 
Concha’s cooperative during the 1980s, partially agreed with her. She knew 
about the difficulties people experienced in the cooperative, and she considered 
the FSLN to carry most of the responsibility for them. Jacinta thought the FSLN 
should have trained and assisted people in better ways. She said:
People in the cooperative were not prepared to live and work like that. People 
took what the Frente gave them as a gift. I remember once getting there and 
people telling me that a tiger had eaten 400 cows.22 They were telling me that 
and did not do anything! When have you heard of a peasant who lets a tiger 
eat all his animals?23
According to Jacinta, the cows were not eaten by a tiger but sold by the 
cooperative leaders. For her, the FSLN’s political project was not wrong in itself, 
but making it a reality was the challenge. Her story underlines the difficulty of 
calling for solidarity at a time when war requires rapid and aggressive action. 
It also speaks to the complexities of managing collective projects on Nicaragua’s 
agrarian frontier, especially projects that were designed by state functionaries 
who did not always understand or value people’s knowledge and ways of life. 
Today ‘rural change’ continues to be an important leitmotif in the FSLN’s 
narrative. ‘Solidarity’ remains part of this political discourse, but the emphasis is 
on employment and access to individual loans, rather than on attempts to create 
cooperatives in the countryside.24
21 Interview, 9 Dec. 2006.
22 In Nicaragua jaguars are known as tigers.
23 Interview, 25 May 2006. 
24 Discussions concerning the FSLN’s current relations with cooperatives and initiatives are 
linked to what is called ‘economía social’. See S. Cáceres, ‘Somos protagonistas del desarrollo 
rural, Envío, no. 385, Apr. 2014.
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Guillermo
At the time I met Guillermo he was in his late fifties. Originally from a small 
community close to Siuna, he spent most of the 1980s in the Sandinista army. 
In the 1990s he started working with a group of nuns in Mulukukú in various 
educational projects. He lived close to the nuns’ house and we shared most of our 
meals together. He almost never talked about politics. What he really liked to do 
was recall stories of his youth – at such moments he would sometimes touch on 
the war in the 1980s. He described the places he was sent to fight, the rivers he 
had to cross and one could see through his stories that he still felt the weight of 
the dead bodies he had carried then.
His community became a cooperative in the early 1980s, but by 1984 most 
of its members had been relocated to a larger one because of the war. When 
I asked him about his experience of working collectively he told me: ‘In the 
cooperative we had a good harvest and a bad harvest and after that I don’t know 
because I was drafted.’ I asked him once: ‘Guillermo did you ever think of 
joining the Contra?’ He told me what nobody else had dared to say: 
‘Yes, once, when they [the Sandinista police] put me in jail, I was in Puerto 
Cabezas, I wasn’t carrying my ID and wasn’t wearing my military uniform. 
I was coming back from my community to the military base. The Sandinista 
Police were on the road, checking men’s ID. Those who didn’t have them 
were sent to jail. I was one of them. As we got to the Police Station they put 
us in line and, one by one, each of us were sent inside a room. As I waited for 
my turn, I could hear a thumping sound coming from the room. I got goose 
bumps just thinking about what they were doing there and said to myself: 
‘No, I’m not going to let them do that’. I didn’t even wait for them to put me 
inside the room; as the policeman approached me I knocked him down. He 
fell to the floor. I was prepared to receive a beating from all the other cops but 
they didn’t do anything. They picked up the guy on the floor and went back 
to the room. After a while they came out, told all the other men in line to go 
home and left me in prison for a week, as a punishment. Only after a week 
was I able to go back to my battalion.25
Unfortunately, I’m unable to translate this violent episode with all the comic 
undertones he gave it in the telling. Guillermo’s narration made us both laugh 
at times, especially when he described the astonished faces of the policemen. 
He was not carrying his ID or wearing his uniform because he feared being 
intercepted by the Contras on his way to Puerto Cabezas. If they had found him 
with a military ID, it would have meant a death sentence.
Guillermo never publicly said that he was a Sandinista or supported the 
Frente. He did not like to participate in political activities nor to offer his 
political opinions: ‘because people get upset when talking about politics’. 
However, when people asked him for his thoughts, he was open and sincere. 
When recalling the revolution, he spoke with great passion at times, while at 
others making light of the sad moments he had endured. And often preferred 
25 Interview, 15 Nov. 2006.
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not to say much at all about certain matters. Without fear, he also recounted the 
things he thought were wrong. An example of this was his experience of police 
aggression, one that made him think about joining the Contras. However, in his 
stories it always seemed that, despite the mistakes, something made up for them 
which led him to continue supporting the revolution, such as the one about the 
return to his ranch. 
When Guillermo told his superior that he wanted to leave the army and 
return to his community, he was sent to jail again. He spent a couple of weeks 
there until his superiors completed an internal investigation which confirmed 
that he was not leaving the army to join the Contras. They authorised his return, 
but when Guillermo got to his ranch, he found another family in residence there. 
A man told him that the government had given them that land and he had a 
piece of ‘paper’ (a title) to prove it. Guillermo, who also had a title, went to the 
Agrarian Development Ministry in Siuna.26 He made an appointment with the 
director and told him: 
‘Look, in my ranch I found a man who says that you gave him that land. 
What about the title I have’ – he pointed to the title he was showing to the 
director – ‘does it have any value?’ ‘Yes, it does’, the director replied and then 
turned to his left and told his assistant: ‘We messed things up here’, to which 
she replied: ‘You are the one who messed this up because I only write what 
you dictate.’27
Laughing at the story, Guillermo said, ‘That young woman was very smart.’ 
Although he got his ranch back, his wife had not waited for him during the 
war. He later started working for the Church and decided to finish high school. 
His stories never showed resentment towards the police, the Sandinista army 
or the Sandinista government. He did not overlook the unfair treatment he 
had experienced at the hands of the police and the army’s or the government’s 
mistakes. But in his stories one could see that he still believed the revolution was 
a better option. He could defend himself, he entered state offices and was heard 
by those in authority.
The abuse of power by the Sandinista police and army in the 1980s forms 
part of the forgotten episodes of the FSLN narrative, in much the same way 
that the Contras’ abuse of power comprises part of their forgotten episodes.28 
Unlike Guatemala and El Salvador, in the 1990s Nicaragua’s government did not 
create a truth commission to investigate human rights abuses committed by both 
armies. The peace agreement concluded at the time involved legally condoning 
these occurrences. It was argued that if peace was to be achieved, then forgiveness 
was needed from both sides.29
26 Ministry of Agrarian Development and Institute of Agrarian Reform (MIDINRA).
27 Interview, 20 Nov. 2006.
28 See Vilas, El legado de una década, 43.
29 Rueda Estrada, Recompas, recontras, revueltos y armados, 404.
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Raul
Raul’s views regarding the Sandinista government were different from 
Guillermo’s. He was born in Matagalpa and he migrated to Siuna with his family 
in the late 1970s, fleeing Somoza’s Guardia. In Matagalpa he became involved 
with the Socialist party and supported the guerrillas. He liked to recall: ‘I was not 
from the 19 of July generation, I’m from the Pancasán generation’, underlining 
that his relationship with the FSLN dated from the 1960s and not from 1979, 
like most peasants in the region.30 When he recalled the late 1960s he said: ‘We 
[peasants] ignored our rights, we lived in the montaña and spent perhaps ten 
years there, working. Nobody would visit us to teach us anything.’31
Most of his stories revolved around the war and the defeat of the revolution 
in the 1990s. In his recollections, one could see a strong critique, frustration and 
even resentment towards the FSLN. He said he was dissatisfied with the way the 
party had treated them – the peasants – after the Sandinistas’ electoral defeat 
in 1990. He mentioned once that he thought some of the FSLN members had 
lost their Sandinista values, that many ‘thought they were “too important” and 
forgot about the rest’. 
The root of Raul’s complaints was what the opposition called the ‘piñata’: 
the distribution of state goods among FSLN members after its 1990 electoral 
defeat.32 The FSLN argued that these appropriations were necessary to 
ensure that the party had economic resources in the future. However, the 
decision exacerbated the economic gap between Sandinistas and led to ethical 
contradictions. Raul’s comment that ‘after giving my youth to the FSLN, I was 
left broken’, while other Sandinistas acquired properties and became rich, 
made this all too evident. His words were bittersweet. Contrary to what he had 
been told and believed – that the peasants would always come first – when I 
interviewed him in early 2007, he felt that they had been left with the ‘dregs’. 
He told me: ‘You can see it, there are no peasants in the FSLN directive, nor in 
other governmental positions. During the time the FSLN ruled [in the 1980s], 
only one, Benigna Mendiola, got to be a deputy.’ 
He recalled how he had left his land in the 1980s to join the cooperatives 
and how, later, he left the cooperative to work with the party. In 1990, when 
the FSLN lost the election, he tried to return to the cooperative to claim a piece 
30 Pancasán is a mountainous region located in the municipality of San Ramón, Matagalpa. 
In 1967, the National Guard uncovered a guerrilla column in the area and assassinated almost 
all of its members. The guerrillas had built a strong alliance with a local peasant union and 
an intense repression of peasants in the region followed, leading either to their assassination 
or their forced migration to regions such as Siuna. Soto, Ventanas en la memoria, and M. 
Baltodano, Memorias de la lucha Sandinista (Managua, 2010).
31 In Nicaragua, ‘montaña’ is a synonym for ‘the bush’, that is, a space not yet ‘conquered by 
agriculture’. The montaña was the place where the Sandinista guerrillas hid from Somoza’s 
National Guard in the years before 1979 and it was also the place where the Contra War 
was fought in the 1980s. 
32 A piñata is a clay pot filled with sweets. At children’s parties, the piñata is broken and the 
sweets shared out. 
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of land but its leadership did not accept him back. He then visited an FSLN 
political leader in Siuna and, with his support, was able to get a house with a title 
in his name. Raul said: ‘If they had not given me that little house I would have 
been left without anything.’ Afterwards, he was able to recover part of the land 
he had abandoned before joining the cooperative. He told me: 
After the defeat [1990], people were trying to live on … I travelled to 
Managua searching for Jaime. When we met I told him ‘I need your support 
to legalise my land’, Jaime responded: ‘For God’s sake, how could you have 
waited so long to legalise your land.’ I got really mad at him and replied: 
‘Don’t fuck with me, aren’t you also responsible for what happened? You came 
to my house and told me to join the cooperative and leave my land, and now 
I’ve lost almost all of it. You told me that we were going to have time to 
“fix things” in the future. Now I want to recover some of it.’33 
Raul was referring to Jaime, an ex-guerrilla member, with whom he had worked 
before 1979 and during the 1980s. In the 1990s many cooperative members 
returned to their ranches to find that new owners had taken over their land. 
Many others did not dare to return, fearing retaliation from the Contras. The 
economic conditions of the 1990s were, for many, more complex than those that 
pertained in the 1980s, made worse by the fears raised by the uncertainty of the 
post-war period. Raul concluded: 
I don’t regret having supported the FSLN and the revolution, but I don’t like 
the attitude of some people there [in the party] and I feel we, peasants, have 
lost political spaces. Sometimes I feel they used us, because before they used 
to tell us a chagüite and now they say: ‘Wait, we will talk later.’34
Raul was upset – he was not poorer than other Sandinista peasants in Siuna, but 
he felt he deserved more political and economic recognition from the FSLN. 
He was not unhappy with the enrichment of party members, but because he had 
been left out of the division of spoils. I asked him once, ‘Would you do it again? 
Would you participate again in the guerrilla and the revolution?’ His answer was 
categorical: 
No, now what I see is ambition … Once Oscar [another ex-guerrillero] 
came to visit me. I told him: ‘Oscar, look, if I had known that things were 
going to be like this, I swear to God I wouldn’t have done it. I would have 
worked to support my children.’35 
During the early 1990s, the distribution of goods among FSLN members and 
the unequal privileges some of them enjoyed were controversial issues, which 
continue to be controversial today. Questions are constantly raised about how 
government resources are used, how they are distributed, and how decisions 
are taken at the national and local levels.36 In this book, Cooper and Francis’s 
33 Interview, 11 June 2007. 
34 To tell a chagüite is to give a speech full of empty promises. Interview, 11 June 2007. 
35 Ibid. 
36 S. Martí i Puig, ‘Nicaragua: la consolidación de un régimen híbrido’; also Vilas, El legado de 
una década.
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chapters analyse how different communities participate in decision-making 
processes at the communal and local levels. Their work is extremely important 
for gaining an understanding of issues such as participation, local conceptions of 
social and economic rights, communal agency and government responsibilities 
in present-day Nicaragua.
Remember Julio Hernández?
Returning to the story with which this chapter began, ultimately we heard 
the news that the person who killed Julio Hernández was not a mozo but a 
mandador.37 The police never caught him.
But the question remains: did the revolution ensure that mozos were not 
as passive as they had been before? The answer is both yes and no. Certainly, 
before the revolution there were courageous mozos who confronted their 
arrogant bosses, but there is no doubt that the revolution upset Nicaragua’s 
‘social balance’ for Sandinistas and anti-Sandinistas alike. In 1991, Dora María 
Téllez, a revolutionary comandante, said: ‘The Nicaraguan peasantry’s struggle 
has gone beyond my expectations; although it was counterrevolutionary, it took 
the FSLN’s political programme. The Contras ... are out there, demanding 
their rights as peasants.’38 Lynn Horton makes a similar argument when she 
asserts that: ‘Among peasants who fought with the contras in defence of pre-
revolutionary values and relationships, the struggle itself and the example of 
the FSLN transformed their attitudes and expectations. Anti-Sandinista Quilalí 
peasants of the postwar period were no longer the quiescent peasantry of a 
decade earlier.’39
Indeed, the Sandinista Revolution made many Nicaraguans feel like 
‘architects of their liberation’, as the lyrics of the FSLN’s hymn reminded the 
population. Peasants were not excluded, whether they were Sandinistas or anti-
Sandinista. Many felt they were constructing their own history, one where they 
were not subjects any more, but rather active participants in a project. The 
challenge was to make that project a reality, to change an unequal society in the 
midst of a war and an economic embargo, to navigate internal disagreements 
about how change might be achieved and to overcome entrenched structures of 
hierarchy and privilege.40
In that context, it is no surprise that the revolution’s attempt to overturn 
Nicaragua’s social balance was filled with contradictions, both personal and 
collective. As Concha’s testimony shows, some peasants were given leadership 
roles in state projects defined by people who had preconceived ideas about who 
the peasants were, what they ‘needed’ and how to ‘support’ them. While some 
37 Also known as capataz, or the boss of farm workers. He worked for the ranch owner. 
38 Envío, ‘Los recontras: campesinos armados con amplia base social’, no. 119, Sept. 1991.
39 Horton, Peasants in Arms, 17.
40 A nuanced analysis of Cold War geopolitics is necessary here to understand Nicaragua’s 
situation at that time. 
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local leaders ended up doing the best they could, others took advantage of those 
opportunities to reproduce traditional conceptions of leadership. As the case of 
Guillermo shows, peasants were able to enter official spaces where many had not 
been welcomed before; at the same time, many were repressed by the Sandinista 
police and army. Finally, as Raul recalled, few peasants had political leadership 
roles as the FSLN reproduced inequalities within its own party structure, and 
those few leaders did not participate as equals in decision-making nor in the 
redistribution of wealth. In the end, inequalities coexisted alongside social 
changes – these are the ‘many other things’ the revolution represented.
As mentioned above, the memories recorded in this chapter are forgotten 
episodes and within them we find the silent lessons of the revolution. These are 
visible in political initiatives, personal understandings and collective actions. 
One does not always find a causal relationship between the forgotten and the 
silent lessons, and examples of the latter often lack moral ‘grandiosity’. However, 
both speak about ways in which some people make sense of the past, as well as 
the complexities of social change.
For some, the main silent lesson is that one must work within the dominant 
economic structure in the hope that, eventually, part of the revolutionary dream 
can be made a reality – a tactic made more complex by the fact that everyone 
interprets the revolutionary dream in their own way. For others, the silent 
lesson is to constantly recall those years, or to choose to keep their revolutionary 
memories to themselves. One colleague, noting the lack of discussion about the 
Sandinista Revolution in university classrooms in Nicaragua, recounted how 
surprised one of her students was to learn about the Sandinista patriotic military 
service of the 1980s. The student later found out her father had been drafted and 
spent two years of his youth fighting in ‘the montaña’ without ever mentioning 
that experience to his children.
For yet others, the silent lesson entails a profound scepticism about any 
attempt to remake Nicaraguan society, sometimes accompanied by considerable 
anger about the revolution itself. Perhaps, as Rancière states, ‘The current 
scepticism is the result of a surfeit of faith.’41 In some cases, that faith endured 
and was passed on to the next generation. I saw that faith in my parents’ eyes but 
also in Concha’s, Guillermo’s and Raul’s. I could see the gleam in their eyes when 
they remembered the revolution. To me, it was the gleam of remembering not 
just dreams, but a collective attempt to make those dreams come true. As Sofia 
Montenegro says when recalling those years:
Despite all the FSLN’s deficiencies, it is the political force that has triggered 
something historically unique in the country: the taking of power by the 
popular classes, the general consensus for the insurrection, as well as the 
thousands of vital experiences, big and small, individual and collective, which 
allowed us to know the unforgettable experience of touching the sky with our 
hands.42
41 J. Ranciere, ‘La imagen intolerable’, 103.
42 S. Montenegro, ‘¿Es revolucionario el FSLN?’, El Nuevo Diario, 14 May 1994, 9.
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The Sandinista Revolution, despite its successes and failures, despite its pains 
and glories, opened up a space for Nicaraguans to imagine themselves and their 
society in new ways. In the end, the revolution is about forgotten episodes and 
silent lessons, but also about collective attempts to make dreams a reality. It is 
the vibrancy of that collective endeavour that, for many, made the revolution 
exceptional.
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3. Nicaraguan food policy: between 
self-sufficiency and dependency
Christiane Berth
During the celebrations for World Food Day 2015 in Nicaragua, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) representative, Verónica Guerrero Rodríguez, highlighted the fact that by significantly reducing 
malnutrition, Nicaragua was among the few countries to have achieved the first 
UN Millennium Goal.1 In fact, the percentage of undernourished people in the 
country had decreased from 54.4 per cent in 1990 to 16.6 per cent in 2015.2 
After Daniel Ortega returned to power in 2006, the government launched a 
number of programmes to improve the country’s nutritional situation, such as 
the Zero Hunger Program and the Healthy Patios Project. Some of these projects 
revived concepts from the early 1980s, when the Sandinistas had adopted a 
highly ambitious food policy that attracted the attention of the international 
nutrition community. The Sandinista government’s apparent success since 2006 
contrasts sharply with the deterioration of the Sandinista food policy in the late 
1980s. By 1990, when the Sandinistas lost the elections, the nutritional situation 
in the country was disastrous.
In this chapter, I argue that the Sandinistas’ continuous struggle with 
economic dependency impeded the revolutionaries’ attempts to make Nicaragua 
more self-sufficient. Despite the reforms of the early 1980s, including a new 
food distribution system, agrarian reform and price regulation, food production 
did not advance as quickly as the revolutionaries had hoped. Consequently, 
Nicaragua continued to depend on food imports and, when foreign exchange 
became scarce, relied increasingly on food aid. With the looming economic 
crisis in the mid 1980s, the gap between political propaganda and social realities 
increased. The Contra War and the US economic blockade, as well as the 
Sandinistas’ political strategies in the countryside, contributed to shortages that 
undermined the self-sufficiency project. In the end, the Sandinista government 
opted for a strategy of ‘economic adjustment’ which reversed some of the 
1 The aim of this Millennium Goal was to halve the proportion of people suffering from hunger 
between 1990 and 2015. 
2 H. Montez Rugama, ‘FAO elogia lucha contra el hambre’, El Nuevo Diario, 8 Oct. 2015.
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important social reforms of the early 1980s. By 1988, hunger was back in 
Nicaragua, when average caloric intakes fell below the levels documented by 
nutritional surveys in 1953–54.3 
Some researchers have argued that the disastrous nutritional situation was 
the result of neoliberal economic policies in the early 1990s.4 This chapter, 
however, proposes a somewhat different interpretation. The failure to guarantee 
Nicaraguans a stable food supply in the second half of the 1980s contributed 
to the demise of the Sandinista Revolution. The disastrous nutritional situation 
then worsened further with the elimination of free healthcare, the introduction 
of neoliberal economic policies, and the neglect of small landholders by the post-
1990 Unión Nacional Opositora (UNO) government. Despite a slight reduction 
in the late 1990s, poverty rates remained extremely high until 2005, when they 
were 48.3 per cent, and then began to decrease from 2006 onwards.5
Despite the setbacks of the 1980s, the revolutionary experience laid the 
foundations for an approach to food policy that is, in some ways, distinctive. 
The Sandinista Revolution left a legacy of peasant networks that reorganised in 
the 1990s and mobilised for improvements in the Nicaraguan countryside. The 
Nicaraguan section of La Vía Campesina (LVC) evolved out of these networks 
and campaigned for a food sovereignty law in Nicaragua.
Although the food sovereignty approach reprised some important elements 
of the Sandanistas’ 1980s food policy, the new setting is different. The Ortega 
government is unwilling to challenge the private sector and has therefore 
subordinated demands for the restriction of food imports to the regulations 
of trade agreements. While several of the new programmes resemble the 1980s 
projects in name, they are conducted in a different political context: the new 
caudillismo or ‘populist left regime with hybrid economic features’6 that Ortega 
has established in Nicaragua since 2007. In this chapter, I evaluate Sandinista 
food policy across three periods: the expansive, ambitious food policy of the 
3 M. Flores et al., ‘Estudios dietéticos en Nicaragua: I. Municipio de San Isidro, Departamento 
de Matagalpa’; M. Flores, ‘Estudios dietéticos en Nicaragua: II. Barrio de San Luis, Ciudad de 
Managua’.
4 S. Linkogle, ‘Soya, culture and international food aid: the case of a Nicaraguan communal 
kitchen’, 97; W. Godek, ‘The institutionalization of food sovereignty, PhD diss., Rutgers 
University, 2014, 164–5.
5 Poverty decreased from 50.3 per cent of the population in 1993 to 47.9 per cent in 1998 
to 45.8 per cent in 2001. R. Spalding, ‘Poverty politics’, 221–2; A. Acevedo Vogl, ‘Estamos 
en un punto de inflexión y deberíamos preocuparnos’, Envío, no. 404, Nov. 2015. The last 
survey on living standards conducted by INIDE (Instituto Nacional de Información de 
Desarrollo) claimed that poverty had decreased from 42.5 per cent in 2009 to 29.6 per cent 
in 2014. However, economist Adolfo Acevedo Vogl criticised the definition of poverty used 
by the survey (i.e. daily expenditure of less than US$1.81), suggesting it was too low. The 
World Bank has amended its definition of poverty for Latin America to include all those with 
a daily expenditure of less than US$4. In addition, INIDE has not published the database for 
the survey. A FIDEG (Fundación Internacional para el Desafío Económico Global) survey 
concluded that in 2013 the poverty level was still 40.5 per cent of the population. FIDEG, 
‘Dinámicas de la pobreza en Nicaragua 2009–2013’, 2014, 4.
6 R.J. Spalding, Contesting Trade in Central America: Market Reform and Resistance, 208.
NICARAGUAN FOOD POLICY 63
first years after the revolution (1979–82), the period of crisis and adjustment 
(1984–8) and the period of erosion (1988–90). In the last section, I discuss 
continuities and discontinuities in the neo-Sandinista food policy after 2007. 
Research on food sovereignty in Nicaragua has provided important insights into 
the politics around food during the last decade. Nevertheless, I propose that there 
is a need for a broader analysis which incorporates agrarian change, consumption 
and food distribution to explain both the reduction of malnutrition and its 
continuing prevalence in rural Nicaragua today. 
Initial euphoria, 1979–82
The slogan ‘Let’s all sow the land’, which appeared on a Nicaraguan Food Program 
poster, called on people to participate in food production. The illustration shows 
a peasant couple with the man holding his machete triumphantly aloft, while 
the woman holds a basket of vegetables on her arm. This poster formed part of 
early Sandinista campaigns to increase food production in Nicaragua.7 Projects 
in the early 1980s set ambitious goals: the aim was to reach self-sufficiency by 
1982 – and this in a country where food imports had increased significantly in 
the decades prior to revolution. 
‘It may be concluded that the theme of FOOD and especially that of 
National Food Self-Sufficiency and Food Security is considered to have a 
very high political priority in contemporary Nicaragua’ was how Otto van 
Teutem, FAO representative in Nicaragua, ended his report on World Food 
Day in 1982.8 His statement demonstrates that the international organisations 
working in Nicaragua also saw the new energy with which the Sandinistas 
were pursuing their revolutionary food policy. It aimed at guaranteeing a basic 
food supply to all Nicaraguans and was based on four pillars: 1) the increase of 
basic grain production; 2) the promotion of local food consumption; 3) the 
democratisation of the supply system; and 4) the regulation of prices. Up to 
1982, the revolutionaries created new institutions, invested more resources, 
developed ambitious production schemes and launched broad-based education 
campaigns. In general, the Sandinistas promoted a ‘mixed economy’, with 
three sectors: private enterprise, mixed firms and a state sector. In contrast with 
other revolutionary regimes, they refrained from a complete nationalisation of 
production.9
During the period of initial euphoria, the Sandinistas introduced credits for 
basic grain producers, democratised the supply system, and mobilised people 
to consume locally produced food. The new distribution network, managed 
by the Empresa Nacional de Alimentos Básicos (ENABAS), included popular 
stores, rural distribution points and popular supermarkets. External aggression 
7 The poster is reprinted in O. Núñez Soto, ‘Unser Land: unsere Revolution’, 104. 
8 O. van Teutem, ‘Report on World Food Day 1982 – Nicaragua, 2 Nov. 1982’. ESH WFD IN 
4/9 NIC, FAO Archives.
9 R. Sola Montserrat, Un siglo y medio de economía nicaragüense: las raíces del presente, 54–55; J. 
Austin, et al., ‘The role of the revolutionary state in the Nicaraguan food system’. 
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played a key role in expanding these ambitious reforms. Shortly after taking 
over the US presidency in January 1981, Ronald Reagan announced that his 
government would cancel credits for wheat imports from Nicaragua. Soon 
afterwards, in May 1981, the Sandinistas launched the Nicaraguan Food 
Program (PAN) to coordinate Nicaragua’s new food policy.10 The cancellation 
of the wheat credits also sparked the first campaign to promote corn as an anti-
imperialist, revolutionary food. The campaigns included visual references, 
Mesoamerican legends, cooking competitions and songs. The first corn festivals 
mobilised thousands of Nicaraguans around local food security.11 More than 
30 years later my interviewees remembered the campaigns with enthusiasm.12 
At the same time, government propaganda increasingly promoted the aim of 
self-sufficiency. In late 1981, PAN director Pedro Antonio Blandón announced 
that Nicaragua planned to reach self-sufficiency in basic grains by 1982.13 To 
stimulate food production in the cities, the Sandinistas also launched an urban 
gardening campaign.
The global nutrition community observed Nicaraguan efforts with interest. 
After the world food crisis in the early 1970s, there was intense debate about the 
correct approach to global nutritional problems. The Sandinista revolutionaries 
attracted attention because they prioritised basic grain production and seemed 
willing to change land distribution structures as well as invest resources in 
improving the nutrition of the poor. Consequently, the FAO, WHO and 
UNICEF financed a large number of nutritional projects during the 1980s. 
Their work, as well as the general interest shown in Nicaragua’s policy, attracted 
many people from the nutritional community to the country. They combined 
work at Sandinista institutions with research on the food system. For example, 
Solon Barraclough the US economist and UN Research Institute for Social 
Development (UNRISD) director, initiated a collaboration that shaped the work 
of the Nicaraguan research centre, Centro de Investigaciones y Estudios de la 
Reforma Agraria (CIERA).14 Conceived of as a research institution to support 
agrarian reform and food policy, the centre applied UNRISD’s food system 
methodology in many of its surveys.
As the Sandinista government began to cooperate closely with the FAO in the 
early 1980s, food security was incorporated in Nicaraguan policy. Moreover, the 
FAO supported several projects under its Food Security Assistance Program.15 
10 Although the programme’s symbol was the corncob, the organisation’s acronym is the Spanish 
word for bread. 
11 Barricada, ‘Xilonem, respuesta y compromiso’, 12 May 1981, 3.
12 Interview, María Josefina Gurdián Mántica (Doña Piñita), Managua, Aug. 2012. Interview, 
Rosario Montes Orozco, León, Sept. 2012.
13 P. Candia, ‘El proyecto PAN trascendencia y obstáculos’, Barricada, 20 June 1981, 3; 
Barricada, ‘Consigna del PAN, producir’, 22 June 1981, 1, 7; Barricada, ‘Blandón evalúa 5 
meses del PAN’, 28 Sept. 1981, 1, 5; Barricada, ‘PAN, unificar políticas en 1982’, 16 Dec. 
1981, 5.
14 S. Barraclough, A Preliminary Analysis of the Nicaraguan Food System (Genf, 1982).
15 E. Saouma to J. Wheelock, 1 Sept. 1981. FA 13/1 FSAS ODG Old, FAO Archives.
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At international conferences, Nicaragua suggested the establishment of a regional 
Food Security Council built on Latin American solidarity and intra-regional 
trade.16 In internal political debates, however, the concept of self-sufficiency 
remained more significant. In 1987, the Nicaraguan Constitution addressed the 
issue of food security, asserting the right of Nicaraguans to be protected against 
hunger, backed up by state guarantees for adequate availability and equitable 
distribution.17 In the political discourse of Nicaragua in the 1980s, the term ‘food 
sovereignty’ did not appear. However, some elements of Sandinista food policy 
anticipated demands subsequently raised by the food sovereignty movement. 
These were the emphasis on local consumption and production, agrarian reform, 
and the right to define the local food system autonomously.18
The first publications by international experts reflected contemporary 
enthusiasm and presented Nicaragua as a model for other countries of the Global 
South. For example, Joseph Collins, founder of the US initiative Food First, held 
up Nicaragua as a model for countries that lacked large budget resources for their 
food policy.19 James Austin et al. concluded that ‘in spite of extremely adverse 
circumstances … the Sandinista Revolution has made significant achievements 
in the areas of food policy and agricultural development’.20 However, the experts 
were also aware that these ambitious projects faced enormous challenges.
The new food policy faced two main obstacles: first, the structure of the 
Nicaraguan economy was highly dependent on agro exports, and, second, the 
policies of the Somoza dictatorship had reinforced this dependency. In particular, 
cotton cultivation had expanded in Pacific Nicaragua, taking up the best soils 
from the 1950s on. By contrast, basic grain production had moved to the inferior 
soils of the Nicaraguan interior.21 When the Sandinistas came to power in July 
16 FAO, Report of the Seventeenth FAO Regional Conference for Latin America: Managua, 30 
August to 10 September 1982.
17 Article 63: ‘Es derecho de los nicaragüenses estar protegidos contra el hambre. El Estado 
promoverá programas que aseguren una adecuada disponibilidad de alimentos y 
una distribución equitativa de los mismos’, Constitución política de 1987, http://
legislacion.asamblea.gob.ni/normaweb.nsf/bbe90a5bb646d50906257265005d21f8/ 
8339762d0f427a1c062573080055fa46?OpenDocument
18 See, e.g., the 2016 definition on La Vía Campesina’s homepage: ‘Food sovereignty prioritises 
local food production and consumption. It gives a country the right to protect its local 
producers from cheap imports and to control production. It ensures that the rights to use and 
manage lands, territories, water, seeds, livestock and biodiversity are in the hands of those 
who produce food and not of the corporate sector. Therefore, the implementation of genuine 
agrarian reform is one of the top priorities of the farmer’s movement’: https://web.archive.org/
web/20160305031659/http://viacampesina.org/en/index.php/organisation-mainmenu-44.
19 Solon Barraclough argued similarily that ‘the Nicaraguan experience in dealing with its 
food problems will probably be highly relevant for some other Central American countries’. 
A Preliminary Analysis, 11.
20 Austin et al., ‘The role of the revolutionary state’; 35.
21 Between 1960 and 1979, cotton exports increased by 381 per cent, beef exports by 335 per 
cent and sugar exports by 349 per cent. B.N. Biondi-Morra, Revolución y política alimentaria: 
Un análisis crítico de Nicaragua, 49, 57–9; Sola Montserrat, Un siglo y medio, 29, 35–9; J.A. 
Booth, The End and the Beginning: The Nicaraguan Revolution, 60–6.
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1979, the initial situation they faced was unfavourable. The civil war of the late 
1970s had brought food production to a standstill, making food supply during 
the insurrectional period difficult. Consequently, the revolutionary government’s 
first priority was to resume food production.
In the countryside, many peasants hoped that agrarian reform would follow 
immediately after the revolution, allowing them to produce on their own land. 
However, the first wave of Sandinista expropriation favoured large state farms 
instead of individual peasant production. In 1979, the Sandinistas transformed 
the enterprise and landholdings of the Somoza family and National Guard 
officers into state enterprises that would continue export production to earn 
foreign currency but would also increase basic grain production to ensure local 
supply. By contrast, after the enactment of the first agrarian reform law in 
1981, land distributions proceeded slowly. During the first period up to 1984, 
cooperatives benefited most, receiving more than 80 per cent of all distributed 
land. Many peasants who had dreamt for a long time of possessing their own 
land felt betrayed.22 At the same time, relations between peasants and ENABAS 
suffered from problems concerning the new system of guaranteed prices the 
latter had introduced. For example, peasants considered prices offered for basic 
grains to be too low as inflation was on the rise. Next, trading with ENABAS 
had its disadvantages because the enterprise paid by cheque instead of cash. Since 
local banks could not always cash cheques, this often meant that peasants had 
to travel further afield.23
Although theoretically basic grain production took absolute priority, the 
need for foreign exchange undermined the food policy agenda. The Nicaraguan 
economy depended strongly on the export of cotton, coffee and sugar, the result 
of which was that the government had to support their production in order to 
secure foreign currency. The resources assigned to agro-export enterprises meant 
that basic grain production received insufficient assistance, because of the general 
scarcity of agricultural inputs. In addition, export agriculture and basic grain 
production also competed for labour.24 
The first evaluations by the Sandinistas of the new food policy showed 
mixed results: agricultural production still faced difficulties, as Figure 1 below 
demonstrates. In particular, corn production had declined after 1978. Although 
it recovered with the 1980/81 harvest, corn production did not reach pre-
war levels again until the late 1980s. The production of beans and rice also 
recovered in the early 1980s, but not sufficiently to keep up with the increasing 
demands of a growing population. This gap is reflected in the first surveys on 
post-revolutionary consumption.
22 E. Dore, ‘The great grain dilemma. Peasants and state policy in revolutionary Nicaragua’, 
102–4, 115–17; E. Baumeister, Estructura y reforma agraria en Nicaragua (1979–1989), 123.
23 A.H. Saulniers, ‘State trading organizations in expansion: a case study of ENABAS’, 119; S. 
Martí i Puig, ‘The origins of the peasant-Contra rebellion in Nicaragua, 1979–87’, 12.
24 L.J. Enríquez, Harvesting Change: Labor and Agrarian Reform in Nicaragua 1979–1990, 84–5.
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Surveys conducted in the early 1980s reveal the mixed results of the 
Sandinista food policy: despite increasing per capita consumption of basic 
foodstuffs, people judged their nutritional situation to be worse after the 
revolution. It must be noted that the surveys encountered many difficulties, 
such as the limited availability of updated statistical data on the population, 
basic grain production and income. CIERA’s first investigation in 1982 into 
popular consumption in ten Managuan districts revealed discontent among the 
inhabitants. Taking meat as the main indicator of good nutrition, more than 
40 per cent of the interviewees contended that their nutrition had worsened in 
the previous two years and only 8 per cent believed that their diets were better.25 
While this was certainly true in terms of meat consumption, the supply of rice, 
wheat flour and eggs had improved.26 The supply of basic foods also increased 
as the government subsidised the cost of basic grains, sugar, milk and vegetable 
oil until 1984. It was the first time in Nicaraguan history that a government had 
distributed subsidised food on such a large scale.27
Throughout the 1980s, revolutionary propaganda revalorised traditional 
Nicaraguan food against imported ingredients and processed food. 
Contemporary surveys on consumption indicate limited success, however. In the 
early 1980s, people in the poor districts of Managua still spent considerable 
25 Centro de Investigación y Estudios de la Reforma Agraria (CIERA), Distribución y consumo 
popular de alimentos en Managua, 78.
26 Barricada published data on per capita consumption between 1977 and 1982, based on 
MIDINRA (Ministerio de Desarrollo Agropecuario y Reforma Agraria) and MICOIN 
(Ministerio de Comercio Interior) data. These statistics show a decline in per capita milk 
consumption while other data indicate an improvement. In general, statistical information 
from the revolutionary years is sometimes contradictory. Especially in the years of economic 
crisis, the scope of surveys remained limited. See C.M. Vilas, ‘Nicaragua. I. Scientific research 
in a revolutionary setting. The case of Nicaragua’, 11–13, 54–55.
27 Data on rural consumption are scarce, but the few existing surveys indicate that peasants 
could supply themselves with meat and basic grains. However, the lack of tools and the other 
means necessary to undertake daily work affected their living conditions and prompted 
discontent.
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sums of money on processed food such as Maggi soup or biscuits. Similarly, 
the demand for milk powder remained high throughout the 1980s.28 The 
government promoted fish as a healthy alternative to meat, frescos beverages 
instead of soft drinks, and corn instead of wheat. In the early 1980s people 
attended corn festivals in large numbers, started urban gardening projects 
and developed creative substitutes for scarce products. Nevertheless, it proved 
difficult to make comprehensive changes to Nicaraguans’ consumption habits. 
Some advances were made with the introduction of new staples such as soy and 
potatoes, production of which was stimulated by development projects, and to 
an extent their consumption improved local diets during the crisis of the late 
1980s.29
By the time CIERA published the results of the consumer survey in 1983, 
the situation in Nicaragua had worsened: from 1981, the US began supporting 
armed opponents of the revolution – the Contras – who attacked Nicaragua 
from their bases on its borders. The Contra War demanded resources that 
could otherwise have been spent on social projects. It also affected basic grain 
production: in the war zones storage and infrastructure were destroyed and 
peasants displaced.30 Worse still, prices of Nicaragua’s most important export 
products on the world markets fell, which led to a deep financial crisis.
Ongoing dependency and the turn to economic  
adjustment, 1984–8
With the Contra War and the looming financial crisis, dependency and scarcity 
became ever more visible in Nicaraguan society. By 1985, military expenditure 
made up 50 per cent of the national budget. Due to US pressure, many 
international financial institutions had blocked funding for Nicaragua. At the 
same time, prices for agrarian export products remained low, which exacerbated 
the scarcity of foreign currency. There had been shortages of basic grains since the 
early 1980s, reinforced by natural disaster, but in 1984 the situation worsened. 
The Nicaraguan economy became a ‘shortage economy’31 and this had many 
negative consequences for Nicaraguan consumers, who had to bear the time-
consuming search for food and the erosion of real wages. Long lines formed 
outside shops and frequently consumers were unable to acquire basic products 
28 Centro de Investigación y Estudios de la Reforma Agraria, Distribución y consumo popular, 
12–13.
29 On potatoes, see Evaluación externa. Retrospectiva y prospectiva del proyecto agropecuario 
MAG-COSUDE. Estelí, Nicaragua, 10–22 June 1991. E2025A#2002/145#2338, 
Bundesarchiv Bern; on soy, see H. Simon, ‘Probleme und Perspektiven von Frauenförderung 
vor dem sozio-ökonomischen Hintergrund Nicaraguas, 128–48.
30 T.W. Walker, Nicaragua: Living in the Shadow of the Eagle, 92–5.
31 The term was coined by the economist János Kornai, who analysed the historical development 
of economies in central, eastern and south-eastern Europe from the 1950s. It refers to chronic 
shortage of important goods as a result of the economy’s structure. B. Tomka, A Social History 
of Twentieth Century Europe, 242. Even if the Nicaraguan economy was not entirely planned, 
structural problems caused the lack of products available to consumers.
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such as sugar, wheat, toilet paper or soap. In 1984, Managuan supermarkets 
reported the first violent protests by consumers, who smashed windows to gain 
access to food.32 Simultaneously, black markets witnessed rapid growth. In 
Managua, informal trade was concentrated at the largest Managuan market, the 
Oriental, where speculators offered scarce goods at exorbitant prices. By 1984, 
the Sandinistas had intensified control measures, for example, by introducing 
a consumer card system for the distribution of rice, beans, salt, sugar, corn, oil, 
soap and matches.
As outlined above, agricultural production had not advanced sufficiently 
to guarantee a basic grain supply to all Nicaraguans. By 1983, the lack of 
foreign currency further undermined production as the government was facing 
serious difficulties in importing necessary agricultural inputs, such as tools and 
fertilisers. This shortage was particularly acute for technology-based crops, such 
as rice, whose production fell significantly between 1983 and 1986. The growing 
dependency on imports and food aid went, paradoxically, hand in hand with 
a radicalisation of the discourse on self-sufficiency. For instance, the FSLN 
newspaper Barricada characterised urban gardens as ‘trenches against hunger’.33 
In illustrations, peasants’ tools were portrayed as weapons, which is indicative of 
the militarisation of political propaganda in the mid 1980s.34 
A closer look at rural communities reveals, however, that the countryside did 
not fight unconditionally at the Sandinistas’ side, either in the military conflict or 
in agricultural production.35 This was the result of the contradictory Sandinista 
agrarian policy during the early revolutionary years. The Agrarian Reform 
Law resulted in very little land being distributed to small peasants, because 
Sandinista elites at the agriculture ministry favoured large-scale agriculture. They 
designed huge, spectacular projects that failed to address Nicaraguan realities.36 
By contrast, advocates of a small peasants strategy formed the majority at 
CIERA, but their arguments were not heard until it became apparent that more 
peasants were supporting the Contras. By the mid 1980s, the Sandinistas had 
accelerated land distribution, were paying higher prices for basic grains, and had 
implemented a new rural supply network.37
To alleviate the general supply situation, the government relied increasingly 
on external food aid, a trend set in 1981, when more than 77.3 million tons of 
food were received. Throughout the decade, wheat, corn and rice were the most 
32 Barricada, ‘Abastecimiento irregular en barrio Bello Horizonte’, 17 Aug. 1984, 10.
33 Translation from Spanish original. Barricada, ‘Huertos: lucha contra el hambre y el bloqueo’, 
3 June 1985, 3.
34 See, e.g., Barricada, ‘Trabajo y defensa ... un solo frente de combate’, 10 June 1985, 8.
35 I.A. Luciak, The Sandinista Legacy: Lessons from a Political Economy in Transition, 123–4; L. 
Horton, Peasants in Arms: War and Peace in the Mountains of Nicaragua, 1979–1994, 158–60.
36 S. Ramírez, Adiós Muchachos: A Memoir of the Sandinista Revolution, 168. Joseph Collins 
had expressed similar fears in the mid 1980s in Nicaragua: Was hat sich durch die Revolution 
verändert? Agrarreform und Ernährung im neuen Nicaragua, with the assistance of F. Moore 
Lappé et al, 148–51.
37 Luciak, The Sandinista Legacy, 124–31; E. Baumeister, ‘Agrarian reform’, 239–40.
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important donated products. This made it possible to guarantee supply quotas at 
times of difficulty, but it also silently undermined Nicaragua’s policy of becoming 
more independent from external aid. Between 1982 and 1984, western European 
governments, Canada and the European Economic Community (EEC) provided 
large amounts of aid, while food donations from socialist countries increased 
significantly after 1983, and had become the most important source of aid by 
1984.38 This reflects a general shift in external aid for the revolutionary project. 
On the one hand, the United States exercised diplomatic pressure that made even 
strong allies cave in to their demands. On the other, early enthusiasm was fading. 
Some European governments criticised Sandinista policy as undemocratic and 
thus reduced their economic aid considerably.39 Although, owing to Socialist 
support, the total amount of aid remained more or less stable, Sandinista leaders 
were continuously seeking to acquire new sources, which also meant adapting 
to donors’ agendas.40 For example, the Sandinistas never publicly criticised the 
FAO and incorporated the international organisation’s self-image into Sandinista 
political propaganda. In the end, food aid strengthened the demand for wheat 
products and powdered milk, which further weakened the self-sufficiency 
project. In spite of some voices expressing concern about external dependency, 
in most cases the Sandinistas glorified the aid in public ceremonies as a way of 
demonstrating their strong international reputation. For example, while they 
idealised East German food aid as an expression of proletarian internationalism, 
archival documentation reveals a clear struggle for influence in Cold War 
terrain.41 Moreover, the German Democratic Republic (GDR) hoped to acquire 
Nicaraguan export products, such as coffee, that could help to alleviate its supply 
problems.42 As the economic crisis became ever more visible, GDR consultants 
commented critically on the lack of adequate economic strategies.43
In fact, by 1983, conflicts on the future of Nicaragua’s economic policy had 
emerged. Faced with a lack of access to foreign currency, Sandinista politicians 
began to question whether an expansive social policy was still possible. This 
contentious discussion among political leaders and experts lasted for several 
38 R. Garst, La ayuda alimentaria al istmo centroamericano, Colección Temas de Seguridad 
Alimentaria 13 (Panamá, 1992), cuadro 15. The data are based on the statistics from the 
Nicaraguan Ministry of Exterior Cooperation.
39 K. Christiaens, ‘Between diplomacy and solidarity: western European support networks for 
Sandinista Nicaragua’, 21 (4) (2014).
40 S. Barraclough et al., Aid that Counts: The Western Contribution to Development and Survival in 
Nicaragua, 73.
41 Barricada, ‘RDA entrega el trigo donado’, 9 June 1981, 1, 5. Documentation from German 
state archives reveals that the GDR competed eagerly with Federal Germany to provide food 
aid, as diplomats from both German states saw this as a means of portraying a positive image 
of their political system. Each carefully observed every step their rivals made. 
42 This expectation was not entirely fulfilled as Nicaragua could not deliver all the promised 
products during the mid 1980s.
43 Müller, Bericht über die Beratertätigkeit Monat Jan./Feb. 1985, 11.2.1985; Müller, Bericht 
über die Beratertätigkeit im Zeitraum November/Dezember 1984, 10.12.1984. BArch DE 
1/58123.
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years. Alejandro Martínez-Cuenca, foreign trade minister, favoured an 
adjustment solution, while others still dwelt on structuralist approaches. With 
elections in 1984, they postponed making a decision until 1985, when the first 
signs of hyperinflation were already becoming visible. In February 1985, the 
Sandinistas launched the first economic adjustment package, including budget 
cuts, the elimination of most food subsidies, increased taxes and a devaluation of 
the Nicaraguan currency. With the new economic strategy, food policy became 
less important.44
While external advisers’ early publications about Nicaragua’s food policy 
had been overwhelmingly positive, by the mid 1980s their evaluations had 
become more critical. Joseph Collins’ third, extended version of his book, 
published in 1986, openly expressed his disillusionment. First, he argued, food 
policy was no longer a political priority. Next, he strongly criticised the reliance 
on technology and large-scale production which meant that small producers 
received only limited technological support. Finally, he said, PAN suffered from 
bureaucratic chaos, inadequately educated staff and a lack of resources.45 By that 
point, researchers’ interest in publishing on Sandinista food policy had also faded 
away. Although basic elements of the policy, such as the distribution system, still 
existed, the economic crisis weakened the system’s capacities. The Sandinistas 
launched increasingly militant campaigns blaming external enemies, such as the 
speculators, for the scarcity of goods.
The erosion of Sandinista food policy, 1988–90
The situation steadily worsened in the second half of the 1980s. Between 
1985 and 1987, Nicaraguans faced an 85 per cent erosion of real wages. The 
government was incapable of halting inflation, which reached 747 per cent 
in 1986; 1,347 per cent in 1987 and 33,000 in 1988.46 The crisis eroded the 
country’s food policy and the capacity to store and manage food donations.
Many products were not available through official supply channels, obliging 
people either to search for substitutes or pay exorbitant prices on the black 
market. In spite of all the Sandinistas’ efforts to bring the Managuan Oriental 
market under control, informal trade continued to grow, as official wages did 
not keep up with inflation. Many state employees reduced their working hours 
so as to engage in other survival activities. Criticism grew hand-in-hand with 
eroding living standards, eventually even by the FSLN newspaper in 1987. 
Several writers, such as the Nicaraguan poet Gioconda Belli, rejected the official 
interpretation that speculation was the main enemy of the revolution and 
suggested the reintroduction of food subsidies.47
44 A. Martínez Cuenca, Sandinista Economies in Practice, 65–6; Ramírez, Adiós Muchachos, 
166; Sola Montserrat, Un siglo y medio, 100–1; J. Ricciardi, ‘Economic policy’, 247–73.
45 Collins, Nicaragua, 154–64.
46 Ricciardi, ‘Economic policy’, 261; D. Close, Nicaragua: The Chamorro Years, 128–9.
47 G. Belli: ¿Quienes son los especuladores?’, Barricada, 25 Feb. 1987. Similar doubts about 
the line between commerce, illegal speculation and poor people’s activities were raised by D. 
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After the first adjustment measures, the government’s economic policy 
continued to divide leading Sandinista politicians. The government consulted 
external advisers, among them the US economist Lance Taylor from the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and Daniel Ibarra Muñoz, the 
former treasury secretary for Mexico, who worked as a consultant for the Comisión 
Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL). By 1988, the Central 
American peace negotiations had advanced to the stage where the Sandinistas 
believed that the conflict could be settled and the time for economic reforms had 
come. Finally, the market and structural adjustment advocates won out.48 
In February 1988, the government introduced a first adjustment package that 
included a 10 per cent budget cut, the dismissal of 8,000 public employees and 
the introduction of a new currency. It soon became apparent that the measures 
were not enough to stop inflation. As people continued to suffer from poor 
supply lines and unaffordable prices, they lost confidence in the government’s 
economic policy. In June 1988, a second adjustment package was implemented 
that devalued the new currency and introduced higher prices for public services, 
wage liberalisation and the elimination of the last food subsidy for milk.49 Still 
the economic situation did not improve. Furthermore, measures to alleviate 
the social crisis had only limited effects.50 In October 1988, Hurricane Joan 
hit the country, an additional blow to the Nicaraguan economy. The hurricane 
shattered the Caribbean coast, causing a total of more than US$839 million 
worth of damage.51
The 1988 adjustment was a radical turning point, as the influence of market 
mechanisms in the mixed economy increased. Simultaneously, the Sandinistas 
reduced the scope of their expansive social policy. A closer look at PAN shows 
that Nicaragua’s food policy was eroded during the transition that began in 1988. 
While PAN’s shrinking number of employees still drew up ambitious plans to 
attract foreign funding, the institutional capacity for their implementation 
was limited. As Harald Juch, a German development cooperation employee 
remembers, the staff lacked nutritional knowledge and showed no interest in 
engaging in public education campaigns any more. At the same time, a large 
corruption scandal affected the programme.52 Similarly, ENABAS adapted to 
Martínez, ‘Reintegrar al trabajo a los especuladores’, Barricada, 26 Feb. 1987, 3.
48 Martínez Cuenca, Sandinista Economies, 69–73.
49 Close, Nicaragua: The Chamorro Years, 124–5; G. Dijkstra, Industrialization in Sandinista 
Nicaragua: Policy and Practice in a Mixed Economy, 136–9; Anlage 3: Übersicht über die 
Maßnahmen zur weiteren Durchführung der Wirtschaftsreformen, Stand vom 10.10.1988. 
BArch DE 1/58121.
50 To alleviate the social effects of the crisis, the government introduced a wage increase of 500 
per cent, on the face of it a high amount. However, the real wage increase was estimated at 
just 200 per cent as the new wage system eliminated other incentives. Dr Bothe, ZK-Berater, 
Nicaragua an Dr Schürer, Vorsitzender der Staatlichen Planungskommission, 25.2.1988. 
BArch DE 1/58122; Dijkstra, Industrialization in Sandinista Nicaragua, 136–9.
51 CEPAL, ‘Damage caused by Hurricane Joan in Nicaragua’, 3.
52 H. Juch, ‘Unser revolutionärer Alltag: Teil 2’, Tagebuch Comics Zeichnungen Fotos, 
unpublished manuscript, 1989, 7–13.
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market mechanisms and abandoned the goal of equal access to distribution 
points and storage facilities.
The economic crisis reversed the social advances of the early revolutionary 
years. Average caloric intakes for Nicaraguans fell continuously until 1989. 
Between 1976 and 1986, the average per capita caloric intake in Nicaragua had 
ranged between 2,000 and nearly 2,400 kilocalories (kcal). In 1986, it started 
to fall: first to 1,932 kcal in 1987, then to 1,610 kcal in 1988 and finally to 
1,591 kcal in 1989 – a 22.5 per cent decline.53 By 1988, average caloric intakes 
had fallen below 1,800 kcal, which is below the current FAO’s definition of 
hunger.54 Health surveys also indicated that malnutrition among children 
had once again increased.55 Nevertheless, Sandinista leaders refrained from 
mentioning hunger in internal political propaganda, as this would have been a 
public acknowledgement of failure. The economic crisis and the hurricane also 
strongly affected food production.
The devastation caused by Hurricane Joan led to the erosion of 10,000 
hectares of arable land, and destroyed seeds, food processing facilities, warehouses 
and storage units. In total, 15,700 head of cattle, 15,000 pigs and 460,000 head 
of poultry were killed, further adding to the country’s grave meat shortages. 
The CEPAL diagnosed ‘a serious food shortage’ and estimated that agricultural 
production would decline by 17 per cent.56 Moreover, the lack of fertilisers and 
other agricultural inputs mainly affected the large-scale production of rice, milk 
and meat. For example, milk production declined by 64.9 per cent and beef 
production by 38.1 per cent between 1978 and 1989. Rice production had 
increased by 1982, but then fell by 40.8 per cent between 1982 and 1989.57 
Despite increasing the production of corn and beans after 1987 – a marker of the 
success of the new peasant strategy – the overall situation remained disastrous. 
Food aid reached a new peak of more than 185 million tons in 1988. These 
donations temporarily alleviated the situation but could not resolve the supply 
crisis.58 As the Sandinistas realised that wages at state institutions did not allow 
people to make ends meet, they introduced a special aid package guaranteeing 
low-cost basic food to around 190,000 state employees.59 This measure was 
53 Program Briefing Paper for Potential CARE Food Assistance Activities in Nicaragua, 4 
Apr. 1990, Box 1218, CARE Archives. Protein consumption levels ranged from 50.7 to 
56.3 grams (g) between 1976–85, fell to 49.8 g in 1986 and then to 37.6 g in 1989. CARE 
obtained these data from PAN. 
54 FAO defines hunger as the inability of a person to acquire sufficient food for more than a 
year, taking a minimum level of kilocalories as an indicator. The organisation establishes the 
average need at 2,100 kilocalories per person. 
55 As the economic crisis also undermined the state’s capacity to generate reliable data, surveys 
sometimes only cover limited samples, which makes comparisons difficult. 
56 CEPAL, ‘Damage caused by Hurricane Joan in Nicaragua’, 10.
57 Data from FAOSTAT, http://faostat3.fao.org/home/E (accessed 23 Apr. 2019).
58 Garst, La ayuda alimentaria al istmo centroamericano, cuadro 15.
59 The AFA (arroz, frijoles, azúcar) package included ten pounds of rice, ten pounds of beans and 
five pounds of sugar per month.
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meant to ensure that government institutions could keep working, but it left 
vulnerable groups unprotected.
Far from Managua, global political changes indicated that aid from the 
Eastern bloc would decline, a fact that local Soviet advisers communicated 
to Sandinista politicians.60 Owing to the crisis Hurricane Joan had left in its 
wake, the government introduced a third adjustment programme in early 1989, 
which drastically slashed state expenditure by 44 per cent. As a consequence, 
the government dismissed a further 35,000 state employees and reduced its 
responsibility for state enterprises.61 During the peace process negotiations in 
February 1989, the Sandinistas agreed to bring the national elections forward 
to February 1990, meaning that 1989 became a pre-electoral period. In their 
election campaign the opposition argued that the United States would revive 
economic aid if they were to win, thereby improving the prospects for the 
Nicaraguan economy.62 To counter this, Sandinista political propaganda claimed 
that Soviet support would definitely continue, even though the leadership 
knew this was not the case. Sandinista politicians continued to honour Soviet 
diplomats with reception ceremonies for donations, even as the political 
transformation of the Eastern bloc began.63
Contemporary surveys on adjustment policies indicate Nicaraguans’ growing 
disillusionment and discontent. For example, the ITZANI research institute 
interviewed more than a thousand people in five Managuan districts in spring 
1989. Two-thirds perceived their personal economic situation to be worse than the 
year before. Only 20 per cent viewed the economic policy as good, with more than 
70 per cent expressing a critical opinion: 24 per cent judged the situation as bad, 
14 per cent as terrible and 36 per cent as indifferent. Finally, 25 per cent believed 
that the government was unwilling to find a solution for the country’s economic 
problems.64 The poor economic situation, combined with people’s desire for peace, 
contributed to the Sandinista electoral defeat.
Overall, Sandinista food policy embarked on a course to becoming more 
self-sufficient, but faced a dependency dilemma. Given the scarcity of resources, 
the promotion of basic grain production would have weakened the agro-export 
sector which generated foreign exchange. Hence, the Sandinistas followed an 
alternative course which also reflected the existence of different factions within 
government institutions. Visions of giant state enterprises producing food proved 
unsuccessful, while peasants’ expectations that they would receive individual 
landholdings were fulfilled too late. After the shift to peasant production and the 
liberalisation of basic grain prices in the mid 1980s, the production of corn and 
60 D.M. Ferrero Blanco, ‘Daniel Ortega y Mijail Gorbachov: Nicaragua y la URSS en los 
últimos anos de la Guerra Fría (1985–1990)’.
61 Ricciardi, ‘Economic policy’, 266–7.
62 Close, Nicaragua: The Chamorro Years, 126.
63 Barricada, ‘Llega embarque de arroz URSS a San Juan del Sur’, 24 Jan. 1990, 6.
64 J.W. Soule, ‘The economic austerity packages of 1988 and their impact on public opinion’, 
International Journal of Political Economy, Fall (1990).
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beans did increase. However, this success came too late and was too limited to 
guarantee the growing Nicaraguan population access to basic food. This failure 
undermined the government’s campaigns to strengthen the consumption of local 
food.
After the 1990 elections, the deepening social crisis and occasional price 
shocks continued to affect the Nicaraguan people. By 1992 some 50 per cent 
of the population was suffering from malnutrition. The UNO (National 
Opposition Union) government led by President Violeta Chamorro (1990–7) 
followed a neoliberal economic policy that was supported by a new influx of 
US economic aid and the cooperation of international financial organisations. 
Although the nutritional situation was severe, the food policy of the Chamorro 
government was left at the margins. International organisations, such as the 
FAO, criticised the strong external dependency of the Nicaraguan food 
system.65 A limited number of Sandinista projects were continued by NGOs 
in the 1990s, while agricultural organisations fought to improve the situation 
in the countryside. During the late 1990s and early 2000s, food policy focused 
on fighting the consequences of Hurricane Mitch, which hit the country in 
1998 and caused another food crisis. Corruption scandals discredited ENABAS 
and President Arnoldo Alemán (1997–2002) exploited food aid for electoral 
purposes.66
Although initially the FSLN deeply opposed the UNO government, after a 
year it had taken a more conciliatory stance. By the late 1990s, the FSLN had 
already abandoned its aim of revolutionary change and entered into an alliance 
with the governing Partido Liberal Constitucionalista (PLC), which can only be 
explained by the profound transformation of the party throughout the 1990s. 
Some of the FSLN leadership joined the country’s economic elite by taking 
control of state property during the political transition, a process commonly 
known as the piñata.67
In 2006, thanks to electoral reforms established during the pact period, 
Daniel Ortega won the elections with 38 per cent of the vote and once again 
became president. Researchers have characterised his second presidency as a new 
caudillismo or a ‘populist left regime with hybrid economic features’.68 Contrary 
to other left-wing Latin American governments, Ortega has maintained more 
institutional continuity and refrained from a strong redistributive policy, 
eschewing nationalisation, land reform or price controls.69 Nevertheless, 
65 FAO, Representación en Nicaragua, ‘Informe Anual: Julio 92 a Junio 93’, 1–2; FAO, 
Representación en Nicaragua, ‘Informe Anual: Julio/94 a Junio/95’, 10–11.
66 Nitlápan–Envío Team, ‘Time for a pact or time for a reflection?’, Envío, no. 204, July 1998; 
J.L. Rocha and I. Cristoplos, ‘Las ONGs ante los desastres naturales: vacíos y oportunidades’, 
Envío, no. 212, Nov. 1999.
67 A. Pérez Baltodano, ‘Political culture’; Ramírez, Adiós Muchachos, 32; A. Zamora, 
‘Some reflections on the piñata’, Envío, no. 180, July 1996.
68 Spalding, Contesting Trade, 208.
69 Ibid., 208–10. 
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his government initiated an anti-poverty policy that was much broader than 
previous governments’ efforts. The new government’s package included programs 
such as Zero Usury and Zero Hunger. The basis for this policy was Nicaragua’s 
new alliance with ALBA-TCP (Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra 
América – Tratado de Comercio de los Pueblos),70 whose funding permitted the 
expansive social policy. Ortega’s new allies put fewer restrictions on economic 
aid than European donors, who limited their support after Ortega’s 2011 
unconstitutional re-election.71
Continuity and change in Sandinista food policy
The new Ortega government’s food programmes display some similarities with 
those of the 1980s – rhetorically at least. The government included an urban 
gardening project in its national development plan, reactivated ENABAS and 
continued the corn festivals. Some continuities with the 1980s food projects 
do exist, for example, ENABAS launched a ‘Food for the People’ project with 
the aim of establishing a just market system.72 However, I argue that the heart 
of 1980s Sandinista food policy has not been restored: food subsidies, price 
regulations and land distribution are absent from the new programmes. More 
importantly, the neo-Sandinistas have made no attempt to break with the 
capitalist economy. Thus far, public debates and research have focused on the 
Zero Hunger Program and the food sovereignty law, because these initiatives are 
embedded within broader regional or global political initiatives. No systematic 
evaluation of Nicaraguan food politics has been made since 2006, so what 
follows is a broad summary of the most important trends until 2016.
The 1980s Sandinista food policy laid the groundwork for the food 
sovereignty debate by prioritising locally produced food and demanding the 
right to shape the local food system. Furthermore, the Sandinista Revolution 
left a legacy of active peasant organisations mobilising for change and debating 
agrarian issues. During the 1980s, these peasant organisations and conferences 
on agrarian reforms established a process of exchange that favoured the rise of the 
LVC (the transnational peasant movement), with the Asociación de Trabajadores 
en el Campo (ATC) and the Union Nacional de Agricultores y Ganaderos 
(UNAG) as founding members.73 In 1997, Sandinista deputy Dora Zeledón 
launched the first initiative for a food security law. The proposal rejected the 
70 The alliance was founded in 2004 by Venezuela and Cuba as an alternative to the Free Trade 
Area of the Americas (FTAA). The two nations agreed on terms for the petroleum trade and 
intensified exchanges in the areas of health and education. Later, Bolivia in 2006, Nicaragua 
in 2007, Ecuador in 2009 and several Caribbean nations joined ALBA.
71 S. Martí i Puig and D. Close, ‘The Nicaraguan exception?’, 299–300. E.g., Denmark ended 
bilateral development cooperation with Nicaragua in 2012, while other countries, such as 
Germany and Finland, announced their intention to evaluate and reduce their programmes.
72 Alianza de los pequeños productores organizados, con ENABAS y los CPC, ‘Creación de Red 
de Mercado Justo’, 2007.
73 W. Godek, ‘Challenges for food sovereignty policy making: the case of Nicaragua’s law 693’.
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perception of food as merchandise and suggested that 50 per cent of Nicaragua’s 
food supply should be provided by national production. Food aid distribution, 
which the law considered to be ‘unfair competition’ for local production, would 
be limited to exceptional supply crises resulting from natural disasters and other 
unforeseen events.74 In the years after 1997, although the initial proposal was 
modified several times, the government of President Enrique Bolaños (2002–7) 
remained unwilling to pass the legislation.
In Nicaragua, the concept of food sovereignty gained traction after the 
2001 World Forum on Food Sovereignty. From then on, LVC member 
organisations began to discuss a new initiative for a food sovereignty law. In 
2004, 40 organisations from Nicaraguan civil society founded the Grupo de 
Interés Soberanía y Seguridad Alimentaria y Nutricional (GISSAN) to promote 
the law. As that name indicates, the debate over concepts continued among the 
initiative’s supporters, because the term ‘food security’ seemed more familiar and 
concrete to many of them. In 2005, GISSAN member organisations worked on 
a new draft for a law that Deputy Wálmaro Gutiérrez (FSLN) introduced to the 
National Assembly in 2006.75 When the National Assembly discussed the law in 
June 2007, the new Ortega government was already in power.
With Ortega’s electoral victory, it seemed more likely that the law would 
be approved. However, the legislation prompted contentious discussions and 
National Assembly deputies rejected the law during its second reading. The 
private sector was particularly opposed to Article 5, which prohibited imports 
of genetically modified food. The business community feared that the law would 
also affect the implementation of the Central America Free Trade Agreement 
(CAFTA) and convinced PLC members to oppose the project. After the first 
initiative failed in 2007, the FAO joined the effort and the law project was 
deradicalised. Those articles which permitted the creation of grain reserves 
and price regulations were eliminated from the draft legislation. In addition, 
Article 9 of the law clearly established that state policies should not touch free 
enterprise and commerce, which meant a surrender to market mechanisms.76 
The deradicalisation of the law reflected the government’s interest in avoiding 
further conflicts with the private sector and the IMF. While discussions about 
the legislation continued, the government launched the Zero Hunger Program 
as a core element of its anti-poverty policy.
The Zero Hunger Program has generated a contentious debate as critics 
accused the Sandinistas of political favouritism. Its name was inspired by 
the Brazilian ‘Fome Zero’ programme. Launched in 2003 by President Luiz 
Inácio Lula da Silva, the programme included cash transfers for poor families, 
favourable interest rates for family farmers and a school meals programme. The 
74 Asamblea Nacional de la República de Nicaragua, ‘Iniciativa de ley “Ley de Seguridad 
Alimentaria”’, unpublished manuscript, 1998.
75 Godek, ‘The institutionalization of food sovereignty’, 175–81. 
76 B. Müller, ‘The loss of harmony: FAO guidance for food security in Nicaragua’; Godek, 
‘Challenges for food sovereignty policy making’.
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Nicaraguan project, however, had a narrower focus, mainly providing peasants 
with the necessary basic inputs for food production. It distributed a package of 
animals, seeds and construction materials worth US$2,000 to 75,000 peasant 
families. Critics bemoaned the programme’s lack of transparency with regard 
to the selection of beneficiaries, as well as the fact that it was not incorporated 
into a broader strategy against malnutrition. A 2007/2008 evaluation suggests 
that the selection criteria for the programme were too vague, allowing political 
considerations to play a role, which in turn led to regions in Central Nicaragua 
such as Masaya being favoured.77 The question of whether the focus on peasant 
farmers was the result of lessons learned in the 1980s, or simply an attempt to 
jump on the bandwagon of the Brazilian initiative, remains the subject of further 
research.78
Efforts to revive 1980s projects are also visible in food distribution and urban 
gardening. The state distribution agency ENABAS resisted privatisation during 
the 1990s, but its capacities were significantly reduced. The neo-Sandinista 
government revived the enterprise and started reconstructing food storage 
facilities with ALBA funding. In addition, ENABAS launched the Programa 
Nacional de Distribución de Alimentos para el pueblo, which aimed to create 
a new network of state distribution points. According to the enterprise’s 
homepage, it has founded more than 3,800 distribution points in about a 
hundred Nicaraguan municipalities.79 However, no systematic research has been 
conducted on the programme’s effects.
Three years after taking over government, the Sandinistas also relaunched 
urban gardening projects. Starting in 2010, with two projects in Los Laureles 
district in Managua and Ciudad Sandino, the so-called Healthy Backyard 
Program was incorporated into the national development plan for 2012 
to 2016.80 During that period, the idea was that 250,000 gardens would be 
involved throughout the country. The gardening projects also aimed at increasing 
fruit and vegetable consumption. Evaluations by geographer Laura Shillington 
demonstrate that local inhabitants sometimes disagreed with international 
project staff about which plants would be most beneficial for their gardens.81
The idea of strengthening local food consumption is also visible at the corn 
festivals. After the Sandinista defeat these festivals had continued at the regional 
level and became more touristy. In Jalapa and Matagalpa, especially, the tradition 
remained strong. Between 2005 and 2015 their mottoes have emphasised 
77 P. Kester, Informe evaluativo (2007–2008): Programa Productivo Alimentario (PPA) ‘Hambre 
Cero’, 17; Spalding, ‘Poverty politics’.
78 Rose Spalding argues that the government launched the Zero Hunger Program having 
possibly learned from its experiences in the 1980s. Ibid., 233.
79 https://web.archive.org/web/20170426210719/http://www.enabas.gob.ni/enabas (accessed 
on 2 July 2019).
80 FAO, ‘Urban and peri-urban agriculture in Latin America and the Caribbean: Managua’.
81 L.J. Shillington, ‘Right to food, right to the city: household urban agriculture, 
and socionatural metabolism in Managua’.
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Nicaragua’s role as a significant corn producer, for example ‘La gran milpa de 
Nicaragua’ (2008) or ‘Jalapa con su maíz … orgullo de mi país!’ (2009).82 At the 
2011 corn festival in Matagalpa, the local FSLN mayor clearly favoured the 
food sovereignty movement. He argued staunchly that it was necessary to rescue 
Nicaraguan culinary traditions for future generations, and that its food was a 
patrimonial value of Nicaraguan culture and formed part of the country’s food 
sovereignty.83 After 1999, corn production increased significantly, peaking in 
2003, and fluctuating between 443,700 and 545,938 tons in the following years.84
In the last two decades, basic grain production has increased, reducing the 
dependency of the Nicaraguan food system on external sources. In 2011/2012, 
Nicaragua was among the least dependent Central American countries in terms 
of basic grain trade.85 However, per capita food availability decreased after 2004 
owing to low yields, which could create further supply problems in the future.86 
Compared to the early 1990s, the nutritional situation in Nicaragua has 
improved considerably in the last two decades. Rates of malnutrition fell from 50 
per cent (1990–2) to 38 per cent (1995–7) to 25 per cent (2000–2). According 
to recent FAO data, the situation has improved further with a reduction in 
malnutrition from 22.3 per cent in 2007 to 16.6 per cent in 2015.87 However, 
undernourishment is still a major problem. Between 2009 and 2013, an average 
of 23 per cent of Nicaraguan children suffered from chronic malnutrition.88 
In rural areas, the situation remains depressing, with poverty rates exceeding 50 
per cent.89
Conclusion
The Sandinista Revolution established ambitious aims: to break with export 
dependency, democratise access to food and guarantee all Nicaraguans a basic 
supply of food. In the early revolutionary years, the government and mass 
organisations designed creative campaigns, which mobilised thousands of 
people, with the goal of ensuring local food security. The Sandinista policy also 
gained the support of international organisations, such as the FAO, WHO 
82 El Nuevo Diario, ‘Preparan feria del maíz en Jalapa’, 28 Aug. 2008; El Nuevo Diario, 
‘Jalapa con su maíz... orgulllo de Nicaragua’, 17 Sept. 2009.
83 Transcription from my sound recording at the event, Apr. 2011.
84 Statistics from FAOSTAT, http://faostat3.fao.org/home/E (accessed 23 Apr. 2019). The peak 
production in 2003 was 588,599 tons, followed by 443,730 tons in 2004 and 545,938 tons 
in 2013.
85 FAO, ‘Panorama de la seguridad alimentaria y nutricional en América Latina y el Caribe 
2011: altos precios de los alimentos: oportunidades y riesgos’, 2011, 63–6.
86 G. Bornemann et al., ‘Desafíos desde la seguridad alimentaria y nutricional en Nicaragua’, 34.
87 Statistics from FAOSTAT, http://faostat3.fao.org/browse/D/FS/E (accessed 23 Apr. 2019).
88 Unicef, ‘At a glance: Nicaragua’, www.unicef.org/infobycountry/nicaragua_statistics.html 
(accessed 23 Apr. 2019).
89 INIDE, ‘Results of the National Households Survey on Measurement of Level of Life, 2014’, 
2015, http://www.inide.gob.ni/Emnv/Emnv14/Poverty%20Results%202014.pdf (accessed 
23 Apr. 2019).
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and UNICEF. In addition, bilateral development cooperation fostered many 
revolutionary projects to increase food production. However, these ambitious 
plans faced enormous challenges because of the dependency of the Nicaraguan 
economy on agro exports, war and the economic blockade. Moreover, Sandinista 
agrarian policy remained contradictory. Until the mid 1980s, it promoted large-
scale, modern agriculture, while giving peasants less support. This was one of 
the reasons why basic grain production did not expand as rapidly as it should 
have done.
Within the Central American context of the early 1980s, Nicaragua’s food 
policy, with its strong focus on self-sufficiency, was exceptional. Looking at other 
Global South countries, however, it is possible to identify similarities with the 
Nicaraguan approach. After attaining political independence in the 1950s and 
1960s, many Asian and African countries developed self-sufficiency projects. 
Political independence was linked to economic independence and control of 
food resources. As in Nicaragua, these countries struggled to find a balance 
between self-sufficiency, food aid and Green Revolution strategies. Research on 
these self-sufficiency projects has not yet been completed, and it is not clear 
whether experts from the international nutrition community were involved 
in these efforts. The evidence for Nicaragua indicates that, starting from the 
early 1980s, international organisations and bilateral support from individual 
countries influenced strategic decision-making about food policy.
Nicaragua is a prime example of the many small countries with dependent 
economies in the Global South that experienced regime changes and became 
Cold War hotspots in the 20th century. After 1979, experts from both Cold 
War blocs struggled for influence over Sandinista politics in different areas. 
Products from both fronts of the Cold War entered Nicaraguan territory in the 
form of food aid, a phenomenon that was extensive in Central America but also 
happened in other Global South countries.
During a short honeymoon period, international organisations and NGOs 
promoted Nicaragua as a model for food policy in the Global South, and 
Nicaragua disseminated proposals for self-sufficiency and regional food security 
alliances at international conferences. These ambitious projects, however, faced 
serious economic limitations: the nation’s dependency on agro exports generated 
conflicts around resources, basic grain production did not expand sufficiently, 
and tensions weakened the relationship between Sandinistas and the peasants.
By 1985, the Nicaraguan economy had entered a severe crisis and the supply 
situation became steadily worse. Because of this, the Sandinista government 
had to rely increasingly on food imports and aid, which undermined the self-
sufficiency project. The reliance on donations also implied a growing surrender 
to the donors’ political agendas, visible in the numerous reception ceremonies 
for food aid. With the 1988 adjustment programmes, the ambitious food policy 
was completely eroded. The financial crisis reversed state institutions’ capacity 
to store food, manage the incoming donations, and implement the projects 
financed by external donors. Simultaneously, the strengthening of market 
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mechanisms reversed the democratisation of the food distribution network. 
Finally, the failure of the Sandinistas to guarantee a stable basic food supply 
during the crisis years contributed significantly to its electoral defeat in 1990. In 
the early 1990s, the UNO government neglected food policy, despite widespread 
malnutrition. At the same time, the food system remained highly dependent on 
imports whose lower prices harmed local food producers who were unable to 
compete.
However, the Sandinistas Revolution left an active network of peasant 
organisations that continued to mobilise for social change. They contributed 
to the campaign for a food sovereignty law in the early 2000s. The close 
collaboration between the Sandinistas and FAO in the 1980s had introduced 
the principle of food security into Nicaraguan politics. Later on, important 
elements of the Sandinista food policy were taken up by the food sovereignty 
movement, such as the priority for locally produced food, agrarian reform and 
the autonomous definition of the local food system. After the 2001 World 
Forum on Food Sovereignty, the issues of food security and food sovereignty 
were debated intensely in Nicaragua. With the FSLN electoral victory, favourable 
conditions for the proposed legislation seemed to have arrived, but in the event, 
the law was passed in a watered-down form.
Although names and rhetoric are similar, the framework for neo-Sandinista 
food policy differs from that of the 1980s. While the Sandinistas based their 
policy on the idea of a mixed economy, the Ortega government and the new 
Sandinista economic elites have accepted capitalism and adapted their policies 
accordingly, taking care not to endanger agreements with the IMF or violate 
CAFTA rules. Unlike other Latin American left-wing governments, the Ortega 
government has not embarked on profound changes in economic structures 
or land distribution. Nevertheless, social policy is a higher priority than it was 
for previous Nicaraguan governments. In fact, poverty and malnutrition from 
2005 to 2015 decreased significantly. Moreover, Nicaragua has become less 
dependent on grain imports than other Central American countries. However, 
reliance on external sources is still a problem: the Ortega government changed 
the country’s foreign alliances, which created a dependency on ALBA funding. 
The deep economic crisis in Venezuela has made ALBA support more uncertain, 
which might also endanger the neo-Sandinistas’ social policy. Because of this, 
malnutrition could rise again, given Nicaragua’s vulnerability to natural disasters, 
dependency on volatile external resources and low basic grains productivity.
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4. On Sandinista ideas of past connections to the 
Soviet Union and Nicaraguan exceptionalism*
Johannes Wilm
Nicaraguan views on relations between Nicaragua and Eastern Europe/the former Soviet Union in the 1980s, is the focus of this chapter. Much has been written about the nature of these relations,1 but little 
about Nicaraguan and Sandinista perceptions of that situation and how these 
have informed Nicaraguan actions. The hypothesis presented here is that the 
seemingly contradictory behaviour and relations between Nicaragua and the 
Soviet Union during that period in the 1980s can be explained by the tendency 
of many key Nicaraguan Sandinistas to place historical agency for events that 
happen in country in their Nicaraguan hands. While Sandinistas are quick to 
point to Nicaragua’s relationship of economic dependence with the United States 
during Somoza’s time and liberal opposition rule between 1990 and 2007, they 
do not view the country’s relationship with the Soviet Union as having had 
the same dependence. Nicaragua is thought of as acting independently of its 
economic circumstances, acting on the world stage as if it were a major power, 
which makes it an exception when compared to its neighbours. It is likely that 
Sandinistas’ support for this view has permitted the most powerful Nicaraguan 
leaders, including President Daniel Ortega, to act as they do and to gain support 
throughout the country for their actions.
* My thanks to Mark Jamieson and Dennis Rodgers, who initially pointed out that the 
collected material on Nicaraguan students in Eastern Europe was significant; to Stephen 
Nugent and Casey High for their many comments on a chapter on a similar theme in my 
PhD thesis, which influenced the final outcome of this chapter; to Michael Böhner who 
spent much time explaining the structures of solidarity with Nicaragua as viewed by GDR-
solidarity activists; to the many Sandinista informants of all ages who gave up their time to 
be interviewed and, in many cases, also hosted me; to the participants of the Central America 
research conference at the Institute of Latin American Studies (ILAS) in London in spring 
2015, whose feedback was of great importance; to Sarah Zurhellen who helped with the final 
wording of this contribution; and to Hilary Francis for her work editing this collection.
1 P. Shearman, ‘The Soviet challenge in Central America’; E. Dominguez Reyes, ‘Soviet 
relations with Central America, the Caribbean, and members of the Contadora group’; 
J. Suchlicki, ‘Soviet policy in Latin America: implications for the United States’; R. Berrios, 
‘Relations between Nicaragua and the socialist countries’.
J. Wilm, ‘On Sandinista ideas of past connections to the Soviet Union and Nicaraguan 
exceptionalism’, in H. Francis (ed.), A Nicaraguan Exceptionalism? Debating the Legacy of the 
Sandinista Revolution (London: University of London Press, 2019), pp. 87–102. License: CC-
BY-NC-ND.
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The Nicaraguan concept of ‘agency’, or protagonismo, differs sharply from the 
understanding of the term that is prevalent among some academics. Historians 
in particular tend to think of agency as the effort expended by people who have 
dreams and try to achieve things, but are ultimately limited by structures. For 
example, Tanya Harmer argues that Chilean agency in the run-up to the 1973 
coup has been underestimated – but she makes it clear that for it ‘does not equal 
power’. An emphasis on Latin Americans’ agency does not, she believes, imply 
a belief that Latin Americans had the power then to ‘radically remake the world 
and their place in it’.2
The term ‘agency’, as it is used here, is much more expansive and closer 
to anthropologist David Graeber’s understanding of ‘historical agency’: the 
capacity of a subject to make history or to change the course of history.3 In other 
words, having historical agency does not simply mean acting or being able to 
pressure others to act: it requires having the power to change things. Historical 
agency. Understood this way, it is the ability to diverge from the ‘normal’ path of 
events conditioned by external circumstances. Graeber’s approach has much in 
common with the idea of protagonismo used in Nicaraguan popular discourse. 
Declarations about the existence of protagonismo are found throughout 
Nicaraguan society. It is not uncommon to hear younger Sandinista leaders 
discuss the ‘protagonismo’ of young people in the revolutionary process, because 
– so the argument goes – young people are less bound by existing rules and 
customs, and are therefore more willing to try something new. In this chapter, 
the Nicaraguan understanding of the concept is favoured because it offers an 
overview of Nicaraguan perceptions about where historical agency lies, rather 
than an analysis of where agency can objectively said to be found. 
This emphasis on agency in Sandinista discourse might seem surprising. 
Sandinista political thought is fully grounded in dependency theory and the idea 
that Nicaragua’s poverty was the result of an exploitative, unequal relationship 
with the United States. In a sense, it is precisely this consciousness of structural 
constraints that drove Nicaraguans’ expansive understanding of agency. This 
connection is clear in Stephen Henighan’s discussion of the work of Sergio 
Ramírez, the Sandinista politician and author. Henighan shows how Ramírez’ 
belief, grounded in dependency theory (Nicaragua is a ‘backward, dominated 
nation’), leads directly to his conviction that ‘“it is necessary to consolidate 
national identity” in a project of national liberation’.4
2 T. Harmer, ‘Tanya Harmer, Allende’s Chile and the Inter-American Cold War’, H-Diplo 
Roundtable Review, 14 (1) (n.d.), D. Walcher and D. Labrosse (eds.), https://issforum.org/
roundtables/PDF/Roundtable-XIV-2.pdf. (accessed 27 Apr. 2019).
3 D. Graeber, ‘Epilogue to the disastrous ordeal of 1987’, 1996.
4 S. Henighan, Sandino’s Nation: Ernesto Cardenal and Sergio Ramírez Writing Nicaragua, 
1940–2012, 450.
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Nicaragua’s relationship with the Eastern bloc
The Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN), the radical element in 
the opposition to the US-sponsored Somoza dictatorship in Nicaragua since 
the early 1960s, succeeded in taking power on 19 July 1979, after a final 
revolutionary insurrection that had started in 1978 and led to about 30,000 
deaths.5 During the 1980s and until the FSLN lost power in 1990, Nicaragua 
was an ally of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. However, the origins of 
the connection between Nicaragua and Eastern Europe, as well as Cuba, in the 
1980s are not entirely clear. On the one hand, some early FSLN leaders had 
previously been part of the Moscow-allied Partido Socialista Nicaragüense 
(PSN). The most well-known among these was Carlos Fonseca Amador, who 
wrote a book about his 1957 experience in Moscow.6 On the other, according 
to currently available evidence, the Nicaraguan revolutionaries did not have 
connections with Moscow during the 1970s. Even after taking power, the 
future President Daniel Ortega’s initial conversations were with US President 
Jimmy Carter in September 1979. The talks led to a loan of US$2 million. 
Furthermore, relations between the US embassy and the Sandinistas were 
friendly in the first months after the takeover.7 Some US political commentators 
even argued that this was an opportunity for the United States to take on the 
role of supporting a revolutionary government, which, until then, had been one 
occupied exclusively by the Soviet Union and Cuba.8
At the same time as the connection to the Soviet Union expanded gradually 
during the first year of Sandinista government, the United States was replaced 
as Nicaragua’s main trading partner. It is not entirely clear which of these was 
the cause and which the effect. By October 1979, US analysts claimed they had 
seen evidence that Cuba had 50 advisers in Nicaragua.9 In February 1980, after 
several months of delay, a narrow majority in the US House of Representatives 
approved a meagre US$75 million in aid to Nicaragua. This had been promised 
earlier, but 60 per cent of it was earmarked to go to private businesses, and any 
expenditure on education projects involving Cuban teachers was prohibited.10 
The amount was much less than the Sandinistas had hoped for and tiny when 
compared with US$1.5 billion debt that the Sandinistas had been asked to 
5 L.H. Gelb, ‘On arms for Nicaragua’, New York Times, 29 Aug. 1979.
6 C. Fonseca Amador, Un Nicaragüense en Moscú.
7 A. Riding, ‘Foreign policy set by Managua called realistic; U.S. seeks regime’s confidence’, 
New York Times, 9 Oct. 1979.
8 Gelb, ‘On arms for Nicaragua’; A. Riding, ‘Nicaragua after Somoza; after Somoza’, New York 
Times, 3 Feb. 1980.
9 ‘U.S. analysts say Cuba is keeping forces abroad; Cubans poorly paid’, New York Times, 
21 Oct. 1979. 
10 G. Hovey, ‘House, by 5-vote margin, passes Bill on assistance for Nicaragua’, New York 
Times, 28 Feb. 1980.
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accept from the Somoza regime in 1979.11 At this stage, it seemed clear that 
Nicaragua would have to find funding from an alternative source, and in March 
1980, a Nicaraguan delegation led by Moisés Hassan, a member of the interim 
governing junta, signed a range of agreements with the Soviet Union.12 This 
placed the country firmly in the camp of the Warsaw Pact countries, which also 
meant a freeze in their relations with the United States. Starting in the period 
1981–3, Nicaragua received measurable military and economic aid from the 
Soviet Union, including tanks, wheat and credit for purchases.13
The change in Nicaragua’s relationship with the United States during that 
first year can also be understood in terms of political differences and shifts in the 
later. Under President Jimmy Carter, the US had first tried to support a moderate 
opposition, without Sandinista participation, in the months prior to the taking 
of power in 1979. Once the Sandinistas were in power, however, the Carter 
administration did try to work with them. It was only when the promised aid 
package had to go through Congress, where it met the opposition of conservative 
Republicans, that restrictions were added to prevent the Sandinistas from aiding 
other armed groups. When they did so anyway, Carter suspended the aid (instead 
of cancelling it). It was only after President Reagan took office that the United 
States changed its strategy and began funding a war against the Sandinistas.14
Relations with the Soviet Union and its allies grew rapidly. Nicaragua’s trade 
with the countries belonging to the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance 
(CMEA), the economic organisation that united the Soviet Union’s closer allies, 
was only 1.1 per cent in 1980, but by 1987 this figure had risen to 48.6 per cent. 
By 1985, after Mexico stopped sending oil to Nicaragua due to its failure to pay, 
90 per cent of petrol imports came from the Soviet Union.15 In addition to such 
aid, advisers from these countries stayed in Nicaragua for extended periods, and 
in 1979–90, many Nicaraguan students pursued their education in allied socialist 
countries (although the total number of students who went abroad is not fully 
known). According to estimates, 20,000 students followed courses in Cuba,16 
11 A. Riding, ‘Nicaragua tries economic cure; concern among bankers’, New York Times, 27 
Nov. 1979.
12 ‘Nicaragua leaders sign pacts with Soviet Union’, New York Times, 23 Mar. 1980.
13 Reyes, ‘Soviet relations with Central America, the Caribbean, and members of the Contadora 
Group’, 149–50.
14 W.M. Leogrande, ‘Making the economy scream: US economic sanctions against Sandinista 
Nicaragua’.
15 F. Harto de Vera, ‘La U.R.S.S. y la revolución sandinista: los estrechos límites de la solidaridad 
soviética’, 89.
16 R. Zúñiga interview with Marlén Villavicencio: ‘Ser internacionalista, para nosotros es un 
principio inalienable’, 23 Nov. 2011.
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4,500–5,500 in East Germany17 and 8,200 in the Soviet Union (approximately 
7,000 civilian18 and 1,183 military).19
International and Nicaraguan perceptions of  
Nicaraguan-Soviet relations
The confrontation with the United States and the cooperation with Cuba and 
Eastern Europe ended up as a major part of the Sandinista reality of the 1980s, 
so it is not strange that many Nicaraguans who lived during that time have 
developed an opinion about it. Additionally, events in Nicaragua became world 
news during much of the 1980s. Nicaraguan understandings of cooperation 
between Sandinista Nicaragua and the communist bloc differed substantially 
from the views that prevailed elsewhere. For US President Ronald Reagan, the 
Soviet Union had obtained ‘a beachhead in North America’. Reagan feared that 
‘[u]sing Nicaragua as a base, the Soviets and Cubans can become the dominant 
power in the crucial corridor between North and South America’.20 While many 
outside Nicaragua disputed Reagan’s assessment of the threat that Nicaragua 
posed, most people would probably accept the general idea that this was yet 
another manifestation of the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the United 
States.
Most scholarship on the relationship between Nicaragua and the Soviet 
Union dates from the 1980s. Unsurprisingly, given the immediate stakes, this 
work is extremely polarised. Some scholars argued that Nicaragua was heavily 
reliant on the Soviet Union, while others saw a much looser relationship. Jiri 
Valenta described the Sandinistas and the Soviet Union as long-time allies: 
‘[F]rom the beginning the FSLN has been led by dedicated, Leninist-oriented 
revolutionaries with long-standing ties to the Cuban and (to a lesser degree) 
Soviet communist parties’.21 Valenta also guessed that ‘the KGB probably assisted 
in efforts to train, finance, and arm the FSLN through Cuban intermediaries’,22 
though he failed to present any meaningful evidence to back up his claim. 
Among those who discerned less Soviet planning behind events, Peter Shearman 
argued that the revolution itself was regionally developed and financed through 
17 M. Böhner to J. Wilm, ‘Answer to the question “How many Nicaraguans studied in the GDR 
in the 1980s”’, 24 Jan. 2016. Böhner is a former GDR-Nicaragua Solidarity activist and 
expert on GDR-Nicaragua relations. The question was posed by the author during personal 
correspondence with Böhner.
18 M. Espinoza to J. Leiva, ‘Cantidad de estudiantes en la URSS, respuesta a la pregunta al 
Director del Centro Regional de Estudios Internacionales (CREI)’, 23 Jan. 2016. Interview 
conducted in person. 
19 Ejército de Nicaragua, ‘Profesionalización del Ejército de Nicaragua’, 91.
20 R. Reagan, ‘Address to the nation on the situation in Nicaragua’, 1986, mp3, Presidential 
Audio Recordings, 1/20/1981–1/20/1989, US National Archives, https://catalog.archives.
gov/id/7450184 (accessed 26 Apr. 2019).
21 J. Valenta, ‘Nicaragua: Soviet-Cuban pawn or non-aligned country?’, 165.
22 Ibid., 167.
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other local powers, such as Costa Rica and Mexico, and that it was only once the 
revolution had triumphed that ‘the Soviet Union enter[ed] the picture as a major 
actor’. However, he went on to explain, Nicaragua was not likely to become part 
of the CMEA and, in that sense, was more distant from the central powers.23 
Similarly, Edmé Dominguez Reyes described the events of 1979 as having been 
a ‘surprise’ for the Soviet Union, and although it became a major source of aid 
for Nicaragua in subsequent years, he said the Soviet attitude toward Nicaragua 
was cautious and mindful of the possibility that the United States could become 
directly involved in a war with Nicaragua.24 This diversity of views is partly 
a reflection of the academics’ political differences, but it is also indicative of 
an ambiguity in the Sandinistas’ position. Nicaragua’s leaders seemed to be 
committed Marxists, possibly even Leninists, with views compatible with the 
Soviet Union’s. They even abstained from voting against the Soviet occupation 
of Afghanistan at the United Nations.25 At the same time, the country continued 
to have a mixed economy and maintained good relations with western European 
social democratic parties. In other words, the Sandinistas did not behave as if 
they were managed from Moscow.
This ambiguity was not present in the discourse about the relationship 
developed by Nicaraguan leaders in the 1980s, one that is still prevalent 
among Sandinistas today. Rather, Sandinista leaders asserted that Nicaragua 
was completely free of foreign influence. In 1981, Sergio Ramírez, at the time 
a member of the government junta and vice-president from 1985, said the 
following about the concerns of the United States:
One of the things on which the government of the United States insisted 
recently was the supposed involvement of the Soviet Union with Nicaragua. 
It did this to convert the actual and real confrontation that there is between 
the United States and Nicaragua into a part of an East–West confrontation 
in Central America. We deny it once more because the only thing that is 
going on in Nicaragua is the confrontation between the United States and 
Nicaragua, because now we have the historical aspiration to be a free and 
independent country, not part of the orbit of influence of the United States 
and not part of the influence of any country in the world.26
This statement is in line with the Sandinista discourse of the time and the 
majority of views expressed by Sandinistas in the current period of Sandinismo. 
It was Nicaragua which had a conflict with the United States, it was Nicaraguans 
who contacted the Soviet Union; their relationship was one of equals, one in 
which their country was an independent actor; and it was not a relationship 
between colony and empire, as Reagan seemed to portray it.
23 Shearman, ‘The Soviet challenge in Central America’.
24 Reyes, ‘Soviet relations with Central America, the Caribbean, and members of the Contadora 
Group’.
25 Shearman, ‘The Soviet challenge in Central America’, 214.
26 Envío, ‘Continuing tensions between Nicaragua and the United States’, no. 7, Dec. 1981.
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It must be noted that Ramírez spoke somewhat differently about the 
relationship with the Soviet Union after he left the FSLN. In 2007, writing about 
the 1987 peace negotiations, he commented that the Soviet Union had urged the 
Nicaraguan government at that time to agree to a negotiated solution because it 
could not see a military one. As Nicaragua depended on Soviet arms to continue 
the war, the Soviets’ attitude was therefore a significant factor in the Sandinistas’ 
decision to pursue the peace process.27 Whether this represents a rare insight into 
the real, seldom-expressed thinking of a Sandinista elite, or whether Ramírez 
has reinterpreted past events, is hard to know. No matter what the case may be, 
such views are not in line with the arguments of rank-and-file Sandinistas or the 
public speeches of Sandinista leaders now or during the 1980s.
Treatment of former connections to the Soviet bloc after 2007
The extent to which Sandinista leaders had not forgotten their past connections 
to the Soviet bloc, and remembered the time when the Unites States was 
considered an enemy rather than an ally, became clear in the first years after their 
return to power in early 2007. At the annual celebration of the triumph of the 
Sandinista Revolution on 19 July 2008, President Daniel Ortega presented the 
Rubén Dario medal for cultural independence to Margot Honecker, the former 
education minister for East Germany and widow of Erich Honecker, the former 
general secretary of East Germany’s old Socialist Unity Party.28 Honecker had 
not appeared in public since going into exile in Chile in the early 1990s, and she 
was awarded the medal, given specifically for the help East Germany had given 
Nicaragua in the past. Discussing the former Soviet Union in 2007, Daniel 
Ortega repeated the position held in the 1980s – that it was Nicaraguans who 
made the decisions about Nicaragua and that the Soviet Union had respected 
these decisions.29 Ortega views Russia as the continuation of the Soviet Union: 
in 2007 he said: ‘[W]hen we speak of cooperation with Russia, we are speaking 
of taking into account the relation that we had with the Soviet Union, when 
Russia was one of our supporters.’30 In 2008, Ortega declared that Russia was 
‘illuminating the planet’ with its ‘struggle for peace and justice’, while ‘the 
Empire’ (the United States) was threatening it militarily.31 Further down the 
FSLN party hierarchy, one also found admiration for their former allies in the 
period after 2007. This section presents evidence from anthropological fieldwork 
undertaken in this context.
27 Sergio Ramírez, ‘Lo que nos tocó de guerra fría’, El País, 29 Aug. 2007.
28 AFP, ‘Ortega condecora a viuda de Honecker con orden Rubén Darío’, El Universo, 19 July 
2008.
29 D. Ortega, ‘No había tal conflicto Este-Oeste’, 22 Aug. 2007.
30 US Embassy in Managua, ‘Ortega administration at six months’, Wikileaks Public Library 
of US Diplomacy (Nicaragua Managua, 2 July 2007), https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/
cables/07MANAGUA1622_a.html (accessed 27 Apr. 2019).
31 La Prensa, ‘Ortega: “Rusia está iluminando el planeta”’, 18 Sept. 2008.
A NICARAGUAN EXCEPTIONALISM?94
At around the time that Honecker received the Rubén Dario medal, I had 
been interviewing spokespeople at the FSLN municipal headquarters in León 
over a period of several months about current political affairs. The secretary and 
several others who regularly passed through the office therefore recognised me 
as a regular visitor. When I announced I wished to ask about the circumstances 
leading to the decision to give the medal to Honecker, commenting that this was 
rather unusual as German media reports about her were generally unfavourable, 
the reaction was a combination of annoyance and surprise. I was told that the 
medal was something the ‘entire German working class’ should be proud of. 
Then, instead of finding an official to speak to me, I was asked to interview 
another person who was standing in line and had been to East Germany (that 
person had apparently experienced now for the first time and had a wonderful 
stay all in all). Over the next year criticism of Eastern Europe regimes, in that 
first interview and most others I conducted with Nicaraguans who had studied 
in Eastern Europe, was almost non-existent. This was the case, I noticed, even 
among Sandinistas I met who had not been to Eastern Europe. Their descriptions 
of socialism in either region were similarly optimistic.
There were some exceptions to this rule. One former student described how 
everyone in East Germany had read Das Kapital: the bus driver, the person 
checking the ticket on the bus, the person sitting next to you. He ended his 
explanation by saying ‘They had read the book while the other Germany had 
the money.’ This could be interpreted as a criticism of the East German state, 
implying it had not been able to provide the same level of welfare for its citizens 
as had West Germany. Another informant, who presented himself as a supporter 
of the opposition party Movimiento Renovador Sandinista (MRS) and a critic of 
President Daniel Ortega, spoke about cases of rape, where Sandinista men had 
had sex with girls without their consent while studying in East Germany, and 
how he felt this had been brushed under the carpet. During the interview, it also 
became clear that the East Germans he had encountered were unaccustomed to 
what he saw as the Nicaraguan tradition of openly expressing different opinions 
during discussions. It is possible that some of my Nicaraguan informants chose 
not to tell me about less positive aspects of Eastern European socialism, as some 
may have assumed that I would identify with East Germany and not be too 
accepting of any criticism.
However, even if some Nicaraguans consciously filtered what they told 
me, this does not seem to counterbalance the number of positive stories. And 
while those who had been to East Germany were aware that living standards in 
Moscow and East Berlin were significantly higher than in Nicaragua at the time, 
they generally portrayed their relationship with the places they had visited as 
having been one of equality, not of an empire trying to influence Nicaraguan 
thinking. Also, the newfound relationship with Russia seemed to be generally 
understood as a revival of the connection with the Soviet Union, much as Ortega 
seems to have portrayed it. For example, Freddy, a gardener in León when I 
interviewed him in 2008, was trying to convince a younger Nicaraguan to ‘go 
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study in the Soviet Union’ – a place he had been as a student and which he 
believed to be a great country and partner of the Nicaraguan Revolution.
Younger Sandinistas generally had a more distant relationship with the Soviet 
Union, although an awareness of that country still remained in Nicaragua. 
Jessica, a 23-year-old Sandinista who is part of the national directorate of 
communication workers of the Sandinista Youth (Sandinistas aged around 16–
25 who work in TV and radio), explained that she first encountered the Soviet 
Union when talking with her Sandinista father during the opposition years: 
‘He told me there had been this country that had stood with the Nicaraguan 
Revolution during the 1980s.’ On another occasion, one of the younger 
communicators said during a meeting: ‘in a certain way we have been part of 
it’, to which a more knowledgeable youth leader responded that Nicaragua had 
actually been a very distant ally of the Soviet Union, and that its connection 
to the Soviet Union had played out mainly in Nicaragua’s political proximity 
and friendship with Cuba, an official ally of the Soviet Union. As in most such 
conversations, an emphasis was put on the egalitarian nature of the relationship.
Egalitarian connections and Nicaraguan exceptionalism
If Nicaraguans were on a par with their Eastern European and Cuban colleagues, 
in what sense did they define themselves as exceptional? This element was most 
apparent in discussions of the difference between Nicaragua and its Central 
American neighbours. Nicaragua was considered exceptional because it was the 
only Central American nation that had had a successful revolution. Although 
there were some revolutionary movements in El Salvador and Guatemala, the 
participants had not won state power. Interviewees also perceived that the other 
Central American nations were much more dependent on foreign powers. 
I asked Sandinista informants how they would describe relations between Costa 
Rica, Nicaragua’s southern neighbour, and the United States. The answer was 
uniformly that Costa Rica was clearly a sort of colony of the United States. 
Comparisons between Nicaragua and the other Central American nations 
were particularly common in the summer of 2009, when a military coup 
against Honduran President Manuel Zelaya caused political confusion in the 
region. Manuel Zelaya had allied himself with the Sandinista government and 
Nicaragua just a year earlier. The country was set to implement some of the 
social programmes that Nicaragua had introduced shortly before, but the process 
was much slower. Prior to that, in the spring of 2009, I first heard the term ‘the 
Sandinista countries’, referring to the countries of Central America, and the idea 
seemed to be that Nicaragua would lead these other countries towards greater 
understanding. A professor at the UNAN-León portrayed the connection this 
way: ‘It is only Nicaragua that is free to express itself. That does not mean that 
the other countries would not like to do so, but for various reasons it is Nicaragua 
that is the only country that can truly speak freely.’
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When the coup happened, I went to Honduras and came back with a 
documentary about the Hondurans who were trying to combat what was 
happening. Members of the Sandinista Youth helped me show the documentary 
in the national theatre and they presented parts of it on national TV and radio. I 
was surprised that the main questions the various Sandinistas asked me when the 
microphones were off centred on the degree to which the Hondurans seemed less 
organised, and whether they had less understanding of international politics than 
Nicaraguans. These perceptions were repeated whenever Nicaragua’s neighbours 
were brought up: even though Nicaragua had lower living standards, it was widely 
believed that their neighbours were the ones who lacked political development 
and were, therefore, forced to follow the plans of the ‘empire’. In the generalised 
Sandinista view, historical agency was reserved for Nicaraguans.
Are Nicaraguan relations with Venezuela and Eastern Europe 
similar?
Through the portrayal of the former Soviet Union and Nicaragua as equal 
partners, the Sandinistas have built up a national discourse that somewhat 
obscures the fact that the Sandinistas, throughout most of their years in 
power, have had to rely on help from abroad. At the same time, along with 
the widespread belief in the country that Nicaraguan leaders act independently, 
Nicaragua has shown a certain level of divergence from the Soviet bloc’s main 
political line.
When the Sandinistas returned to power in early 2007, the country again 
started to function somewhat independently, even though it was financed to a 
large degree by another country, this time Venezuela. Relations with Russia were 
re-established, but during the conflict between Georgia and Russia in 2008, it 
was Nicaragua who first – and rapidly – recognised the independence of the 
Georgian breakaway republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia,32 more than a 
year before Venezuela did so.33
In 2013, when former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) employee Edward 
Snowden was asking a range of countries for asylum, Ortega made a conditional 
offer (‘If circumstances permit it...’) that was made public a few hours before 
Venezuela offered asylum, seemingly unconditionally.34 It is likely that the offers 
from Venezuela, Nicaragua and, a day later, Bolivia were coordinated to some 
degree, but the fact that Nicaragua made the first offer did not go unnoticed 
by the Sandinistas. Among the young communication workers of the Juventud 
Sandinista, the exact order of who had offered asylum was mentioned frequently 
and it was taken as a sign that Nicaragua was playing a leading role.
Between 2007 and 2010 the United States changed its understanding of the 
relationship between the Sandinista government and Venezuela. In 2007, the US 
32 DPA, ‘Nicaragua reconoce independencia de Abjasia Y Osetia Del Sur’, Emol, 3 Sept. 2008.
33 Red Voltaire, ‘Venezuela reconoce a Abjasia y Osetia Del Sur’, Red Voltaire, 20 Sept. 2009.
34 Clarín, ‘Venezuela le otorgó asilo a Snowden, el topo de la CIA’, Clarin.com, 5 July 2013.
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embassy wrote in a confidential cable that ‘[a]lthough “national sovereignty” 
is a favorite leitmotif of Ortega’s, he continues deferring to his Venezuelan 
counterpart’.35 By 2009, after Nicaragua’s recognition of South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia, the US embassy changed its wording, thereby acknowledging that 
Ortega had some level of historic agency, even though this role was restricted to 
recreating a situation in which Nicaragua would be a client state: ‘We believe that 
Ortega wants to recreate the bipolar conflict and clientelism that once existed 
between Russia and the West in Central America.’36 In 2010, a secret cable 
discussed why Ortega had made recent friendly overtures to the US ambassador. 
One of the possible reasons, it was speculated, could be that the efforts of the 
Nicaraguan government to establish relations with, and obtain funding from, 
countries other than Venezuela, such as Iran and Russia, had not yet produced 
the expected economic results.37 While the tone regarding everything about 
Ortega and the Nicaraguan government was consistently negative, and at times 
accusatory, by 2010 it was tacitly accepted that the Sandinistas and/or Ortega 
were acting somewhat independently of the country that was financing their 
activities.
Older Sandinista informants who were politically active during the 1970s 
and 1980s tended to have a somewhat cautious view of Venezuela. They 
perceived Nicaragua as an independent actor, just as able as Venezuela, at times 
ideologically more educated, and with a greater experience of having government 
power. Those Sandinistas who were active during the 1980s almost seemed to 
think of Venezuela as a liability and that the concept of 21st-century socialism, 
which arrived in Nicaragua through Venezuela, was merely a less-thought-
through alternative to the original principles of Sandinismo (without clearly 
defining what these were).
Conclusion
As we have seen, past and present understandings of Sandinismo are dominated 
by a sense of historical agency. The actions of Sandinistas and Nicaraguans are 
interpreted in this light, while the populations of neighbouring countries where 
revolutions were not successful are portrayed as being trapped in structures of 
dependency. The tendency to see local politics as the outcome of the actions of 
local actors is not unique to Nicaragua. For example, after the 1973 coup the 
Chilean dictatorial regime saw itself as taking a lead in fighting communism 
35 US Embassy in Managua, ‘Ortega administration at six months’.
36 US Embassy in Managua, ‘Nicaragua and Abkhazia establish formal diplomatic ties’, 
Wikileaks Public Library of US Diplomacy (Nicaragua Managua, 18 Sept. 2009), https://
search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09MANAGUA913_a.html (accessed 26 Apr. 2019).
37 US Embassy in Managua, ‘(U) Ortega and the U.S.: new-found true love or another still-born 
charm offensive?’, Wikileaks Public Library of US Diplomacy (Nicaragua Managua, 25 Feb. 
2010), https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/10MANAGUA115_a.html (accessed 26 
Apr. 2019).
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because the United States was not playing the role it ought to.38 Until recently, 
international scholars have put too much emphasis on the United States when 
considering US–Latin American relations, leaving little-to-no room for Latin 
American agency.39
Nevertheless, the Sandinista emphasis on Nicaragua’s historic agency 
continues to be emphasised. However, the view that Nicaragua, one of the 
poorest countries in the western hemisphere,40 is somehow more able to exert 
historic agency than other larger Latin American countries which are less 
dependent on foreign aid, seems to lack a material basis. Nicaraguan poet 
Rubén Darío wrote, ‘If the nation is small, one dreams it large.’41 In a sense, 
the problems that Nicaragua face are so overwhelming that an exaggerated sense 
of the country’s power is necessary to face these enormous challenges.
Yet somehow, Sandinista leaders and the Nicaraguan people have been able to 
put the country on the map and make Nicaragua one of the few Latin American 
countries capable of upsetting the president of the United States. Nicaragua has 
maintained international alliances and continued on its own very particular road 
to development. Even the World Bank emphasises that Nicaragua stands out in 
achieving ‘shared growth’ and notes that it is performing better than the Central 
American and the Caribbean averages.42
Parallels between the Soviet–Nicaraguan relationship in the 1980s and 
current links between Russia and Nicaragua are especially noteworthy. In one 
sense Ortega’s efforts to renew Nicaragua’s alliance with its former partner from 
the 1980s suggest a blinkered approach which ignores several changes that have 
taken place in world politics since then. Equally though, it points to the positive 
effects of Nicaraguan confidence. In 2010 US diplomats felt, according to US 
embassy cables released by Wikileaks, that Ortega’s attempts to reconnect with 
former allies had failed, but these links have solidified in subsequent years. 
Nicaragua, simply by insisting on an alliance has obtained something that at first 
seemed impossible. Of course, these new links are being forged in a completely 
different world, and while the alliances of the 1980s were brokered on ideological 
terms, Nicaragua is now simply opting for capitalist Russia instead of the 
capitalist West. In this uncertain climate, the future of Nicaragua’s international 
relations is precarious. But whatever the future holds, it is likely that Nicaraguans 
will continue to believe in their country’s ability to defy structural constraints 
and act as a force to be reckoned with in the wider world.
38 T. Harmer, ‘Fractious allies: Chile, the United States, and the Cold War, 1973–76’.
39 M.P. Friedman, ‘Retiring the puppets, bringing Latin America back in: recent scholarship on 
United States–Latin American relations.’, 621.
40 C. León, ‘Nicaragua and IDA: an enduring partnership’.
41 R. Darío, El viaje a Nicaragua e intermezzo tropical.
42 León, ‘Nicaragua and IDA’.
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5. Agrarian reform in Nicaragua in the 
1980s: lights and shadows of its legacy
José Luis Rocha
Nicaragua embarked on an agrarian reform adventure in the 1980s, inspired by a revolutionary government that longed to make great transformations. Despite these grand dreams, however, initial 
reform was state-centric and progress was slow. The inadequacy of these early 
efforts led to the deterioration of relations between the state and the peasants 
in the countryside and the intensification of armed conflict. Agrarian reform 
measures were bitterly contested and their results were ambiguous – a conflict 
and ambiguity that has continued to mark the descendants of those affected 
by the original reforms. The 1980s was a time of bitterness for those whose 
land was confiscated and of jubilation for the beneficiaries of reform, but the 
1990s brought compensation for those whose land had been confiscated, just 
as embargoes by banks transformed the original beneficiaries’ joyous dream 
into a nightmare. Together, dubious and inadequate land titles, contested 
reallocations of land to former owners, and compensation awarded on the basis 
of fraudulent claims created a heavy burden of debt that Nicaraguan taxpayers 
are still servicing to this day. At the same time, ongoing uncertainty over land 
ownership continues to block access to loans, discourages long-term investment 
and undermines productivity.
From the beginning, agrarian reform was presented as an essential part of 
the exceptionalist ideal that the Sandinista Revolution expected to make flesh in 
Nicaragua: it was assumed that successful reform was the inevitable destination, 
and the path towards it was laid out with apparently clairvoyant clarity. In reality, 
though, an analysis of the actual trajectory of the reforms reveals constant 
oscillations between illusion and realism, principles and pragmatism, grandness 
and misery.1 Agrarian reform was a stage on which different concepts, both 
reformist and anti-reformist, faced off against each other, leading the country 
to a point of no return – neither the restitution and compensation measures 
of the 1990s, nor the resurgence of extreme inequality in land ownership ever 
succeeded in restoring the status quo ante. The Sandinistas’ agrarian reform did 
1 J. Wheelock, La reforma agraria sandinista.
J. Luis Rocha, ‘Agrarian reform in Nicaragua in the 1980s: lights and shadows of its legacy’, in 
H. Francis (ed.), A Nicaraguan Exceptionalism? Debating the Legacy of the Sandinista Revolution 
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not provide a blueprint that led ineluctably to exceptionalism; in practice, the 
collision between multiple initiatives, forces and circumstances ensured that 
property ownership was shaken up enough to introduce substantial changes 
in the way that land tenure was structured. For many, this shift was not as 
penetrating and widespread as it should have been, but its impact was significant 
enough so that 40 years later we can still discern its imprints, some of them 
etched in now-hard lava, while others are traced in sand. What were the reform’s 
achievements and flaws? What legacy did it leave us, for better or worse? Did the 
agrarian reform make Nicaragua an exceptional country? If so, in what sense? 
The data in this section will provide tentative answers to these questions.
In 1979 the new Sandinista government inherited a system of land 
distribution that was dominated by a class known as the ‘rural bourgeoisie’. 
Out of a total of 5.6 million hectares of land dedicated to agriculture, almost 
2.1 million (36 per cent) were held in properties larger than 350 hectares. Small 
farms of less than 35 hectares only accounted for 17.5 per cent of the land in 
use.2 Extreme inequality in the distribution of land was linked to inequality of 
access to credit: in the 1960s and ’70s, 90 per cent of the loans destined for the 
agricultural sector went to the big agro-export landowners.3 In agriculture the 
poor comprised 61.4 per cent of the economically active population. Of these, 
36.5 per cent were smallholders who hired themselves out as workers at certain 
periods of the agricultural cycle, 17.4 per cent were farmhands who made up 
the permanent labour force on the big agro-export haciendas and 7.5 per cent 
were seasonal labourers who could only access full-time work during the coffee, 
cotton or sugar-cane harvests.4
After Somoza fled the country the question of land distribution was a 
primary concern of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN). The 
third decree issued by the new Government Junta of National Reconstruction 
ordered the confiscation of all properties owned by Somoza’s family and his 
allies, including soldiers and officials of the defeated regime. Soon after, another 
decree expanded the scope of the confiscations to ‘people connected with 
Somoza’. These two decrees affected 20 per cent of all farmland in Nicaragua. 
The confiscated land was known as the People’s Property Area (APP). It was not 
distributed to individual farmers but instead organised into 1,500 state farms 
under the management of the newly created Nicaraguan Institute of Agrarian 
Reform (INRA).5 Some 50,000 people, perhaps 13 per cent of all agricultural 
workers, were employed by the state in these enterprises. Despite these initial 
2 Centro de Investigaciones y Estudios de la Reforma Agraria (CIERA), La reforma agraria 
en Nicaragua 1979–1989, vol. I, 292.
3 S. and J. Saravia-Matus, ‘Agrarian reform: theory and practice. The Nicaraguan experience’.
4 C. Maldidier and P. Marchetti, El Campesino-Finquero y el potencial económico del campesinado 
nicaragüense, 15.
5 Saravia-Matus, ‘Agrarian reform’, 30.
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measures most landless labourers and smallholders – a total of 322,549 people 
– remained in limbo.6
Initial reforms did not match the Sandinista government’s revolutionary 
aims. In 1981, two years after the Sandinistas took power, the speech that 
announced the new Agrarian Reform Law noted that 1.2 per cent of the 
population still owned 47.1 per cent of the land, while 30 per cent of the rural 
population had no land at all.7 Between 1979 and 1981 around 1.2 million 
hectares had been confiscated from Somocistas and senior National Guard 
officers, many of whom had mortgaged their land and escaped with the 
cash before the Sandinistas took power. Much of this land consisted of huge 
plantations with tens of thousands of agricultural workers, which the government 
did not consider suitable for distribution among peasants. In these early days 
of agrarian reform the government opted to expropriate huge farms such as 
La Fundadora and La Cumplida and convert them into state enterprises, and 
they also expropriated medium-sized properties that could be joined together 
and made into big state-run haciendas. One faction within the revolutionary 
government sincerely believed that breaking up large and medium-sized 
haciendas into small plots would reduce their productivity and jeopardise the 
generation of hard cash from exports. Beyond the problem of land distribution, 
the Sandinista state was also concerned with agricultural production and income 
generation, income which was essential if the revolutionary government was to 
secure the social transformation it promised. And all this in a context where the 
dark clouds of the US economic blockade and armed aggression, financed and 
managed by the Reagan government, could already be discerned. It was thus 
decided to add disused farmland to the properties subject to expropriation, and 
a year after the triumph of the revolution Sandinista officials began drafting the 
Agrarian Reform Law.8
The law streamlined the agrarian reform process and triggered a boom 
in different forms of property ownership. Fallow, underused or abandoned 
properties larger than 350 hectares in the Pacific region and 700 acres in 
the country’s interior were subject to the new legislation. Even so, only 558 
properties covering an area of 350,000 hectares were affected in the first phase 
of the programme (1981–4). Subsequently, Law 14, passed on 11 January 1986, 
legalised the confiscation of all disused or underused properties, regardless 
of their size.9 This law accelerated agrarian reform and increased the bank of 
available land. At the risk of stating the obvious, it should be noted that these 
laws did not penalise large landowners as such, only those people who were 
letting their land lie fallow, something the country could ill afford. Nonetheless, 
6 Ibid., 31.
7 Ley de Reforma Agraria, Decreto no. 782, Junta de Gobierno de Reconstrucción Nacional 
de la República de Nicaragua, 16 Oct. 1981; CIERA, La reforma agraria, vol. VIII, 58–89; 
Envío, ‘The Agrarian Reform Law in Nicaragua’, no. 3, Aug. 1981.
8 Wheelock, La reforma agraria, 52–3 and 56.
9 Ibid., 57–8 and 64.
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there were substantial shifts in patterns of land distribution. In 1988, two years 
before the FSLN’s electoral defeat, the private sector owned 2.6 million hectares 
of productive agricultural land, down from 5.6 million in 1979. Overall, the 
state had reallocated 48 per cent of productive agricultural land. In 1979 private 
properties larger than 350 hectares made up 36 per cent (2.1 million hectares) 
of the total available land. By 1988 this figure had dropped to 6.4 per cent or 
350,000 hectares.10
Most of the reallocated land was absorbed by state farms – known as State 
Production Units (UPE) – and cooperatives. Of productive agricultural land, 
UPEs accounted for close to 12 per cent, while nearly 14 per cent ended up in the 
hands of cooperatives. Most (11.4 per cent) of this land was farmed by Sandinista 
Agricultural Cooperatives (CAS), whose members held a joint title to their 
property and carried out all work collectively. Credit and Service Cooperatives 
(CCS), where small farmers worked their own land but received credit via 
collective loans, were less common, comprising just 1.7 per cent of the total.11 
Overall, with almost a quarter of the land ultimately being farmed collectively 
in some form, the programme represented an unprecedented shift in patterns 
of agricultural land ownership. These shifts were clearly linked to the model of 
agrarian change promulgated by the Sandinista government. At the same time, 
other reformist pressures did not form part of the state’s original plans and these 
forced the Sandinistas to take unforeseen decisions. These pressures, particularly 
the demands of the peasantry, also made their mark and, arguably, proved to be 
more durable than the state’s efforts, because they came from below. The history 
of these collisions between state and non-state ideals gives the lie to any notion 
of exceptionalism forged directly and solely from the Sandinista programmes.
In 1984, the expropriation of farms was intended to increase the amount 
of land available for redistribution, but it was also a means of strengthening the 
government’s hand in its fight against the Contras. Counterrevolutionaries were 
punished (the 1984 measures sanctioned the confiscation of lands belonging 
to anyone aiding the Contras) and allies were rewarded. Land awarded to 
Sandinistas and their allies helped to cement support, and state farms and 
cooperatives played an active part in the government’s defence strategy by 
helping to repel Contra attacks. Above all, the state provided titles for those 
holding land following occupation or invasion, in effect legalising a de facto 
process of agrarian reform that had been unfolding since before the triumph of 
the revolution. These measures marked a change in FSLN policy, made possible 
by the impetus of the war and a shift in thinking among INRA leaders. The 
overall trend was simple – less state property and more peasant property – but 
the political and ideological battles that lay behind the changes were complex 
and contested. In the next section a discussion of the conflict between two trade 
unions that organised farmers and farmworkers – the Rural Workers Association 
(ATC) and the National Union of Farmers and Ranchers (UNAG) – sheds light 
10 CIERA, La reforma agraria, vol. I, 292.
11 Ibid., vol. IX, 39.
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on the wider ideological battle, revealing the stakes and positions held by the 
opposing camps.
ATC demands salaries, not land
The ATC was founded on 25 March 1978 as an organisation for agricultural and 
semi-proletarian workers. Within a year it had 47,851 members who acted as a 
logistical support network for the Sandinista guerrillas in the months leading up 
to the Sandinista Revolution. Its members cut communication lines, destroyed 
telephones and roads, joined the fighting and transmitted information, within 
a network that was organised geographically, dividing areas into units for each 
community and district.12 After the revolution, the ATC organised the SACs 
(cooperatives which were initially called agricultural communes), made up 
of organised agricultural workers’ collectives that seized Somocista farms and 
worked them collectively. In this way, the ATC as an organisation was aligned 
from the beginning with the Sandinista state’s initial preference for maintaining 
large farm estates as single productive units, an approach that was meant to allow 
a greater concentration of capital, land and workers as well as facilitate their use 
of superior technology.
Originally peasants and farmers with small and medium holdings were 
also supposed to be included in the ATC. However, the difference between 
their perspectives and interests and those of salaried farmworkers made their 
coexistence within one organisation difficult. Peasants’ demands for land were 
entirely different from workers’ demands for higher wages, and the ATC’s 
leadership was more interested in defending the farmworkers’ interests.13 When 
peasants founded UNAG, the ATC prioritised organising workers in state 
agrarian-reform enterprises. It replaced its district-by-district organisational 
structure with a network of local unions which had offices in the state farms. In 
1983, despite the loss of peasant members who had moved to UNAG, the ATC 
had 44,413 members on its books.
Work in ‘bureaucratic capitalism’
The ATC prioritised two lines of action: to raise productivity and to train 
workers so that they could take over management of the state farms in the future. 
In practice, however, the ATC’s demands in the early years related chiefly to 
wages and the prices of consumer goods, because management of the haciendas 
was the preserve of state bureaucracy.14 Farmworkers no longer answered to the 
farmer-boss but to the state-boss – the bureaucrat-boss characteristic of what 
Cornelius Castoriadis calls ‘bureaucratic capitalism’, based on the social division 
12 CIERA, La reforma agraria, vol. VI, 60.
13 C. Vilas, Perfiles de la revolución sandinista, 271.
14 CIERA, La reforma agraria, vol. VI, 77, 83 and 85.
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between the proletariat and a bureaucracy that excludes workers from managing 
the means of production.15
Although the ATC’s intervention forced the enterprises to keep paying the 
wages of workers mobilised in the armed struggle against the Contras, there were 
many limitations to its achievements. For example, the unions were never able 
to get the bosses to make temporary workers permanent.16 They were not even 
able to maintain the value of their wages: the nominal pay for piecework in the 
coffee harvest only went up by 0.15 córdobas between 1980 and 1983. In real 
terms, measured by purchasing power relative to inflation, this was a reduction 
of almost 40 per cent. Coffee pickers’ wages were particularly vulnerable, even 
in times of good international prices. The price of some basic goods fell, but the 
drop in salaries was much more significant: the price of corn and beans dropped 
by at least 5 per cent while cotton pickers’ wages fell by 28 per cent.17
The deterioration in wages went hand-in-hand with a declining work culture, 
made apparent in the wry joke which defined socialism as ‘a system in which the 
state pretends to pay and the workers pretend to work’. A widespread belief was 
prevalent that the revolution should change the rules of the game and instigate 
a more relaxed work ethic, thus distinguishing itself from capitalist exploitation 
of the labour force. In fact, the working day dwindled to two or three hours, a 
phenomenon that was a key factor in the slowing of production during those 
years.18 While farm workers waited for their historic vacation, those without land 
longed for more aggressive agrarian reform.
The UNAG is born, with a peasant seal
In April 1981, UNAG was born, supported by peasants who were poor but had 
experienced a rapid economic ascent during the coffee and cattle booms of the 
years immediately prior to the revolution’s triumph. Many had collaborated with 
the guerrillas and were loyal to the FSLN, even when they did not necessarily 
share the Sandinistas’ politics. At their initial 1981 gathering, in the Perla de 
Matagalpa theatre, 3,000 farmers with small and medium holdings, representing 
100,000 peasants came together to break publicly with the Central Cooperative 
of Coffee Growers, a Somoza-era organisation whose middle-class anti-
Sandinista members had hoped to create a broad front against the revolution. 
The peasants who met that day were to become the embryonic UNAG.19
Typical UNAG members owned a medium-sized portion of land and had 
been sidelined by the elite-dominated associations of agro exporters in the 
Somoza era. They were now targets of proselytizing work from those same 
15 C. Castoriadis, La sociedad burocrática.
16 CIERA, Las clases sociales en el campo de Jinotega.
17 Vilas, Perfiles, 387.
18 CIERA, La reforma agraria, vol. VI, 95. M. Spoor, ‘Rural employment and agrarian markets 
in transition: Nicaragua (1979–89)’, 538.
19 CIERA, La reforma agraria, vol. VI, 80–1.
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associations, but UNAG filled a gap and neutralised the agricultural elite’s 
attempts to build opposition to the revolution. It sought to unite all farmers, 
regardless of their class status, to achieve hegemony among the rural sectors that 
had not been organised by the ATC. This interaction between classes helped to 
assuage the fears of many peasants, who already held land and employed a small 
workforce, and who felt threatened by the clamour for land from those who 
had no property of their own.20 The farmers with small and medium holdings 
who had come together in UNAG were particularly anxious to secure long-term 
loans, agricultural supplies, technical assistance, new roads, participation in state 
institutions, and decision-making on prices and marketing. Farmers from this 
sector also pressured INRA to pass the Agrarian Reform Law in 1981.
Directed by the FSLN, UNAG initially worked with cooperatives and 
successfully urged many of its members to form CCSs. In the 1980s, 93 per cent 
of UNAG members belonged to cooperatives, largely the CCSs.21 In 1984, as 
the Contra War heated up, UNAG sought to extend its social base to incorporate 
other farmers with similar portions of land who were not in cooperatives and 
even those portrayed – in Sandinista propaganda – as representatives of the 
‘patriotic bourgeoisie’. They were involved in the farming associations and 
commissions that promoted each crop and they energised the district committees 
of UNAG.
While the ATC dedicated itself exclusively to agricultural workers, UNAG 
recruited poor peasants through district outreach work as well as middle-income 
and well-off peasants, giving the organisation a particularily heterogeneous 
social base. This situation had disadvantages for some. The predominance of 
landowning peasants meant that UNAG’s demands mirrored the concerns of 
the farmer with a medium-sized holding, who was worried about prices, access 
to markets, transport and the availability of agricultural inputs. It did not 
give the same voice to poor peasants clamouring for land.22 In the early years 
of the revolution, the FSLN feared that demands for land by poor peasants, 
who had not been absorbed into state enterprises, might destroy the revolution’s 
plans for national unity, which were predicated upon an alliance with the rural 
bourgeoisie. The FSLN was reluctant to give up this unity project and it did not 
want to distribute the land belonging to state enterprises, which were seen as the 
linchpin of national wealth. In other words, if the FSLN aspired to some form 
of exceptionalism, it expected to achieve it thanks to the productive capacity 
of the state and its vast supply of agricultural land, not by distributing land to 
small farmers.
As the economic crisis worsened, peasants grew increasingly frustrated with 
the FSLN’s failure to respond to their demands. This eroded UNAG’s power to 
20 M. Merlet and C. Maldidier, ‘El movimiento cooperativo, eje de la sobrevivencia de la 
revolución’, 56.
21 CIERA, La reforma agraria, vol. VI, 133.
22 V. Fitzgerald and A. Chamorro, ‘Las cooperativas en el proyecto de transición en Nicaragua’, 
30 (1987): 31.
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unite farmers, although the organisation continued to attract new members. 
It became increasingly critical of the FSLN and its farming policy, especially after 
1986, when it began to give voice to the peasants’ demand for land. Projecting 
itself as the key mass organisation in the countryside, UNAG took the lead in 
peasant protests, changing both its discourse and its practice in the process. 
In 1986 UNAG’s slogan was ‘An organisation for struggle’ – and the struggle 
was for land.23 This shift ensured that UNAG recovered its previous strength.
Cooperatives = solidarity
The demands of UNAG’s members collided with an ideological sacred cow: 
the veneration of collectivism. From the start, the Sandinista government had 
promoted cooperatives in order to forge ‘a spirit of solidarity and cooperation’ 
and overcome ‘competitive and exploitative relationships among men’.24 
Competition was perceived as a capitalist evil that had to be suppressed. 
Solidarity was integral to the figure of the ‘new man’ and multiple devices were 
employed to promote it. In Nicaragua, this collectivist impetus sprang in part 
from an ideological debt to Sandino who, in the 1920s, said he was ‘in favour 
of land belonging to the state’ and inclined ‘towards a cooperative regime’ along 
the Río Coco.25 Cooperatives were part of the FSLN’s 1969 historic programme, 
which was committed to motivating and encouraging peasants to organise and 
take their destiny into their own hands and participate directly in the country’s 
development.26 These local precedents were reinforced by modes of thought 
common in revolutionary states, where a dichotomy between individualism 
(bourgeois and reactionary) and collectivism (revolutionary) prevailed. This 
opposition, and its role in the strengthening of the revolutionary state, are the 
subject of two books by Lynne Viola, whose work on the Soviet Union reveals 
divisions greatly similar to those that existed between the ATC and UNAG in 
Nicaragua.27
The emphasis on collectivism, therefore, was the result of a mix of local 
and transnational ideological currents. It was also driven by the perception that 
only large-scale units could deliver the material wealth so desperately needed 
by the fledgling Sandinista state. The economies of scale involved in working a 
large landholding made it possible to use irrigation and mechanisation, and to 
apply modern technology; operating as a group would also facilitate access to 
loans, technical assistance, the buying and storage of harvests, and the supply 
of agricultural inputs. The plan also included the provision of educational 
23 Merlet and Maldidier, ‘El movimiento cooperativo’, 62.
24 CIERA, La reforma agraria, vol. VIII, 135.
25 Wheelock, La reforma agraria, 42.
26 Ibid., 44–5.
27 L. Viola, The Best Sons of the Fatherland: Workers in the Vanguard of Soviet Collectivization L. 
Viola, Peasants Rebels under Stalin: Collectivization and the Culture of Peasant Resistance.
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programmes and health, housing and cultural services.28 In 1988 the state even 
went so far as to exempt productive cooperatives from paying income tax.29 The 
cooperativist project soon achieved wide coverage: by 1982, 2,849 cooperatives 
with 65,820 members had already been set up and controlled an area of some 
700,000 hectares. By 1988, the project seemed to have gained even more ground, 
with 3,151 cooperatives and 76,715 members who controlled over a million 
hectares.30 We must remember, though, that two kinds of cooperative existed: the 
CASs, which required a more complete form of collectivisation, and the CCSs, 
with a lighter touch, which collectivised administration but not cultivation. As 
the next section will show, these different types of cooperative evolved differently, 
in ways which again reflect the contested nature of agrarian reform.
UNAG v. MIDINRA, Bukharin v. Preobrazhenski
From its foundation, UNAG challenged Sandinista officials’ view of the 
collectivisation process. In January 1980 INRA was merged with the agriculture 
ministry to form the Ministry of Agricultural Development and Agrarian 
Reform (MIDINRA), triggering what would become a long-running dispute 
between it and UNAG. Social scientist Peter Marchetti compared this 
controversy to the 1924 debate between Eugene Preobrazhenski and Nikolai 
Bukharin over the Soviet Union’s New Economic Policy instituted between 1921 
and 1929. Preobrazhenski favoured a rapid transition to socialism supported 
by the expansion of state enterprises and industrialisation, at the expense of 
the peasantry. Similarly, MIDINRA supported large-scale projects involving 
directly controlled state farms or fully collectivised CASs. This would allow the 
state to control the harvest and sale of crops, thereby securing a supply of cheap 
agricultural produce for the cities. Preobrazhenski and MIDINRA viewed the 
peasantry as ‘backward’, a seedbed of capitalism. Bukharin and UNAG held 
the opposing view. For them a more moderate approach to collectivisation was 
necessary in order to maintain an alliance with the peasantry. They also believed 
that a greater emphasis on individual production would help to limit the state’s 
monopoly, make better use of the nation’s productive potential, and ensure that 
the agricultural sector responded better to market forces.31
The Cooperatives Law expressed these conflicting visions by facilitating 
the creation of two types of cooperatives: credit and service cooperatives with 
individual land ownership (the CCS model) and production cooperatives 
with collective property (the CAS model). The CCS model was much more 
popular with farmers’ groups because it was more flexible and did not involve 
28 Wheelock, La reforma agraria, 136.
29 CIERA, La reforma agraria, vol. VIII, 148–9.
30 Ibid., vol. I, 304–6.
31 P. Marchetti, ‘Semejanzas y diferencias en dos debates sobre el campesinado: la economía 
mixta y la vía al socialismo’, 35–45.
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collectivisation or a commitment to the state.32 There were far fewer CAS 
cooperatives, partly because their foundation depended on the allocation of 
agrarian reform land. Initially the CSS cooperatives outnumbered the CAS 
by seven to one, in terms of both land and members. Landless peasants were 
the most willing to organise into a CAS, because establishing one involved the 
granting of new land. Middle-income peasant farmers who already had land and 
were interested in gaining access to loans were far more likely to form CCSs.33 
Cooperative status was a prerequisite for government loans, so many peasants 
registered as CCS members who did not comply with the minimal operational 
requirements. Many formally constituted CCSs never called a member’s 
assembly and those who had joined never did anything together aside from 
filling in the paperwork needed to apply for a loan. The 1981 Cooperatives Law 
stipulated that ‘the revolutionary state will grant farming cooperatives special 
financial support through programs that offer preferential interest rates’.34 Actual 
practice went even further than this and cooperatives’ debts were forgiven so 
frequently that non-repayment of loans became an implicit norm.
Despite the CCSs’ early preponderance, it soon became clear that the CAS 
model would predominate. In 1982 the cooperative development strategy 
prioritised giving CASs access to land, loans and technical supplies, and CAS 
holdings grew substantially. At the start of the agrarian reform, cooperatives 
received an average of 11 to 12 hectares per member; by 1988 the CCSs were 
still within this range, but they now controlled an average of 20 hectares per 
member, chiefly because state farms had been converted into CAS cooperatives.35 
By 1986 the CASs had received 75 per cent of the land assigned by the agrarian 
reform to cooperatives and individual owners, with predictable consequences 
for the relative importance of the two models.36 Between 1982 and 1988 the 
number of CAS cooperatives increased by 129 per cent, their membership grew 
by 217 per cent and the area of land they controlled expanded by 453 per cent. 
In contrast, the number of CCS cooperatives fell by 6 per cent, with a 14 per cent 
reduction in membership and a 38 per cent drop in landholdings.37 Many of the 
CCSs which had existed in name only were disappearing, but the CCSs were also 
seriously affected by the war – the number of cooperatives fell by 17 per cent in 
the central region, the area of the country where most fighting took place, partly 
because CCS members were afraid of armed counter-revolutionaries accusing 
them of having links to the FSLN. In contrast, the war actually strengthened the 
CASs, as they owed a greater debt to the Frente. Significantly, the first bands of 
armed counter-revolutionaries – the MILPAS (Anti-Sandinista People’s Militias) 
– appeared in 1980 in the northern part of the country, supported by owners of 
32 CIERA, La reforma agraria, vol. V, 288–9.
33 Fitzgerald and Chamorro, ‘Las cooperativas’; 31.
34 CIERA, La reforma agraria, vol. VIII, 145.
35 CIERA, La reforma agraria, vol. I, 305.
36 Fitzgerald and Chamorro, ‘Las cooperativas’, 37.
37 CIERA, La reforma agraria, vol. I, 304–5.
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small and medium coffee farm and cattle ranches who feared that the growing 
nationalisation of the rural economy would lead to the confiscation of their 
property. The MILPAS leaders were former Sandinista guerrillas unhappy that 
confiscated land had been turned into state enterprises.38
The war forced the pace
The war meant that the CAS cooperatives won out over the CCSs, but 
ultimately the conflict resulted in a shift towards the UNAG-Bukharin model, 
with a reduction in large units directly controlled by the state. The war was 
intensifying in the border area with Honduras, a mountainous area ideal for 
insurgency. Between 1981 and 1985 the Contras carried out a reported 133 
attacks in this area, leaving 242 dead, 49 wounded and 44 abducted, limited to 
cooperative members and workers on state farms only.39 The FSLN responded 
by introducing the draft, which it dubbed Patriotic Military Service (SMP), and 
by changing its agrarian policy. The goal was to regain the political initiative and 
promote the defence of territory adjacent to the cooperatives’ lands.40 The need 
was particularly acute because worsening economic conditions were creating 
support for the Contras.41 Farmers whose land had been confiscated, and those 
who thought their land might be expropriated, were especially disaffected. Most 
of the Contra leaders were farmers from Matagalpa and Jinotega who saw the 
revolution as a threat. Their dissatisfaction had to be allayed.
The state’s new policy on land tenure was designed, in simple terms, to 
confiscate land from ten people and hand it over to one hundred. The high point 
of the agrarian reform was 1984, when 37 per cent of the 2.7 million hectares 
ultimately affected by the agrarian reform was given out in the form of ‘special 
titles’. In reality, these titles simply recognised families’ legal right to occupy small 
plots that they had been farming for decades, but the issuing of this type of title 
was also due to the war: 66 per cent of the special titles were ‘granted’ in 1984, 
and only 13.57 per cent had been issued prior to that. The reform that benefited 
cooperatives was similar: 86 per cent of the land granted to cooperatives was 
received between 1983 and 1987, whereas only 10 per cent of the total land 
ultimately allocated was distributed between 1979 and 1982.42
Strengthening a peasant front that would be loyal to the revolution and 
that would hold back the advance of the counterrevolutionaries was a matter of 
urgency. A tight network of individual FSLN sympathisers and cooperatives was 
built, all of them beneficiaries of land reform. The land was taken from recently 
38 A. Grigsby, ‘Nicaragua: conflicto armado y políticas económicas y sociales’, Mimeo, 2001.
39 Wheelock, La reforma agraria, 127.
40 D. Kaimowitz, ‘La planificación agropecuaria en Nicaragua, 70.
41 CIERA, La reforma agraria, 414.
42 CIERA, La reforma agraria, vol. IX, 39–44.
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confiscated farms or from former state farms.43 Some 39 per cent of the land 
allocated in 1986–7 came from confiscated farms of over 350 hectares and only 8 
per cent came from farms smaller in size. The remaining land was formerly state-
controlled.44 The war meant the growth of the Bukharin-UNAG model marked a 
rupture with the blueprint that had, until then, guided land distribution policies. 
The war laid the groundwork for an exceptionalism that had not featured in the 
FSLN’s original plans.
The redistribution that took place in those years changed the structure of 
land tenure in Nicaragua, creating a greater proportion of small farms. This shift 
in tenure patterns created the conditions for different kinds of innovation and 
facilitated later experiments with organic production and participation in fair 
trade networks. These far-reaching achievements might have gone even further, 
but the FSLN never wholeheartedly embraced the UNAG-Bukharin model. 
Michel Merlet, an agro economy expert who worked with INRA throughout 
most of the 1980s and now directs AGTER, an association for the improved 
governance of natural resources, notes that,
between 1985 and 1987, almost half the state sector was redistributed to 
cooperatives or peasants. These measures helped the government regain 
control of the situation: production of basic grains increased, the Contra 
advance was halted, but an indisputable division persisted, a real schism at 
the heart of the peasantry. A more flexible agrarian reform from 1984 on did 
not lead to a radical review. No sooner had the country emerged from the 
emergency situation than the FSLN stopped expanding and intensifying the 
agrarian reform.45
The last line is discouraging. According to Merlet’s figures, the transformation of 
the land tenure structure was significant, but still only partial, in 1988:
The large holdings (more than 350 hectares) only represented 19 per cent 
of all farmland (7 per cent private and 12 per cent state farms) compared 
to 36 per cent in 1978. Production cooperatives were working 12 per cent 
of the land and the rest was in the hands of individual peasant farmers and 
strata of rural petty bourgeoisie. Some 70,000 peasant families received land: 
almost one out of every two peasant families. But the area redistributed for 
individual usage only represented 5 per cent of all farmland.46
The Sandinista land reform repeated all the errors and abuses of the reform 
undertaken by Mexico’s Lázaro Cárdenas 50 years previously: a slow start to 
redistribution, successive debt pardons, a prohibition on selling or inheriting 
43 The FSLN granted some 383,600 hectares between 1984 and 1987. Eduardo Baumeister, 
‘Transformaciones agrarias y revolución en Nicaragua’. Paper presented at the LASA 
conference, New Orleans, 17–19 Mar. 1988.
44 Ibid.
45 M. Merlet, ‘Fragilidad y límites de las reformas agrarias en América Central. Las enseñanzas 
de dos países: Honduras y Nicaragua’. Course for ‘Gestión y Tenencia de la Tierra en 
Centroamérica’, BIVICAT- RECCAT, FAUSAC, URACCAN, IRAM, París, Francia, 
from 1 July to 30 Sept. 2004.
46 Ibid.
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land, the under-utilisation of plots, a fall in production and productivity, a mix 
of paternalism and subjection, and investment wasted on extravagant projects.47
The Sandinista piñata and the neoliberal turn
The 1990s brought an abrupt change in approach. Violeta Chamorro’s electoral 
victory meant that the government cabinet was largely made up of a group of 
technocrats educated in US universities, well-versed in theories of monetarism 
and neoliberal ideology. Sharing the business sector’s faith in the market’s 
invisible hand, they implemented a series of policies aimed at dismantling state 
controls, privatising state-owned land and lowering taxes. The General Board 
of National Public Sector Corporations (CORNAP) was created in 1990 to 
take over the state’s business functions. It was effectively a holding company 
responsible for offloading state enterprises.
However, even before CORNAP had gestated in the neoliberal womb, 
the Sandinista regime had begun privatising state assets. In the two-month 
transition period between the FSLN’s electoral defeat in February and Violeta 
Chamorro’s inauguration in April, the Sandinista leadership implemented the 
swiftest transfer of goods in national history: farms, houses, buildings, factories, 
vehicles, tractors, small islands and millions of dollars in cash were taken from 
the state and given to the Sandinista elite. Compared to the Sandinista ‘piñata’, 
as it came to be known, the other redistribution programmes of the 1980s pale 
into insignificance. The piñata contributed to a rollback of agrarian reform that 
has never been fully examined. Leading Sandinistas, including the agrarian 
reform minister and deputy ministers, ended up with some of the country’s best 
farms, with the result that CORNAP started operating with what remained 
after the Sandinista piñata. Most of the properties bestowed by CORNAP – 
52 per cent of transfers, accounting for 59 per cent of their value – went to 
private buyers or tenants. Only after a major battle did the new government 
reluctantly reward workers of the former state-owned entities with 23 per cent 
of the properties, representing 30 per cent of the total value. The percentage 
of former combatants who gained from the privatisation process, either from 
the Sandinista Popular Army or the National Resistance, was tiny.48 Former 
combatants were beneficiaries of just 241 of the 1,532 transactions carried out 
by CORNAP between 1991 and 1994, but the value of the property given to 
them – a little over 15 million córdobas – represented less than 1.4 per cent of 
the total value of the property transferred.49 They made their dissatisfaction felt 
immediately.
47 E. Krauze, Biografía del poder. Caudillos de la revolución mexicana (1910–1940), 458–60.
48 National Resistance is what all armed counterrevolutionary groups called themselves. It 
included the Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN, in Spanish) in the north, the Democratic 
Revolutionary Alliance (ARDE) in the south and MISURASATA, from the Miskito, 
Sumo and Rama Amerindian peoples of Nicaragua’s Atlantic coast.
49 D. Close, Los años de Doña Violeta, 214.
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Meanwhile the US government, which had generously disbursed millions 
to keep the armed counterrevolution in weaponry, refused to have anything 
to do with the now retired ‘freedom fighters’ and pressured the Chamorro 
government into reducing the Sandinista Popular Army to a bare minimum. 
Troops plunged from 86,810 in January 1990 to 16,200 in 1992 and then to 
14,553 by 1994, making the recently renamed Army of Nicaragua the smallest 
in Central America. It was reduced by 86 per cent overall, at a rate of 21.5 per 
cent per year. According to Nicaraguan military expert Roberto Cajina, the scale 
of demobilisation that took place in Nicaragua is unprecedented – we might say 
exceptional – in contemporary military history.
The process was hastily implemented and chaotic, with benefits unfairly 
skewed towards the more senior ranks. For the most part, the thousands of 
two-year conscripts were simply happy to return home, but for those of all ranks 
who had made the army their career and had committed to revolution, there 
were various plans, some of which stressed seniority criteria and others the rank 
reached. They also had diverse compensation methods such as houses, land, 
money or staggered disbursements. Worst of all, the seemingly political criteria 
for deciding who would remain in active service and who would retire were never 
made clear. Even more so than the unequal compensation and subsequent lack 
of government compliance due to insufficient resources, the emotions related 
to being summarily dismissed from the herd after all the sacrifice and danger, 
without any clear and understandable explanation, fuelled resentment.
‘Recompas’ and ‘recontras’: together for land
Between April and December 1992 many demobilised soldiers, fed up with 
broken promises, led a series of protests and hunger strikes to spotlight the 
government’s failure to implement signed agreements corresponding to the 
three discharge plans. They sought proper titles to their lands and access to loans 
and technical assistance. They argued that grants of land to demobilised army 
personnel had been based on elitist criteria that favoured high-ranking officers 
– the total of 582 officers (2 colonels, 25 lieutenant colonels, 97 majors and 458 
captains), represented just 5.8 per cent of all demobilised officers. Many of the 
latter were also adversely affected by the mechanism of compensation payments 
disbursed over a long period. Many dissenters organised into groups, rearming 
themselves: some to get the government’s attention, some to carry on the war 
and others to engage in low-level banditry.
Ex-National Resistance members were also dissatisfied. In their case the main 
problem was the chaos in the land titling process and facilitation of repayments 
or compensation prioritised in agreement two of the disarmament protocol. 
Meagre resources were meted out to provide for the war wounded, orphans and 
widows, resulting in miserable pensions. Talk began to be heard of a social divide 
that did not allow services to get through to the regions where settlements of 
demobilised Resistance fighters were situated.
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Bands of armed army veterans (‘Recompas’) and Resistance veterans 
(‘Recontras’) turned their rearmament and rebellion into a means of demanding 
land and forcing the government to keep other unmet promises. At first some 
Recompa groups reactivated to respond to Recontras’ revenge abuses, but more 
often than not, the two formerly adversarial groups discovered they had shared 
interests and united in bands under separate commands known as ‘Rejuntos’, or 
a joint command known as ‘Revueltos’, to engage in publicity-seeking actions 
such as taking over a city or stretch of highway.50 
The Chamorro land reform was mostly an instrument for awarding severance 
pay and unemployment benefit to Army and Resistance veterans, and an attempt 
to pacify the rearmed groups. Although the government did not always keep 
its promises, some land distribution took place on the agricultural frontier, 
sometimes fanning the flames of ethnic conflicts with indigenous peoples on 
the Caribbean side of the country, and sometimes being drawn from privatised 
state properties. Of the 22,000 demobilised Contras, 11,385 had received a 
total of 231,000 hectares of land by 1992.51 Some of these together with certain 
land grants conflicted with other state programmes. For example, the Chamorro 
government granted land in areas later demarcated as forestry reserves, generating 
conflict in both directions. The presence of settlers had the demonstrable effect 
of attracting new invaders to the reserve areas, so the army would carry out 
evictions that were legitimate according to one law but in violation of another. 
In spite of these short circuits, possibly expressions of the diverse interests at 
play, the post-1990 reform – which was meant to strengthen the peace process 
– was in many ways a continuation of the Sandinista agrarian reform. Both were 
shaped by a combination of peasant demands and the consequences of the war 
itself. This new distribution of land, in significant if not enormous quantities, 
was an exceptional policy within Central America. Demobilised soldiers in other 
Central American countries did not receive the same benefits and, as a result, 
went on to form organised crime groups or to carry out contract killings for drug 
cartels, as happened with the Guatemalan kaibiles.52
Better a hired hand on another’s farm than the boss  
of one’s own
At the end of the 1980s the ATC, with its 65,000 members, had grouped together 
union branches according to the kind of crop or enterprises their workers were 
involved in. For the branches related to coffee production, the ATC guaranteed 
workers’ participation, putting its money into a ‘deprofessionalisation’ of the 
organisation to rid it of bureaucrats and allow greater union participation in 
50 These names are an emblematic example of Nicaraguan humour in adversity: permutations 
on the well-known phrase ‘juntos pero no revueltos’ – together but not mixed – referring to 
generations of families forced to live under the same roof due to poverty rather than choice.
51 E. Baumeister and A. Fauné, ‘Elementos para una nueva estrategia gremial de la UNAG’. 
Paper presented at a seminar to Junta Directiva Nacional of UNAG, Managua, 8 June 1992.
52 A. Hernández, Los señores del narco, 399.
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the economic management of the enterprises within it. This process accelerated 
with the privatisation of state enterprises in the 1990s, especially following 
farm seizures. The ATC promoted these to upset the Chamorro government’s 
privatisation plans, which were designed to favour business owners with which 
it was connected. The ATC was thus finally able to achieve the objective pursued 
in training received in the 1980s: worker-managed state enterprises.53 The 
workers thus became owners too, a situation unforeseen in the revolutionary 
government’s early plans.
The farm workers organised in the ATC managed to acquire a coffee-
processing operation and nine coffee estates, covering a combined area of 16,670 
hectares, scattered across Matagalpa, Jinotega, Carazo and Managua. In 1999 
these properties were combined to form a coffee company, AGROCAFE S.A., 
with 2,032 members, 98 per cent of whom were workers on the farms, which 
also grew basic grains and managed cattle ranches and a large area of forest. 
According to AGROCAFE, the estates belonging to the Workers’ Property Area 
(APT), the new name for these lands, were responsible for 7 per cent of the 
country’s coffee production, which was, and still is, the country’s most important 
export.54
By 1994 the situation for the worker/entrepreneurs on these farms was 
already looking unpromising. In one of them, the Adolfo García, covering 
255 hectares in El Crucero, only 16 out of 165 members knew how to read 
and write. School dropout rates did not augur a better future for them: only 
half of 250 farmworkers’ children managed to finish the 1993 academic year. 
They were acutely aware of their limitations in managing their own businesses. 
Furthermore, they were being strangled by a financial debt of 583,000 córdobas 
and a dearth of agricultural inputs. The migration of some members to other 
farms, the cities and Costa Rica started undermining their capacity for self-
management. The ten córdobas a day they could get as hired hands on other 
farms was almost double the income they received working for themselves.55 
Some of their farms were sold or rendered unproductive due to lack of credit.
A range of circumstances conspired against worker management. Merlet 
points to ‘economic insecurity’ as a big factor, explaining that structural 
adjustment policies brutally changed the rules of the game by getting rid of the 
various subsidies that benefited farmers. The new small farmers and the former 
state enterprises, now managed by workers, were subjected to pressure from 
former owners and the police, who were able to justify their interference because 
of various unresolved legal problems with property titles. The new owners were 
also economically asphyxiated by a drastic reduction in access to credit and 
little or no renegotiation of the debts previously acquired by their cooperatives 
or enterprises. According to Merlet, who has followed the fate of the agrarian 
53 CIERA, La reforma agraria, vol. VI, 101.
54 M. González, ‘Worker-owned coffee farms: the bitter and the sweet,’ Envío, no. 154, 
May 1994.
55 Ibid.
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reform through all the years since it began, a considerable portion of the land 
awarded was sold at prices way below its market value. This was partly because 
of the lack of adequate title deeds, especially in the case of the best lands or those 
with urban development or tourism potential. If a balance sheet were drawn up 
of the gains (land given to former combatants, for example) and losses (sales of 
land and land returned to former owners), beneficiaries of the reformed sector 
would have a net loss of some 400,000 hectares between 1990 and 2000. And 
the process is not yet over.56
Forty years later?
It has often been said that a return to extreme inequality in land tenure has 
occurred in the last decade, an agrarian counter-reform spurred on by elites, 
old and new, grabbing farms of all sizes. Eduardo Baumeister charts the state of 
land tenure to four milestones in Nicaraguan history which fall close to census 
dates: the start of Somoza’s decline, the end of the Somoza dynasty, the end of 
Sandinista agrarian reform and the end of two neoliberal governments (those of 
Violeta Chamorro and Arnoldo Alemán).57
Between 1963 and 1978 there were no significant changes in landholdings. 
The relative drop in the area of farms larger than 350 hectares is a result of 
the division of farms between multiple heirs. This stratum was transformed, 
although not as much as some desired, between 1978 and 1988. Collectives 
absorbed 25.5 per cent of the farmland, while holdings of 140 hectares or more 
dropped precipitously, from just over 52 per cent of total landholdings to just 
over 26 per cent: basically, the big farms fed the collectives. The most significant 
increase in the number of small farms took place between 1988 and 2001: 
the proportion of land held in units of 140 hectares or less grew by almost 13 
percentage points, partly due to the breaking up of cooperative land and state 
farms into individual plots, and partly due to the land being given to veterans of 
both sides and to returning exiles. The fact that collectives shrank by more than 
20 per cent does not just reflect their being parcelled out to farm workers and 
cooperative members. A large part of this land was returned to former owners 
or acquired by old or new large-scale owners, which accounts for the number of 
farms over 140 hectares having also increased in the same period. 
It should be noted that the increase in the number of smallholdings does not 
necessarily imply a rise in the number of smallholders. Some of the change is due 
to members of the middle class having acquired many small farms to diversify 
their sources of income. There is also a risk that the governing party could use the 
current situation, in which the Nicaraguan is described – according to current 
propaganda – as ‘Christian, socialist and in solidarity’, to bring back the methods 
of the outmoded paternalist state to engage in new expropriations and distribute 
56 Merlet, ‘Fragilidad y límites’.
57 E. Baumeister, ‘Treinta años de agricultura nicaragüense (1978–2008)’, 400.
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properties among the ‘good’. The later in this ‘second stage of the revolution’ are 
submissive yes-men.
Range (Hectares) 1963 1978 1988 2001
Up to 7 3.5 2.1 3.1 4.5
From more than 7 to 35 11.2 15.4 16.7 20
From more than 35 to 141 26.5 30.1 28.4 36.6
From more than 141 to 352 17.6 16.2 12.8 18
More than 352 41.2 36.2 13.5 16.5
State land 0 0 11.7 0.4
Collective property 0 0 13.8 4
Total 100 100 100 100
Figure 5.1. Evolution in the size of farms by range (in percentages of land used for 
agriculture). 
Source: CIERA and agricultural census of 1963, 1978, and 2001.58
Without doubt, a fresh attempt at redistribution would be welcomed by 
the many who are again landless, from the recipients of freebies and by those 
who benefit from troubled waters. The passage of time is a great fragmenter of 
smallholdings. It is inevitable that any such project would necessarily ignore 
the burden of unresolved conflict that Nicaraguans still carry as a result of the 
agrarian reform of the 1980s. This time redistribution would be implemented 
without the legitimacy the FSLN once enjoyed and abused, and it would ignore 
the fact that property rights are not the only – or even the most important – 
reason for the struggle around land, its use and the distribution of its benefits. 
New struggles could be more aligned to common interests and the common 
good, and they might include other components, provide more options, adopt 
new strategies and diversify demands and approaches. This could happen, if, as 
Merlet suggests, instead of talking about ‘land,’ we talked about ‘rights to land’; 
if we understood that a title or deed covers different rights, but not all rights; 
and if we talked about ‘land tenure regimes’ instead of ‘terms of ownership’.59
Another factor might come into play which could have the opposite effect, 
as it tends towards the rolling back of the agrarian reform: the expropriation of 
small- and medium-sized properties along the possible route of the interoceanic 
canal which is unlikely to be constructed. This coup de main would result 
in the concentration of farms and residential properties in the hands of the 
58 E. Baumeister, ‘Treinta años de agricultura nicaragüense (1978-2008)’, in Nicaragua y el 
FSLN [1979-2009] ¿Qué queda de la revolución? (Barcelona, 2009): 400.
59 M. Merlet, ‘Regímenes de tenencia de la tierra, sistemas financieros y construcción de nuevas 
modalidades de gobernanza’. Paper presented at the international seminar ‘Economías 
campesinas y sistemas financieros rurales’, Foro latinoamericano y del Caribe sobre finanzas 
rurales (FOROLACFR), La Paz, Bolivia, July 2007.
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canal company and its shareholders.60 Considerable resistance has been made 
against the expropriations of the canal project, in the form of four protest 
marches, all led principally by medium and small-scale farmers.61 So far, the 
government has reacted with indifference and repression: the authorities have 
not passed judgement on the matter and the police have turned a blind eye 
when government sympathisers attack the demonstrators. At the same time, 
the government cannot feign indifference in the face of the peasants’ ability to 
communicate their complaints to various national stakeholders and international 
fora. Government apathy on this matter is a result of the fact that the FSLN wins 
far more votes in urban areas, which is where most of Nicaragua’s population is 
now concentrated.62
This indifference is built upon a sense of contempt for some of the most 
lasting achievements of the agrarian reform – achievements which have survived 
for 40 years. The Nicaraguan peasantry has shown itself to be organised and 
conscious of its interests, even though it was required to subordinate them 
to the directives of the revolutionary government in the 1980s, when urban-
focused policies that were harmful to peasant interests were emphasised.63 Since 
‘consciousness’ is an intangible benefit, the exact scope of which is not easily 
measured, I will mention a more concrete and tangible achievement: in the 
2002/2003 cycle Nicaragua sold 3,925,364 kilograms of coffee through Fair 
Trade channels, which was 6.12 per cent of Fair Trade coffee originating from 
Latin America, and 3.45 per cent of the global output, making it the fifth 
largest producer in Latin America.64 The democratisation of coffee cultivation 
in Nicaragua has created the right conditions for Fair Trade. Its cooperatives and 
small-scale farmers are highly attractive partners for institutions that promote 
this alternative to the conventional market, including Espanica, a Fair Trade 
organisation that distributes coffee in Spain, sourced from farmers in Matagalpa 
and Condega who are organised in cooperatives that own lands from the old 
APP.
Some agrarian reform cooperatives continue to stand out in Fair Trade circles. 
The Promoter for Cooperative Development in Las Segovias (PRODECOOP) 
is one of the most successful examples of coffee-producing cooperatives in the 
Fair Trade market. Founded in 1993, it brings together more than 2,000 small 
farmers who are members of 40 different cooperatives. In 2002 it controlled 
60 M. López Baltodano, ‘Truths about the canal concession all Nicaraguans should know’, 
Envío, no. 390, Jan. 2014.
61 E. Romero, ‘Campesinos marcharon contra el canal’, La Prensa, 22 Apr. 2016.
62 J.L. Rocha and T. Martínez, ‘A country divided: relative defeats and victories’, Envío, no. 232, 
Nov. 2000.
63 R. Mendoza Vidaurre, ‘We erred to win...’, Envío, no. 111, Oct. 1990.
64 J. Vieto, ‘Foro Internacional. El café sostenible en América Latina. Situación actual de la 
oferta y tendencias’, Centro de Inteligencia sobre Mercados Sostenibles, 25 Nov. 2003, Lima, 
Perú.
A NICARAGUAN EXCEPTIONALISM?122
assets worth more than a million dollars.65 The Centre for Coffee Cooperatives 
of the North (CECOCAFEN) comprises 12 organisations which have 2,637 
members (709 women and 1,928 men). Both of these cooperatives have gained 
in strength because Fair Trade prices are considerably higher than the price on 
the New York exchange. For example, in the 2002/2003 cycle, when the average 
price of coffee in Nicaragua was US$68.93 dollars per quintal, CECOCAFEN 
and PRODECOOP paid US$110 and 104.76 per quintal respectively. The 
average prices paid by the commercial giants CISA and Atlantic were US$71.15 
and 64.94 dollars per quintal respectively.66 In times of crisis, thanks to Fair 
Trade’s relatively captive customers, the difference between the Fair Trade price 
and the price on the New York exchange increases. In 2001, when the average 
price of coffee in Nicaragua was US$60.22 per quintal and CISA and Atlantic 
paid no more than US$56, the Union of Agricultural Cooperatives (UCA) paid 
US$87.15, PRODECOOP paid US$80.25, while CECOCAFEN averaged 
US$99.61 and COSATIN – a cooperative in Boaco – paid more than US$104.67
To a great extent Nicaragua’s participation in the Fair Trade and organic 
markets is rooted in the legacy of the two models of cooperativism. It is not just 
that farmers with small/medium holdings are obvious targets for Fair Trade, 
but rather that a series of ideological affinities has ensured that cooperativists, 
organised peasants and NGOs promoting them have worked together to boost 
Fair Trade – and this situation is clear in the case of coffee.68 However, huge 
gaps in knowledge exist in other areas where the likelihood of the positive 
impact of agrarian reform is also detectable. That impact makes Nicaragua an 
exceptional case in Central America. It remains for future studies to investigate 
whether the diversification of agricultural production and the incursion into 
less conventional products for export – mangoes, pineapples, yucca – is also, at 
least partially, rooted in the legacy of the agrarian reform. With the onslaught of 
Monsanto and its control over seeds, as well as the importation of corn and other 
basic products for which national demand used to be satisfied with domestic 
production, another question is raised: to what extent has food sovereignty and 
the food security crisis been halted as a result of the structure of land tenure 
which in turn is a result of the agrarian reform?
There is no doubt that the trend towards inequality in land tenure and the 
threat of an abrupt seizure of large amounts of land to benefit the canal owners 
are threats to this more democratic system of land use. The banks and the local 
loan sharks are the principal agents of this move towards concentration. Their 
daily work takes place silently but constantly. In contrast, the business of the 
interoceanic canal, including the highly probable fact that in the end there will 
be no canal, would be a more sudden blow and of greater concern: it affects 
65 PRODECOOP, ‘Quinta asamblea de delegados. Informa a la Asamblea General’, Nov. 2002.
66 Datos del Centro de Trámites de las Exportaciones (CETREX), Exportaciones de café por 
empresa. Cosecha 2002/2003.
67 Ibid., Cosecha 2001/2002.
68 R. Mendoza Vidaurre, ‘La paradoja del café.
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27 per cent of the territory of 13 municipalities and 23,847 farmers, most of 
them small or medium producers.69 This tour de force of the counterreform 
would establish a perverse symmetry with the reform of the 1980s: while in 
the past the process of granting land was accelerated for military reasons, here 
the expropriations would be carried out for economic reasons. Land tenure 
would again be a dependent variable shaped by the macropolitics of a state 
that has another goal in mind. The peasants who were sacrificed on the altar 
of the revolution are now being asked to make another sacrifice in the name of 
progress or, more probably, for the sake of the greed of a group of politicians 
and investors. It is, at the very least, disconcerting and disheartening that the 
same organisation – the FSLN – is the one that has always demanded and still 
does, the one that gave and now seeks to take away. Nevertheless, the FSLN’s 
actions make sense: to a great extent land tenure will again be determined by the 
requirements of geopolitics.
In the past, the progress that the FSLN had in mind revolved around one 
great landowner who guaranteed greater productivity and cohesion: the state. 
In the present, progress consists of ceding control of the area to large private 
landowners, a project that resembles the model developed by liberals in the 
19th century. In both cases, the final results do not match the original plans. 
In the 1980s, peasant resistance and the war itself – which was fought by a 
discontented peasantry – were the real drivers of Nicaraguan exceptionalism, 
because they accelerated agrarian reform, pushing it closer to the Bukharin 
model and prolonging it beyond the revolutionary decade. This culminated 
in the Chamorro government’s post-1990 reform, which was necessary to 
secure a lasting peace. Peasant actions made agrarian reform exceptional in 
terms of both infrastructure and superstructure, shaping land ownership and 
ideology. Nicaragua’s participation in Fair Trade networks is built upon these 
achievements. At the time of writing, as the spectre of the interoceanic canal 
threatens to prompt a massive reconcentration of land ownership, it is once 
again the strength of peasant activism that has halted the trend towards greater 
inequality.
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6. The difference the revolution made: decision-
making in Liberal and Sandinista communities
Hilary Francis
On returning to office in 2007, the FSLN introduced a range of social programmes, which provided farm animals, roofing and other goods to poor rural families. At the local level these schemes were initially 
administered by the Consejos de Poder Ciudadano (Citizen Power Councils, 
or CPCs), community-level committees made up of local residents. Opponents 
allege that the CPCs brought centralisation, politicisation and unprecedented 
interference into Nicaraguans’ daily lives.1 Most commonly, the CPCs have been 
described as a means of establishing a clientelistic relationship between poor 
Nicaraguans and the FSLN.2
This chapter provides a detailed account of decision-making structures in two 
rural communities, where the evidence bears out many of the critics’ charges. In 
both the communities surveyed here, social programmes have been specifically 
targeted at non-Sandinistas, and this targeting has led some traditional Liberal 
voters to vote Sandinista for the first time. (Historically most of the right-
wing vote in Nicaragua has belonged to parties which identify as Liberal, so 
the word has a distinct connotation in the Nicaraguan context.) But while the 
poaching of Liberal voters occurred in both the communities described here, the 
FSLN’s social programmes worked differently in the two villages. FSLN officials 
confronted two very different sets of social and political structures, a product 
of the two communities’ diverse experience of Nicaragua’s recent past. The 
revolution did make a difference, in the sense that the present is not the same as 
the past because of the events of 1979–90. It also created difference, in the sense 
that it caused previously similar communities to take very different ideological 
paths, and develop very different cultures of community decision-making.
1 S. Prado, ‘The mettle of our civil society is going to be put to the test’, Envío, no. 307, Feb. 
2007; W. Miranda, ‘Aprueban los gabinetes de Rosario Murillo’, Confidencial, 21 Feb. 2013, 
R. Montoya, ‘Contradiction and struggle under the leftist phoenix: rural Nicaragua at the 
thirtieth anniversary of the Revolution’.
2 K. Bay-Meyer, ‘Do Ortega’s citizen power councils empower the poor in Nicaragua?’; 
S. Prado, Entre los CDM y los CPC; J. Howard and L. Serra Vasquez, ‘The changing spaces 
of local governance in Nicaragua’.
H. Francis, ‘The difference the revolution made: decision-making in liberal and Sandinista 
communities’, in H. Francis (ed.), A Nicaraguan Exceptionalism? Debating the Legacy of the 
Sandinista Revolution (London: University of London Press, 2019), pp. 127–44. License: CC-
BY-NC-ND.
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This chapter looks at two rural communities in the north of Nicaragua, 
less than 40 kilometres apart. One, here called ‘El Junco’, was a bastion of 
support for the Sandinista government during the 1980s. The other, ‘Potrero’, 
was a stronghold for the anti-Sandinista Contra forces. This chapter shows that 
the legacy of the revolution means that El Junco has a far stronger tradition 
of community decision-making than Potrero. However, the effect of this 
revolutionary legacy is not wholly positive. El Junco’s stronger ties with the 
FSLN have meant that central government interference and control has been 
felt more keenly in El Junco than Potrero in the years since 2007.
Revolution, war and neoliberalism in El Junco and  
Potrero, 1979–2007
The inhabitants of El Junco first made contact with the Sandinistas in the late 
1970s. Some community members were involved with progressive elements in 
the Catholic Church, and they attended religious retreats which led to their 
increased politicisation and opposition to the Somoza dictatorship. As a result 
of these contacts, religious meetings (with some political content) began to take 
place in the community. These were dangerous because they were forbidden by 
the Jueces de Mesta, which represented the Somoza state in the community. 
Nonetheless, those who were involved in this clandestine activity believe that this 
early organisation actually kept the community safe from harm:
There were places where the Guardia carried out massacres because people 
hadn’t been properly warned about what was going to happen ... and we were, 
because of the church. [We knew] that these weren’t things you talk about 
with just anyone. We already knew ... if the Guardia came and asked about 
something [to say] ‘we don’t know anything about what’s happening’.3
These religious meetings were regularly attended by 35 to 45 community 
members and on occasion passing Sandinista guerrillas also came to observe. 
This early activism provided a reference point for community activism after the 
revolution, and a foundation for the belief that, despite apparent difficulties 
and dangers, being organised actually kept the community safe. Much of the 
land in El Junco belonged to a single landowner who was a supporter of the 
Somoza regime. After the triumph of the revolution in July 1979, these lands 
were expropriated and a state farm was established there. In addition, a local 
Sandinista Defence Committee was formed. El Junco’s current community 
leader remembers the work of organisation during the 1980s in glowing terms: 
‘We were united, with a single purpose: production and defence. At that time 
we were more organised than now ... there was more political consciousness.’4 
For others more actively involved in those first years, however, the picture was 
not so rosy: ‘At the beginning it was difficult, because people were afraid. And 
3 Interview, Juan Carlos Centeno, July 2015. All names have been changed.
4 Interview, Augusto Zeledón, July 2015.
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then when rumours about the counterrevolution started, it was worse. The whole 
thing nearly fell apart because people were scared.’5
In spite of these difficulties, a strong tradition of local decision-making was 
forged in El Junco. In 1984 the state farm was made into a cooperative, which 
led to more support for devolved community decision-making. Training was 
provided in the theory and practice of democratic structures: how to hold a 
meeting and a vote; the standard roles and responsibilities for a committee’s 
secretary, treasurer and chair. Most importantly, consistent financial support 
allowed community members the space and time to develop these structures. 
The new cooperative had a full time adviser from UNAG (Union Nacional de 
Agricultores y Ganaderos, a farmers’ union) and the state also paid cooperative 
members’ full-time salaries.6
In Potrero, the history of community decision-making in the 1970s and 
1980s is harder to reconstruct. Those members who have lived in the village since 
the 1970s tend to be virulently anti-Sandinista and reluctant to recognise any 
benefit at all that might be associated with the revolution. This position was not 
always so entrenched: the village was home to a Sandinista ‘political school’ in 
the early 1960s, shortly after the FSLN was formed, and one of the village’s more 
prominent families was actively involved in supporting the Sandinista guerrillas 
in the 1970s.7 In the period immediately after the revolution, local ties with the 
Sandinistas were broken. The reasons for this are complex, but the change was 
in part a result of anger about some of the land confiscations that took place in 
the area, as well as a feeling that local support for the Sandinistas had not been 
adequately repaid.8 As early as 1980 some community members had begun to 
support the fledgling Contra movement.9
In Potrero, as in El Junco, a cooperative was established in 1984. However, 
this new structure did nothing to embed a local commitment to community 
decision-making. Community member Alejandro Palacios explains:
In 1984, 1985 there was an armed collective here. They grabbed people from 
different places and they put them in there, armed, to protect themselves ... 
The government just said to the evacuees that came from other communities 
‘here’s the farm, get in there’. And that’s how it happened, but there wasn’t 
any kind of concretely delegated organisation there, no. ‘Get in there’ and 
that was it. And that’s why there were problems with the agrarian reform, 
things weren’t organised well ... Then when the war got more intense they left 
the land. Nobody stayed there. [They were] a bit scared.10
5 Interview, Juan Carlos Centeno, July 2015.
6 Interview, Augusto Zeledón, July 2015.
7 Interview, Gregorio Flores, May 2012. The information about the Sandinista political school 
comes from a secondary source, but citing it here would reveal the location of ‘Potrero’.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
10 Interview, Alejandro Palacios, July 2015.
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Palacios was imprisoned by the Sandinistas for several years in the 1980s because 
of his support for the Contras in Potrero, so his testimony is in some ways 
problematic, since he was probably involved in organising the violence that made 
the settlers ‘a bit scared’. It may be that the cooperative in Potrero had more 
government support than this account suggests. Even if it did, it is clear that no 
tradition of community organisation was established, because the settlers came 
from elsewhere and were quickly forced to leave the area. The Contras and their 
supporters had their own clandestine organisation in the community, but these 
structures were more hierarchical and solely concerned with the organisation of 
the war effort. After 1990, the community began to organise and a committee 
was established to manage the maintenance of the water supply, a new initiative 
supported by a US charity. Still, there was nothing in this post-war experience 
equivalent to the time and space residents of El Junco had gained from the 
revolution – time and space that allowed them to develop their own tradition of 
community organisation.
In El Junco, the community’s decision-making structures were challenged 
by the transition which followed the Sandinistas’ defeat in the 1990 elections. 
These structures were now charged with working with, and for, a right-wing, 
anti-Sandinista government. El Junco resident Famnuel Centeno explains:
It was a bit difficult, because of the stress of the transition ... 1990–6 
was a moment of pressure, of nerves because people didn’t know what was 
going to happen ... people wanted to leave, to distance themselves from 
[the community structures] because they said ‘if I take part they’re going to 
say I’m a Liberal and I’ll put myself in danger, they’re going to mark me out’.11
Despite these fears, the community in El Junco started to organise again from 
about 1993. The new effort was prompted by intervention from the (Sandinista) 
municipal government, which was trying to revive the cooperative movement. 
As for so many Sandinista-allied movements in these years, the end to the war 
removed the need for absolute unquestioning unity, and multiple fault lines and 
divisions began to appear. In the 1980s El Junco had one cooperative, but in the 
organisational revival of the mid 1990s three different cooperatives were formed. 
One comprised native-born community members, another was for settlers who 
had arrived in the 1980s. A third cooperative for women was subsequently 
formed, because they felt their voices were not being heard in either of the 
existing structures. These divisions notwithstanding, the community remained 
overwhelmingly Sandinista, and this shaped local decision-making even after the 
Sandinistas lost the 1990 elections:
During the 16 years of neoliberalism they tried to involve more Liberals, 
rather than Sandinistas [in decision-making]. [But] there’s very few of them 
[in the community], so in the end they included one or two Liberals in these 
bodies, but the rest were Sandinistas. So the Sandinistas always dominated.12
11 Interview, Famnuel Centeno, July 2015.
12 Interview, Famnuel Centeno, July 2015.
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This dominance at the community level was facilitated by the fact that El 
Junco was part of a municipality which voted Sandinista; in fact, the municipal 
government has always been Sandinista. Similarly, Liberal Potrero was part of 
a municipality that voted Liberal at every election from 1990 (when municipal 
elections were first introduced) until 2012, when the FSLN achieved an 
unprecedented dominance in the municipal elections (amid allegations of 
widespread fraud).13 This changing relationship with their respective municipal 
authorities would become crucial for both communities when the FSLN 
returned to power.
‘They don’t think any of it’s important’: community 
organisation in Potrero since 2007
When Daniel Ortega and the FSLN returned to government in January 2007, 
the new administration made community organisation an absolute priority. The 
third decree issued by Ortega on his first day in office made sweeping changes 
to Nicaragua’s structures for local governance. Decree 03-2007 announced the 
government’s intention to ‘facilitate genuine participation of citizens and citizen 
democracy via direct democracy’.14 This participation would be organised by 
the CPCs which comprised 16 members, each with a particular responsibility. 
As well as providing a focus for community deliberations, the councils were to 
oversee the management of the FSLN’s social programmes. A key component 
of these was the Bono Productivo Alimentario (or the Productive Food Bonus), 
known colloquially in Nicaragua as the ‘bono’. It comprised a grant of a pig or 
cow, chickens and seeds. It has been an important component in the FSLN 
government’s attempts to reduce poverty in Nicaragua, but it is also a tool for 
winning over anti-Sandinistas and increasing support for the FSLN.15 
From the outset, this effort to change Nicaragua’s political landscape was 
vigorously resisted by the Sandinistas’ opponents. In 2008, before beginning 
research in Potrero for the first time, I visited the Liberal mayor who led the 
municipal government that governs the town. Press articles about the failure of 
the CPCs were prominently displayed his office walls. I was given the name of 
the ‘coordinator’ in Potrero, Alejandro Palacios, who was in fact the coordinator 
of the Junta Comunal (or community council) which had operated in the village 
before the Sandinistas returned to power. Palacios told me himself that there was 
no CPC in Potrero, but it subsequently transpired this was not the case, but that 
its coordinator was a Sandinista from another community who rarely visited 
Potrero. In 2009 I carried out interviews with every household in Potrero, but 
found only one person who would admit to being part of the 16-member CPC.16
13 ‘La violencia electoral en Nicaragua empezó en 2012’, La Prensa, 19 Nov. 2017.
14 La Gaceta: Diario Oficial, no. 7, 10 Jan. 2007, 246.
15 P. Kester, Informe evaluativo (2007–2008): Programa Productivo Alimentario (PPA) 
Hambre Cero.
16 Interview, Marvin Talavera, Mar. 2009. This does not mean that no one else had agreed to be 
listed a member of the CPC, at least on paper. Rather, it is indicative of the stigma attached 
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There was considerable underlying tension in the community because 
of the strength of anti-Sandinista feeling, and for that reason the FSLN’s 
political structures were practically non-existent. Despite this, the FSLN’s 
social programmes functioned reasonably well. In 2009 five women from the 
community benefited from the bono. The programme requires that participants 
have at least one manzana of their own land where they can keep the animals, 
which excludes the poorest.17 In general, therefore, the beneficiaries were 
certainly not well off, but equally not the poorest in the community either: 
one ran a small shop and another had some support from relatives resident in 
the United States. The considerable stigma attached to cooperation with the 
Sandinistas meant that only the more confident community members felt able 
to take advantage of the programme in its early years. The reluctance of the 
community also meant that benefits often passed through familial networks – 
one of the first beneficiaries was a Liberal from a Liberal family, but she was also 
the niece by marriage of the Sandinistas’ municipal political secretary.
Although control of these social programmes fell to the Sandinistas, it was 
clear that political control in the community still remained in the hands of the 
Liberals in 2007–12. In rural Nicaragua, community leaders have significant 
power, because a letter with their signature is required for all kinds of contacts 
with the municipal government, including requests for funds or for permission 
to chop down trees for construction. As long as the municipal government 
remained Liberal, these kinds of requests continued to go to Palacios, rather than 
to the CPC coordinator. In 2009, Palacios made it clear to me that he would 
take immediate (unspecified) action if the CPC coordinator ‘presumed’ to give 
anyone permission to chop down trees in Potrero.18 Such fears were certainly 
misplaced, since the Liberal municipal government had no intention of dealing 
with the CPC.
According to the leaders of the Junta Comunal (the Liberal-era community 
council which remained the de facto authority until the Sandinistas took the 
municipality in the elections of 2012), the decision-making structures of Potrero 
were fully democratic between 1990 and 2012: the committee was elected by the 
whole community and regular meetings were held. In reality though, community 
participation was of a limited and particular kind. In the house-to-house survey 
I carried out in 2009, respondents were asked how community leaders were 
chosen, and whether regular meetings took place. These questions were most 
often met with blank stares and professions of ignorance, sometimes coupled 
with the response that the Junta Comunal handled those things.
to being associated with Sandinista programmes in Potrero. Gladys Hernández, who is cited 
below, was also involved briefly in the first iteration of the CPC, but she did not admit this to 
me until 2015. 
17 Kester, Informe evaluativo, 15. A manzana is equal to 6987.4 square metres.
18 Informal conversation, Alejandro Palacios, Mar. 2009.
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Despite this weak democratic structure, the community was more than 
capable of acting together in pursuit of shared goals. One evening in 2009, 
I happened to mention to Palacios that I was using a GPS to make a map of 
the community. He asked if it could be used to measure the pipes used for the 
community’s water supply as the municipality had asked the Junta to supply 
information about the exact quantity of pipe needed for a replacement. I said 
it could and we agreed to take measurements the next day. At 7.30 am the 
next morning I woke up to find that most of Potrero’s male population had 
assembled, with machetes, ready to help clear the brush that had grown around 
the pipes so that we could take accurate measurements. The efficiency of the 
operation was particularly surprising to me: I was more accustomed to the 
community structures of El Junco, which were certainly more democratic, but 
where a similar water project had been held up for years, in part because of a 
lack of action from some community members. Many of the men from Potrero 
fought with the Contras during the war, and the Contra forces were subject to a 
strict disciplinary regime, far more absolute and hierarchical than the equivalent 
structures of the Sandinista army.19 It seems likely, therefore, that the legacy of 
that experience partially explains this greater level of hierarchy – and efficiency 
– in community activity in Potrero.
In 2012 the uneasy coexistence of CPC-led social programmes and 
political control by the Liberal Junta Comunal came to an abrupt end. The 
Sandinistas won the municipal government elections in the municipality for 
the first time since 1990. Potrero is one of the most Liberal communities in this 
predominantly Liberal municipality, and on the day of the elections there was 
substantial conflict. A dispute arose because some of the ballot boxes containing 
Liberal votes were allegedly discarded in the community before the rest of the 
boxes had been taken to the municipal centre. There was little doubt in Potrero 
that the ballot boxes had been dumped. One resident who sympathised with the 
Sandinistas conceded that this had happened, but argued that it did not matter, 
because the count took place in Potrero before the votes were taken into town.20 
Community members forcibly tried to prevent the ballot boxes from leaving and 
the electoral officials had to be escorted away by riot police.
For Alejandro Palacios the presence of riot police is clear proof that the 
election itself was fraudulent:
They put the riot police onto us ... to intimidate us. They didn’t actually 
hit us – you can’t say things happened if they didn’t – but they intimidated 
people ... And when people see these guys in uniform, it makes them nervous 
19 This difference is frequently noted by former Contra combatants. In an interview for a 
different study one combatant recalled that during the war ‘we heard on the radio the way a 
[Sandinista] subaltern would respond with swear words to his superior – “why don’t you go in 
yourself you son of whatever” – when he told him to go ... When he said to him “go through 
the entrance, Franco” [the response would be] “why don’t you come here and go through 
yourself?” In the Contra you didn’t see that.’ Interview, Santiago Estrada, May 2012.
20 Nora Rodríguez, informal conversation, July 2015.
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... this type of repression. Why did we see repression? Because when things 
are legal it doesn’t have to be like that ... if they won they won, but they won 
legally, and there’s nothing to do about it. We weren’t very happy about it, 
because they snatched the election from us.21
One might expect to see even greater levels of conflict and polarisation in Potrero 
as a result of the conflict over the election – but this is not quite what happened. 
A new community leader was named: Efraín Flores, a Sandinista who had 
recently moved to the village. Now that the municipality head was Sandinista, 
Flores became the key conduit between the community and the municipal 
government, taking on the role previously occupied by Palacios. Although the 
stalwart anti-Sandinistas were further alienated by the events of 2012, others 
were won over by the Sandinistas’ ongoing social programmes. At the same 
time, the climate of fear and stigma that prevented many from cooperating with 
the Sandinista programmes began to abate a little. Gladys Hernández, who had 
briefly been a member of the CPC back in 2007, began to participate in the 
FSLN’s structures again in 2015. She reflected on the change:
[In 2007] it scared me. I did it for a bit, but it scared me. Sometimes you take 
part not because you’re a member of that party [the Sandinistas], but so you 
can help the community, but they got me scared and they said this, that and 
the other ... But no, thank god ... it’s not like that anymore. People have got 
used to the government that’s in power and you don’t hear that sort of talk 
any more.22
Of course, tensions have not disappeared completely: the continuing delicacy of 
such matters is evident in the lengths to which Hernández goes to avoid using 
the word ‘Sandinista’ in her account of her involvement. But even the hard-
core Liberals concede that the Sandinista programmes have led some people in 
Potrero to change their political allegiance. For the stalwarts the shift is difficult 
to comprehend:
It’s something I don’t understand. Because I’ve always been a Liberal and I’m 
still a Liberal because I don’t see the sense in changing ... it makes no sense, 
to change yourself to support a man because of something that isn’t real, that 
they give you from other countries. He [the Sandinista leader] is just the 
conduit, he just signs off on it.23
In Potrero it is clear that Sandinista social programmes have been used as a 
political tool – and a very effective one – to win support for the FSLN. But 
what of the critics’ other charges?24 Is there a greater level of top-down control 
21 Interview, Alejandro Palacios, July 2015.
22 Interview, Gladys Hernández, July 2015.
23 Interview, Ernesto Rugama, July 2015.
24 I am referring here to the criticisms of the CPC cited in the introduction to this chapter: 
Prado, ‘The mettle of our civil society’; Miranda, ‘Aprueban los gabinetes de Rosario Murillo’; 
Montoya, ‘Contradiction and struggle’; Bay-Meyer, ‘Do Ortega’s citizen power councils 
empower the poor in Nicaragua?’; Prado, Entre los CDM y los CPC; Howard and Serra 
Vasquez, ‘The changing spaces of local governance’.
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in community level governance? Are decision-making structures interfering in 
people’s daily lives in an unprecedented way?
In Potrero, the answer is mainly no. This is partly because the government 
has changed the format of community structures so many times. In 2013 the 
CPCs were discarded in favour of the Gabinetes de la Familia, Comunidad y 
Vida (or Cabinets for the Family, Community and Life).25 Critics have voiced 
a particular concern that the new Gabinetes would have the power to interfere 
in private family life.26 In both Potrero and El Junco this fear was misplaced 
because by 2015 the Gabinetes existed in name only and had little or no impact 
on how the communities were governed. In fact, at that stage, decision-making 
in both communities was in practice coordinated by the Comités de Liderazgo 
Sandinista (or Sandinista Leadership Committees, CLS). These committees 
have existed since 2007, but in both communities by 2015 they had taken on 
the functions originally charged to the CPCs: they allocated the bono and the 
zinc roofing distributed by the government, and they acted as intermediaries 
between the communities and the municipal government. Although the CPCs 
were always dominated by Sandinistas in both communities, the government was 
at least rhetorically committed to promoting the CPCs as apolitical organisations 
which valued the participation of all.27 By 2015, the de facto situation was that 
all key decisions were made by an openly and exclusively Sandinista body.
Nonetheless, in Potrero in 2015 there was little evidence of absolute 
Sandinista control. The existence of a strong anti-Sandinista constituency 
meant that even though the political secretary of the CLS controlled the flow 
of goods and services to the community, he still remained extremely cautious in 
his dealings with community members. All other interviewees in Potrero and El 
Junco had a litany of complaints about the nature of local governance structures, 
the inadequacy of other community members’ participation and the mistakes 
made by regional and national government officials. In contrast, Potero’s 
political secretary, Efraín Flores, displayed a tight-lipped, forced enthusiasm 
for everything and everybody. ‘To do this work here you have to be everyone’s 
friend,’ he explained. ‘I have to make little jokes, all that, these people like me 
a lot.’28 As both a newcomer and a Sandinista, Flores’ position was tenuous. 
During moments of crisis, like the elections of November 2012, his power could 
be backed up by riot police and the Sandinista state’s monopoly of violence. Most 
of the time, however, Flores was on his own, and the precariousness of Sandinista 
control meant that he had to tread very carefully.
25 ‘Gabinetes de la Familia, la Comunidad y la Vida profundizarán protagonismo y 
productividad de la Persona’.
26 J. Jiménez, ‘El Código de la Familia es el último eslabón de un proyecto de control social’, 
Envío, no. 398, May 2015. 
27 Héctor M. Cruz, ‘Los CPC en Nicaragua: un análisis sobre la articulación, el diseño y la 
implementación del Poder Ciudadano’..
28 Interview, Efraín Flores, July 2015.
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The Sandinistas’ tenuous control was partly a result of the persistence of 
anti-Sandinista feeling in Potrero. It also had to do with the community’s limited 
interest in, and experience of, democratic decision-making and participation. 
In the 2009 house-to-house survey, questions about community-wide meetings 
prompted more blank stares. The Junta Comunal was in charge at the time and 
Alejandro Palacios insisted that meetings did take place, just as Efraín Flores was 
adamant that they were happening under the Sandinistas in 2015.29 The problem 
was that, in the main, community members had little interest in such activities. 
Gladys Hernández feels the fault lies with the community itself:
They do invite the whole community [to meetings], but it’s difficult to get 
the whole community together ... They say it’s a vice of Nicaraguans, that 
they invite us to something and we don’t consider it important. We don’t take 
things seriously. I’m a health brigadista and it’s the same ... they tell me to call 
a meeting of the community, because they’re going to come and give a talk 
on health and the same happens. There’s no support from people, they don’t 
think any of it’s important.30
This lack of participation makes it difficult for decision-making structures in 
Potrero to have much power. Equally, though, there is no real expectation that 
community members have a right to be consulted. This lack of a democratic 
tradition perhaps partially explains the surprisingly muted reaction to power 
shifts in the community since 2012. In El Junco, in contrast, the revolution left 
a legacy of democratic participation and community decision-making, and as a 
result, the community’s interaction with the FSLN government since 2007 has 
been very different indeed.
‘The day the asambleas are lost, it will be the end of the 
world’: community organisation in El Junco since 2007
In 2015 interviewees in both El Junco and Potrero had a strong perception 
that their communities were apathetic and participation in decision-making was 
dwindling. For Augusto Zeledón, the political secretary in El Junco, the change 
was obvious but the cause was obscure: 
I ask myself ‘what’s happening?’ There’s a decline in the social programmes 
and everything. The cooperatives too. They invite all 20 members [to a 
meeting] and 10 or 11 come. The other [cooperative] has 40 members, so 18 
or 20 come.31
There was an acute sense in El Junco that participation was falling and people 
did not care, but in relative terms the tradition of community decision-making 
was still extremely strong. By most standards the 50 per cent attendance rate 
that Zeledón reports is not at all bad, particularly since the large number of 
29 Interview, Alejandro Palacios, July 2015. Interview, Efraín Flores, July 2015. 
30 Interview, Gladys Hernández, July 2015.
31 Interview, Augusto Zeledón, July 2015.
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organisations in the community meant that meetings were frequent and the 
burden of participation was high:
[People] don’t participate like they did before. Because there are lots of 
meetings, that’s the issue. There are meetings of the cooperative, meetings for 
the school, meetings for community work, to deal with problems with the 
water supply ... and in the end it’s the same people in the community who are 
going to meetings two or three times a week. So it doesn’t work, people get 
sick of it and they have lots of farm work to do. Immigration is affecting this 
too. Because of the [coffee] rust problem a huge number of people are going 
to work in Managua or abroad.32
Growing apathy was also related to the passage of time. For the older generation 
of community leaders, all of whom are devout Sandinistas who lived through the 
war in El Junco, the experience of the 1980s created an unshakeable commitment 
to community work and to the FSLN, one that is not always shared by their sons 
and daughters. In recent years, the FSLN has tried to ensure that the younger 
generation takes up positions of leadership at the local level, but this policy has 
failed. This is partly because most young people do not have the time nor the 
financial resources to carry out this voluntary work. Community members in El 
Junco, however, believe that it is also because younger people don’t have the same 
commitment to political work, because they did not live through the revolution 
and the war.
The government wanted to revoke the community structures and put in 
young people. It didn’t work out for them. Young people have a different 
way of thinking. [They care about] fun, discos. And that doesn’t leave time 
for community work. It didn’t work out for them. So who was left? The 
leaders are all about 50, I’m 52 for example. For a young leader it’s difficult, 
much too difficult. They don’t have that revolutionary consciousness. That 
revolutionary mística that one gets, once it’s got you, you never get rid of it ... 
It’s a consciousness that’s born in the trenches, born from the war.33 
The younger people agreed with this assessment. Rafaela Castillo, who is a 
member of the CLS and coordinator of the Sandinista Youth in the community, 
explained that ‘We’ve tried to involve more young people, but the young people 
like having fun rather than serious things.’34 Nonetheless, for a significant 
minority of this younger generation, community activism continued to matter, 
and the legacy of the revolution informed and shaped their involvement too: 
At the beginning I was scared to work ... in this kind of organisation, because 
I was working with people who had lived it [the revolution], who had felt it, 
and I didn’t, I was someone who had just heard about it second hand. But we 
started working, and I would ask questions about what happened, and I got 
more involved that way ... all the things that they lived through, I made them 
my own. Made it so it was as though I had lived it too.35
32 Interview, Famnuel Centeno, July 2015.
33 Interview, Augusto Zeledón, July 2015.
34 Interview, Rafaela Castillo, July 2015.
35 Ibid.
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The importance of this legacy, even for the younger generation, is clear in the 
community’s attitude to asambleas, or community-wide meetings. In spite of 
widespread concern about declining participation, and multiple problems 
related to the practical functioning of decision-making structures, all members 
considered the asambleas to be extremely important. Famnuel Centeno was not 
directly involved in the CLS and he was a child during the 1980s. Nonetheless, 
he considers the survival of the asambleas to be paramount:
The asambleas have a massive impact in the community. Because it’s the only 
way that people get information, it’s the only means we have to identify or 
discuss problems in the community. Or [talk] about new projects, about new 
initiatives. Imagine a community where there are no asambleas, or where there 
are no meetings, how would the people of the community get information? 
They’re indispensable, I think the asambleas will never never ... the day the 
asambleas are lost it will be the end of the world.36
Because of this deeper engagement with politics, the actions of the FSLN 
government have had a much greater impact in El Junco, not all of it positive. 
Greater community activity means that government directives can have a 
considerable, often unforeseen, effect on the delicate political balance within 
the community. In July 2015, shortly before the interviews for this study were 
carried out, the FSLN government distributed the latest tranche of zinc roofing 
and bono in El Junco and Potrero. In both communities a list of beneficiaries 
was drawn up by the political secretary of the CLS – and in both places officials 
from Managua came to check their choices and made changes to those lists. In 
Potrero this led to some grumbling about the fact that the Sandinistas ‘lied’, 
and political secretary Efrain Flores conceded (in a characteristically mild way) 
that the changes had caused him some problems.37 In El Junco, in contrast, the 
changes prompted open warfare between CLS members.
In El Junco the CLS political secretaries are the aforementioned Zeledón and 
Amada Acuña.38 Acuña and Zeledón had a considerable disagreement over the 
changes to the list. Zeledón suspected that Acuña had helped the visitors from 
Managua make the changes, a charge she vehemently denied:
None of them listened to me, not the ones from the mayor’s office or the ones 
from Managua ... They didn’t use guides ... So one day I went to the mayor’s 
office and I said to them ‘please explain to the political secretary [Zeledón] 
that it wasn’t me who accompanied you, that I didn’t have anything to do 
with the plan techo stuff, or the bono ... it’s not my fault’.39
In fact, for Acuña, the changes made were perfectly logical. The beneficiaries on 
the new list ‘are poorer, and there are some people who have too many animals 
... maybe they saw they were a bit thin and so they think if they can’t even look 
36 Interview, Famnuel Centeno, July 2015.
37 Interview, Efraín Flores, July 2015. Interview, Ernesto Rugama, July 2015.
38 Each CLS has one male and one female secretary, although in both El Junco and Potrero 
it is the male political secretary who is the overall coordinator on the committee.
39 Interview, Amada Acuña, July 2015.
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after those ones ...’40 Zeledón rejects this, but the conflict is not really about the 
specific beneficiaries. Rather, it has to do with the question of who has the power 
to make these decisions. For Zeledón, the incident was a violation of his local 
authority, one that has affected his relationship with the local community and 
the FSLN officials he reports to:
I’ve questioned this a lot with the compañeros from the government in 
[local town] who coordinate my work. Because if I go to my community and 
I make a list and a certain compañero appears, that compañero trusts that I’m 
going to sort it out, but those that have a say after me are going over my head. 
I’m asking for leadership. I end up looking like a liar. If they’re going to do it, 
let them do it but don’t involve me. [The community] blames me and it’s not 
my fault.41
Acuña has attempted to get Zeledón removed from his position, but she was told 
that unless he chooses to leave he cannot be removed before the end of his term. 
Clearly, such open conflict within the community’s key governance structure is 
problematic. Substantial concern also exists in the wider community that the 
CLS is running things, rather than the Gabinete, which ostensibly replaced the 
CPC:
They haven’t let the Gabinete de la Familia work in the way it really should 
... I think they’re politicising the whole situation. So that information from 
the Sandinista party is passed directly to the CLS, and it isn’t passed to the 
Gabinete. So it’s the CLS that acts, and not the Gabinete. Even though 
they say that the Sandinista structure, the structure for the CLS, is only for 
political matters and the other is for community projects, information from 
the party is always passed to the CLS and not the Gabinete, so they haven’t 
really given them the opportunity to take control. Because the water project 
shouldn’t be ... it’s a community project ... so it should be managed by the 
Gabinete. The solar panels project, the electricity project, the road repairs ... 
the CLS shouldn’t have anything to do with it, it should be the responsibility 
of the Gabinete.42
Famnuel Centeno sees this structural change as evidence of a wider, creeping 
politicisation of community decision-making, and believes that this shift has 
caused increasing apathy more widely:
I think it’s because in every meeting they bring politics into it ... at the 
moment everything comes via the CLS and the CLS is required to bring it up 
in every asamblea ... do an introduction on what the FSLN is, the projects of 
the FSLN ... If I put myself in the shoes of a Liberal ... if I was a Liberal and 
I’m in an asamblea I’m not going to like it that they keep going on about the 
Frente.43
It may be that the present government’s approach alienates Liberal voters, but 
it is also true that these divisions are deep-seated and that Liberals have never 
40 Ibid.
41 Interview, Augusto Zeledón, July 2015.
42 Interview, Famnuel Centeno, July 2015.
43 Ibid.
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participated much in El Junco’s community structures. In 2009, when I was 
making a map of El Junco, I discovered that there was a whole (Liberal) sector 
of the community that I had never heard of or visited, despite living there for a 
year in 2004–5. A friend, born in 1976, gave me directions for the route down 
a particular lane. He got this information second-hand: even though he had lived 
in the community his entire life, and the path was less than half a mile from his 
house, he had never walked that way because it was adjacent to the property of 
a prominent anti-Sandinista landowner. Just as the tradition of participation 
in Junco is a legacy of the revolution, so too are these extremely entrenched 
divisions. Just as the passage of time has diminished political commitment in 
the area, it has also gradually reduced this political polarisation. Nonetheless, 
participation in community decision-making is so intimately connected with the 
legacy of the revolution and the war that it is difficult to see how a truly apolitical 
structure could exist, regardless of the central government’s approach.
The strength of local decision-making in El Junco is a result of the 
community’s long experience of organising, and a widespread recognition that 
this kind of work is valuable and important. Critics of FSLN policies since 2007 
have characterised the new social programmes and community committees as 
an attempt to build a clientelist state, and it is clear that the diffusion of benefits 
has won the Sandinistas some new supporters. However, it is also clear that the 
real backbone of the system – and the reason for its relative success in El Junco 
– was the work of particular individuals with a long-standing commitment to 
the revolution. The national government relied upon the voluntary work of 
committed individuals who were not paid for their contributions. That reliance 
has limited the government’s ability to run a truly centralised, top-down system 
of governance: any attempt to overrule local leaders results in considerable 
disagreement and pushback, as it did in El Junco in 2015.
The mechanisms of government control were starker, and more sinister, in 
relation to individuals who were directly employed by the state. One close friend 
in El Junco refused to talk on tape about the village’s governance structures, 
even though he knew that all names and locations would be changed. He was 
employed as a teacher in the village and he was afraid he might lose his job 
if it was discovered he had said anything negative about Zeledón. While the 
community’s volunteer leaders were more than happy to criticise their superiors 
and each other, those directly employed by the state have to be much more 
cautious. Alejandra Martínez ran a nursery school in the village; 20 children 
attend, the minimum number required for a nursery to qualify for state support. 
When another community member attempted to start another nursery school, 
thereby threatening Martínez’s quota, Zeledón vetoed the new nursery, thereby 
protecting Martínez’s income. Understandably, Martínez was thus reluctant 
to say anything against the political secretary. The caution demonstrated by 
state employees is amply justified: some individuals have been penalised for 
disagreeing with government policy. ‘Not long ago a teacher lost her job [in a 
nearby town] because she spoke out, brought up situations where she didn’t agree 
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with the government. And her criticisms made sense, but they were complaints 
and so ... [she was fired].’44
There were several different dynamics at play in the relationship between 
the Sandinista government and the residents of El Junco. Some villagers, 
previously Liberal voters, had begun to vote for the FSLN as a result of the 
current government’s social programmes. This alliance is a clear example of a 
clientelistic relationship, but not all the links between El Junco and the FSLN 
government can be understood in terms of pure clientelism. For state employees, 
the restrictions on freedom of expression suggest a relationship that is too 
coercive to be described as mere clientelism. On the other hand, the community’s 
many committed Sandinistas have a relationship with the state that is as much 
ideological as it is material. Community members in El Junco have contributed 
considerable time and effort to organisation because of a sense of civic duty, 
ideological commitment and a desire to continue the revolutionary project.45 
This kind of commitment is particularly notable among the older generation. 
Famnuel Centeno is one of six children, all of whom are professionals and 
university graduates. His parents, who did not learn to read and write until after 
the revolution, are stalwart Sandinistas:
My parents will never change [their support for the FSLN]. Never ever, 
whatever happens. And up to a point I think that maybe they are right. 
Because if the FSLN had not existed, none of their children would have gone 
to school. I don’t know what would have happened. We would be peasants or 
working on a hacienda somewhere, but we wouldn’t have been able to go to 
school. We wouldn’t have a house either because we wouldn’t have anywhere 
to build it. I don’t know what would have happened.46
As Rocha and Soto’s contributions to this volume attest, the revolution failed to 
provide permanent access to land and opportunities for many of the desperately 
poor Nicaraguans who needed it. Even in El Junco this process was by no means 
as clear-cut as local collective memory might imply: community members only 
gained individual plots when the revolutionary-era cooperative was broken up 
in 1990. There is no doubt that it is the granting of individual plots, rather than 
participation in the collective, which is the pivotal moment celebrated in local 
memories. The actual chronology is elided so that land ownership is seen as the 
primary benefit of the revolution, as a reward given for the community members’ 
many sacrifices during the years of war. Even as local memory rewrites some of 
the crucial elements of this recent past, this constructed ideal of the FSLN’s role 
belies a deeper truth. For many Sandinistas in El Junco, their experience of the 
revolution was transformative. It forged an unshakeable commitment to the 
44 Interview, Famnuel Centeno, July 2015.
45 Scholars focusing on other regions in Latin America have debated the relationship between 
clientelism and ideology, and the question of whether these dynamics are always mutually 
exclusive, but the scholarship on Nicaragua has not yet addressed such questions. D.J. 
Epstein, ‘Clientelism versus ideology: problems of party development in Brazil’; M. 
Coppedge, ‘The dynamic diversity of Latin American party systems’.
46 Interview, Famnuel Centeno, July 2015.
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FSLN. The very strength of this commitment is a cause for concern: it allows 
the FSLN government to become increasingly autocratic without any fear of 
reproach from their core supporters.
This revolutionary legacy also powers a robust tradition of community 
organisation, although it could certainly be argued that this tradition has its 
limits. One standard measure of community democracy, Arnstein’s ladder of 
citizen participation, ranks such structures according to the amount of power 
they have: are they truly autonomous? Do they have the capacity to make their 
decisions felt at higher levels of authority?47 In El Junco, the answer to these 
questions has always been a resounding ‘no’. In both the first and second stages 
of the revolution, being organised never meant genuine, bottom-up democracy. 
That state of affairs continues. In 2017, as a result of a decision reached in an 
asamblea, the community sent a united plea to the municipal government for 
much-needed improvements to the only access road, but the request went 
unheeded. And as the conflict over the distribution of the bono in 2015 clearly 
shows, there is little that the community can do when the central authorities 
choose to overrule local decisions.
Why, then, does the community place so much value on the asambleas 
and other aspects of this culture of participation and ‘being organised’? These 
attitudes are certainly not universal. In 2012 Birgit Kvernflaten noted the 
lacklustre approach of local residents towards a municipal cabildo (or municipal 
assembly) in rural Matagalpa. The event was poorly attended and nobody asked 
questions. ‘Some sit in the front and applaud hard’, one of her informants 
told her, ‘but only because they got their project funded.’48 El Junco residents’ 
commitment to being organised is driven partly by the fact that it brings 
clear benefits not directly related to the state. As Rocha notes, a capacity for 
participation and organisation makes it much easier to integrate into global Fair 
Trade networks,49 and El Junco’s cooperatives have strong links with national 
and international buyers for their Fair Trade, organic coffee. Equally, as Cooper 
argues, being organised brings benefits in the form of links with national and 
international NGOs.50 Compared to Potrero, El Junco has a much broader range 
of links to such organisations, which have brought a variety of projects to the 
community.
Although local community members certainly recognise the material benefits 
that being organised provides, it would be a mistake to reduce these traditions 
to some kind of rational choice or profit-seeking urge. The generational divide 
which exists in community work, and the greater involvement of the generation 
that lived through the revolution and the Contra War, makes it clear that this 
particular heritage has created a particular way of doing things in El Junco. That 
47 S. Arnstein, ‘A ladder of citizen participation’, 216–24. 
48 B. Kvernflaten, ‘Conflicting health interventions: participation in health in rural Nicaragua’, 
308. 
49 See the chapter by Jose Luis Rocha in this book.
50 See the chapter by David Cooper in this book.
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same generational divide makes it difficult to predict how these local traditions 
will fare with the passing of time – it is certainly possible that community 
participation is dependent upon the activism of the revolutionary generation. 
With its endless meetings, petty fiefdoms and often-vicious infighting, El Junco 
is no revolutionary utopia. Nevertheless, a commitment to local democracy has 
survived here, despite the upheaval of the war, the uncertainty and poverty of 
the neoliberal years and the multiple interventions of the FSLN. This culture 
of participation is far from perfect but, for now, it does deserve to be called 
exceptional.
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7. Grassroots verticalism? A Comunidad 
Eclesial de Base in rural Nicaragua*
David Cooper
How do we come to form judgements about the way something so intangible as a nation, or a society, might change or remain the same? If a society is understood to have changed, what values or images do we 
refer to in order to gauge whether that change is for the better or for the worse? 
If a process of social change is thought to have rendered a nation exceptional, then 
on what conceptual basis are comparisons made? In the case of Nicaragua, and 
in relation to the question of how, and whether, the Sandinista Revolution gave 
rise to a state of exceptionality – in comparison both with its neighbours and its 
own pre-revolutionary past – a central analytical imagery has been an orthogonal 
opposition between the ‘vertical’ and the ‘horizontal’. This chapter delves in 
detail into a highly localised ethnographic scenario – examining the continuing 
activity of a liberation theology group in rural Nicaragua – and aims to draw 
insight from that scenario for these larger questions of political and historical 
evaluation. While forming broad comparative judgements about Nicaraguan 
society by reference to an opposition between the vertical and the horizontal has 
been of central importance for scholars – and, indeed, for liberation theologians 
– the case explored here suggests that this potent evaluative framework is not 
necessarily the most pertinent one for some of those whose lives have been most 
profoundly affected by the revolution.
For the Nicaraguan campesinos (or farmers) among whom I conducted 
ethnographic fieldwork, the movement of socio-political history was often 
gauged by a different measure. Rather than referring to a diagrammatic 
opposition between vertical and horizontal social or political forms, they focused 
upon the difference between a politics characterised by inclusion and care, and 
a politics of abandonment. The contrast carries concrete political implications. 
* This chapter is based upon ethnographic fieldwork conducted in Gualiqueme and 
neighbouring villages from Nov. 2011–July 2012 and Jan. 2013–July 2013. A return 
visit was made in Nov.–Dec. 2015. Names of individuals and those of some locations and 
organisations have been changed. This work was supported by the Economic and Social 
Research Council under Grant ES/H012478/1, and by the European Research Council 
(ERC) under Grant ERC-2013-CoG, 617970, CARP.
D. Cooper, ‘Grassroots verticalism? A Comunidad Eclesial de Base in rural Nicaragua’, in H. 
Francis (ed.), A Nicaraguan Exceptionalism? Debating the Legacy of the Sandinista Revolution 
(London: University of London Press, 2019), pp. 145–64. License: CC-BY-NC-ND.
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The notion that desirable social change amounts to an elimination of the vertical 
– as the ethnography explored below makes clear – can easily translate into a 
sense that the minds of campesinos require structural adjustment through the 
inculcation of a culture of horizontalism. But the campesinos I came to know 
attributed their ongoing economic struggle not to flaws in their own way of 
understanding the world, but instead to the degree to which the moral behaviour 
of those in positions of power facilitated the kinds of inclusion that were 
desired. They focused their energies, correspondingly, upon the effort to elicit 
an appropriate ethical orientation, as they understood it, from powerholders. 
The basic aim of this chapter is to explore the ways in which these contrasting 
models of socio-political transformation found expression in one particular 
ethnographic scenario, but then to think through the implications of that 
discussion for scholarly debates about Nicaragua’s broad trajectory of change, 
the kind of difference the revolution is taken to have made, and the implications 
of established perspectives in those debates for our understanding of campesino 
political culture.
Grassroots verticalism
‘Just “Ricardo”’, requested the priest leading the proceedings, as he was once 
again addressed honorifically as ‘don Ricardo’. During the 2012 annual meeting 
of PROOR (Proyecto Oscar Romero), a development initiative established by 
liberation theologians in northern Nicaragua, the tensions underlying this minor 
exchange emerged time and again. When I spoke to Ricardo about the PROOR 
project, he expressed his pride in what had been achieved by participants over 
the years. The organisation had been established after a small group of Spanish 
priests, Ricardo among them, secured a generous donation from Germany to 
provide emergency relief in the wake of Hurricane Mitch in 1991. Wishing 
to ensure that the money was used wisely, PROOR was established to give 
beneficiaries a say in how funds would be administered. Developments since 
then had been entirely in the hands of participants, Ricardo stressed. They took 
the initiative themselves to propose and establish a mutual savings and credit 
organisation. The structure of meetings, and the concrete form the project had 
eventually taken, had all been directed by participants’ own suggestions and 
ideas. His role has always been merely one of facilitator, he emphasised, taking on 
such minor responsibilities as arranging for the rental of chairs for the meetings.
During the meeting, however, Ricardo encountered some starkly contrasting 
readings of his own role in the organisation. The honorific ‘don’ persistently 
prefixed his name, despite his repeated requests, as speakers apparently insisted 
upon placing him in a position of seniority and status. When he announced 
that this was to be the last meeting for which he would be convener, a series of 
individuals proceeded to stand up and make impromptu, celebratory speeches of 
gratitude, each commending him for his commitment to the project and praising 
him for the successes that had come as a result. The majority of these improvised 
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contributions emphasised the benefits of having participated in the project in 
highly personalised terms, constructing their own lives as having been positively 
improved due to Ricardo’s transformative assistance. Ricardo’s discomfort with 
the hagiographic tones of these homilies was all too clear – one speaker even 
suggested that he would go down in local memory alongside Oscar Romero 
himself.
The central ethnographic focus of this chapter is an active Comunidad 
Eclesial de Base (CEB) in the village of Gualiqueme, in the Segovian mountains, 
and their regional network based in the city of Estelí. As we shall see, the tension 
in PROOR’s meeting described above encapsulates a substantive disagreement 
regarding the form of the forces underpinning relevant social and historical 
change which runs through liberation theology activities. Among CEB 
participants and their neighbours, the prospects and possibilities of CEB activity 
are frequently discussed in relation to a set of social and political assumptions 
which I will tentatively term ‘grassroots verticalism’; tentatively, because the 
discussion below ultimately leads me to reject the concept. I use the phrase to 
point to understandings of political possibility which view apparently vertical – 
even hierarchical – social relations as a source of potential and as a viable target 
of political activity. Ricardo’s discomfort, however, points to the way in which 
grassroots verticalism shows up as problematic from the perspective of liberation 
theology itself. At issue in PROOR’s meeting were two competing readings of 
the productive, transformative potentials enabled by participation in the project. 
Ricardo emphasised the extent to which transformative possibilities were enabled 
by the horizontal, self-organising capabilities of participants, while many of the 
latter put forward an image which construed Ricardo himself as a transformative 
figure, whose personal input and capacity as an intermediary was the crucial 
factor in the project’s value. For Gualiqueme residents, as we shall see, CEB 
activity is shot through with such tensions. Participants often speak about the 
value of taking part in terms of the possibilities it opens up of gaining access to 
the valued ‘help’ of liberation theologians themselves – assistance which is viewed 
as an instance of a broader developmental force associated with Sandinismo 
and the revolution – while liberation theologians understand themselves to be 
working to dislodge and combat hierarchical social and religious thinking.
In viewing moments of apparent preference for vertical political forms 
as disturbing – and, as we shall see, something to be combated – liberation 
theologians draw upon a set of assumptions about the shape of political history 
that is often shared by scholarly analysts of Nicaragua’s post-revolutionary 
situation. Indeed, evaluations of Nicaragua’s trajectory since 1990 make frequent 
recourse to an analytic which constructs the vertical as corresponding to a process 
of historical regression. On this analysis, the revolution’s ‘progressive’ advances 
are viewed as having been overturned to the extent that horizontal political forms 
and intra-class solidarities have been eroded, with a resurgent and disempowering 
verticalism taking their place. Here progress is viewed as coterminous with a 
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diagrammatic shift from the vertical to the horizontal.1 Drawing upon concepts 
such as clientelism, populism and caudillismo to describe these developments, 
scholars work to construct Nicaragua’s political trajectory as veering tragically 
backwards, towards a standardised Latin American form.2 If the revolution’s 
transformations once rendered Nicaragua exceptional insofar as the nation made 
concrete ‘advances’ towards a horizontal social order, these analyses amount to 
the claim that Nicaragua’s exceptionalism has been slipping away. 
My aim in this chapter will be to use an exploration of one community’s 
involvement with CEB activity to think through the implications of this 
depiction of verticalist politics. Though the orthogonal imagery I chart is central 
to a critique of trends towards authoritarianism, corruption and caudillismo at 
Nicaragua’s political centre, it is important to ensure that this potent line of 
political polemic does not eclipse the possibility of perceiving ways in which 
hierarchy may be drawn upon as an active political resource by subaltern 
populations. In interrogating – and finally rejecting – the notion of grassroots 
verticalism, I point towards aspects of the political thought of Nicaraguan 
campesinos that risks being obscured by a model of political change founded 
upon horizonal-vertical oppositions. If constituencies of present-day Sandinista 
supporters are not to be dismissed as the mere dupes of populist strategies 
deployed by political elites, or as helplessly caught up in overarching processes of 
political regression, attending to the specific contours of the political imaginaries 
which inform continuing commitment to the FSLN is crucial. The broader 
1 It should also be noted that, during the 1980s, Sandinista governance was explicitly tied 
to theories of revolutionary vanguardism that have themselves been described in terms of 
‘verticalist’ politics. Indeed, a central line of analysis in diagnoses of the problems faced by 
the revolutionary government in the 1980s has been grounded in critique of such verticalist 
tendencies: see, e.g., R. Montoya, Gendered Scenarios of Revolution.
2 E.g., Hoyt warned us that the Ortega-Alemán pact ‘returned Nicaragua to the old days of 
caudilllismo’: K. Hoyt ‘Parties and pacts in contemporary Nicaragua’, 18. A recent analysis 
by Close and Marti í Puig, ‘The Scandinistas and Nicaragua since 1977’, 9, views Alemán’s 
politics as ‘the perfect adaptation of classical Latin American caudillo politics to the demands 
of electoral democracy. Rosario Montoya, ‘Contradiction and struggle under the leftist 
phoenix’, 46, views Ortega’s incumbency as characterised by ‘assistentialism’, and suggests that 
the ‘caciquismo [...], familialism, and exclusion of women’ evident in recent state and NGO 
projects stands as a return of ‘familiar rural forms’ that worked to undermine revolutionary 
practice in the 1980s. And Dennis Rodgers, ‘Searching for the time of beautiful madness’, 84, 
portrays the ‘social atomisation’ of the neoliberal present as standing in stark contrast with the 
‘pervasive solidarity and collective support’ of the 1980s. This line of analysis resonates with a 
key argument regarding the development of rural political support for the FSLN in first place. 
Pre-revolutionary rural politics is widely understood to have been founded upon patron-
client ties: J. Gould, To Lead as Equals: Rural Protest and Political Consciousness in Chinandega, 
Nicaragua, 1912–1979; V. González-Rivera, Before the Revolution: Women’s Rights and 
Right-Wing Politics in Nicaragua, 1821–1979; M. Gobat, Confronting the American Dream: 
Nicaragua under US Imperial Rule. Revolutionary political mobilisation, correspondingly, has 
been viewed as having been possible where sociological shifts undermined that hierarchical 
social pact; see, e.g., L.R. Horton, Peasants in Arms: War and Peace in the Mountains of 
Nicaragua, 1979–1994, 55–61. To the extent that revolutionary political practice has been 
understood to depend upon the erosion of clientelism, recent vertical trends come to appear 
as primarily a step backwards.
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intention here, then, is to use the ethnographic tension identified in one local 
CEB to open up analytical space for comprehending grassroots participation 
in Ortega’s ‘assistentialism’ in a way that does not cast rural people as simply 
responding mechanically, inevitably and predictably to political distribution.
After providing a brief historical account of Gualiqueme’s history, the chapter 
will describe the nature of CEB activity both in village meetings and in the 
regional meetings periodically held in the city of Estelí. An exploration will 
follow of the view of hierarchical thinking that emerges from the theoretical 
perspective of liberation theology itself. This perspective – in common with 
many critical commentaries on the clientelism of Ortega’s recent governance – 
mobilises a strong historical narrative in which hierarchy is rendered coterminous 
with an oppressive past. Hierarchy is constructed as integral to a traditional Latin 
American culture, and CEB activity is theorised as offering the possibility of 
leaving that culture behind and achieving authentic subaltern political agency. 
If apparently vertical thinking persists among CEB participants, this perspective 
takes it as evidence of an incomplete process of cultural change. The chapter 
will proceed, however, to explore the practical activities of the CEB group. By 
examining the practical engagement of Gualiqueme residents with their CEB, 
and exploring the parallels villagers draw between CEB participation and a range 
of other institutional experiences, it will argue that the ideas we provisionally 
termed grassroots verticalism are, in fact, bound up with a view of political 
possibility which an orthogonal imagery fails to adequately illuminate. Revolving 
around a sense that crucial prerequisites for political and economic progress are 
located elsewhere, this view implicitly contests the notion that social change 
should be sought by modifying campesino culture or social practice. Instead, it is 
the moral orientations of elites that are presumed to stand as the most coherent 
target for transformative endeavour.
CEBs in Gualiqueme
The village of Gualiqueme was established in 1984, in the middle of the 
Contra War and in the midst of Contra activity in the northern mountains 
near Honduras. It was created as an asentamiento as part of the creation of a 
Cooperativa de Autodefensa (CAD), a militarised and collectivised agricultural 
organisation, the founding members of which comprised displaced campesinos 
whose previous villages had been attacked by the Contras.3 After the Sandinista 
victory in 1979, the land later granted to the cooperative had initially been 
established as a state farm. Comprising areas formerly belonging to three large 
haciendas, the farm had been well endowed with a substantial dairy herd, a coffee 
farm and a commercially exploited pine forest. As FSLN agrarian policy shifted 
over the course of the 1980s, an initial preference for state farms gave way and 
the formation of cooperatives became a priority. In war-torn regions, granting 
3 On the creation of asentamientos during the Contra War, see J. Ercoreca Bilbao, et al., 
‘Reforma agraria, migraciones y guerra: asentamientos en Nicaragua’; J.L. Hammond, 
‘Resettlement and rural development in Nicaragua’.
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land to agrarian cooperatives came to be viewed as offering the possibility of 
creating outposts of loyal Sandinistas capable of defending vulnerable territories 
against Contra incursions.4 The formation of the Rigoberto Cruz cooperative, 
then, was intended to meet a range of goals: resettlement, military defence and 
rural development.
For several years after it was established, the cooperative functioned 
collectively, with members assigned work responsibilities by an elected leadership 
and receiving a salary. Ultimately, however, amid the economic turbulence 
caused by the Contra War – and subsequently, with the complete withdrawal 
of state support for agricultural cooperatives once the Sandinistas were voted 
out of office in 1990 – the members ended up dividing the land out among 
themselves and working individually. Today the cooperative still exists as an 
institution, and the land is still legally owned by the cooperative, although land 
sales to non-residents are an increasing problem. Residents speak about the 
history of their cooperative in a range of ways: they often readily acknowledge 
the difficulties the institution experienced and are sometimes critical of the poor 
performance of some leaders, but mostly they emphasise the tremendous value 
of the cooperative as an organisation. Local accounts of the village’s early years, 
however, tend to be overwhelmingly focused upon the difficulties and suffering 
of the war. These difficulties have done nothing to dent the loyalty of villagers 
to the FSLN, however. Gualiqueme residents describe themselves as Sandinistas 
through and through, and many proudly affirmed that every single person in the 
village voted for the FSLN in the 2011 elections.
The close relationship of liberation theologians to the revolutionary process 
in Nicaragua has been well-documented, and activists within the popular church 
have become personally known to Gualiqueme residents over the years.5 For 
example, narratives of the community’s history invariably emphasise the fact that 
when people arrived at the village site, the area was just puro monte (wilderness), 
and initially people had to live collectively in old hacienda buildings. They 
were able to build their own houses, people explained, when Padre Bonifacio, 
the director of an organisation known as the Escuela Radiofonica Nicaragua, 
established a project which provided them with the materials to do so. This 
historic involvement continues to the present day. Several villagers are involved 
with PROOR, the organisation whose meeting I described at the start of 
4 The changing priorities in Sandinista agrarian policy in the 1980s have been well-discussed 
in the literature, with many scholars viewing rural discontent with FSLN governance as the 
result of a refusal to grant land to individuals until late in the revolutionary decade. M.J. 
Saldaña-Portillo, The Revolutionary Imagination in the Americas and the Age of Development 
offers one of the more recent overviews of these debates.
5 J. Kirk, Politics and the Catholic Church in Nicaragua; M. Foroohar, The Catholic Church 
and Social Change in Nicaragua; D. Sabia, Contradiction and Conflict: The Popular Church 
in Nicaragua; and P.J. Williams, The Catholic Church and Politics in Nicaragua and Costa 
Rica provide historical accounts of the development of the liberation theology movement 
in Nicaragua and its relationship with the Sandinista Revolution.
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the chapter. Considerably more active within the everyday life of the village, 
however, were the activities of the Comunidad Eclesial de Base.
Theology and practicality in CEB activity
Village meetings
The CEB group in Gualiqueme meets each week, on a Sunday, at around 11am. 
They own a small adobe building, purchased in recent years in order to have 
a dedicated space to hold their activities, which generally remains locked and 
unused for the rest of the week. As some other villagers make their way to the 
Catholic chapel for their regular Sunday service, CEB members assemble in 
their modest building. The timing means that participants face a clear choice: 
they cannot attend the conventional Catholic service in addition to the CEB 
celebration. If a female participant arrives early, she might quickly sweep the 
floor, as the men remove the heavy wooden stakes blocking the windows to let in 
the light. The walls are decorated with posters of Óscar Romero, one displaying a 
montage of dozens of photos of the martyred Salvadoran priest at different stages 
of his life. Plastic chairs are unstacked and placed optimistically at the front of 
the room – as other participants arrive, they will usually be repositioned towards 
the back when people take their places. Well-worn books containing hymns in 
the liberation theology tradition, photocopied and bound by hand, are handed 
around. There are rarely enough for a copy each. Once a reasonable number of 
people have assembled, the celebration will begin.
The group comprises a small number of core members, who take responsibility 
for proceedings, undertake to lead or contribute to these weekly sessions, and 
frequently attend the regional meetings which are occasionally held in the city 
of Estelí. In addition, a number of villagers are associated with the group to a 
degree, but do not attend as frequently. Always present, however, are a group of 
seven or eight teenage girls, sometimes referred to as las becadas – those who are 
receiving becas (studentships for secondary study) from the CEB – who sit right 
at the back of the room and firmly resist the attempts of more senior participants 
to encourage them to contribute to discussions. After a request has been made for 
a volunteer, and following a long silence, one or two of these apparently reluctant 
participants will be made to stand up and give a scripture reading.
Proceedings always follow a regular structure. Meetings open with a prayer, 
followed by several hymns. Perhaps surprisingly, the opening prayer in meetings I 
attended was frequently the Novus Ordo, or ‘Yo Confieso’ (I confess), containing 
the strong emphasis of personal sin; ‘Yo confieso ante dios todopoderoso … 
que he pecado mucho … por mi culpa, por mi culpa, por mi gran culpa.’6 The 
hymnbooks, however, contained songs from the Misa Campesina Nicaragüense, 
such as ‘vos sos el dios de los pobres’, and ‘vamos a la milpa del señor’, which would 
6 ‘I confess before God almighty … that I have sinned greatly … I am to blame, I am to blame, 
I am truly to blame.’
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be accompanied by guitar on those occasions when a musician had brought an 
instrument along.7
Following printed guidelines for scriptural readings and themes to explore, 
the proceedings attended were generally led by don Lucas, sometimes by Samuel, 
another leading member of the group. After the opening prayer and songs, a 
reading of a selected biblical passage is made. Subsequently the person leading 
the proceedings offers a commentary on the text and invites participants to 
contribute to the discussions. Contributions I witnessed were frequently striking 
in their stark conjunction of themes; participants occasionally referred to ideas 
that drew very clearly from a liberationist tradition, but it was also common for 
discussion to centre upon more conventional Catholic questions of personal sin 
or prospects of salvation and damnation in the afterlife.
Once the discussion of the weekly scriptural reading draws to a close, 
the meeting shifts to administrative and organisational concerns. Upcoming 
financial requirements of the group are discussed – for example, the need 
for everyone to contribute to pay for the meeting house’s electricity bill. 
Arrangements for any upcoming events being held by the regional group are 
discussed. On occasions when there are plans for other members of the regional 
group to visit Gualiqueme for a celebration, for example, such discussions might 
revolve around who will contribute food or make a financial contribution, who 
will cook, and who will be able to offer accommodation to visiting members 
of other groups – commitments which place considerable demands upon 
participants. An offering of a few córdobas will generally be placed on a table at 
the front, which will be used to cover the basic running costs of the group itself, 
before people make their way home.
Regional meetings
Central to the activities of the group are monthly regional meetings, which are 
conducted in a sizeable CEB building in Estelí. These being together leading 
members of local groups from a number of villages surrounding the city, as well 
as some members based in Estelí itself. It is significant that several practising 
Evangelicals are among those who attend.8 The regional group is overseen and 
administered by Camila, a liberation theologian of Spanish origin, who has lived 
for many years in the village of one of the member groups. Participants described 
her to me as a former nun, and when speaking about the activities of the CEB, 
active participants and other villagers almost always emphasised her central 
7 ‘You are the God of the poor’, and ‘Let’s go to the Lord’s cornfield’.
8 In meetings I attended participants openly discussed some of the difficulties potentially faced 
by Evangelicals who involved themselves in CEB activities. E.g. one woman described how 
her pastor had subjected her to sanctions within her church as a consequence of having been 
involved. The pastor imposed the standard disciplinary procedure of withdrawing ‘privileges’ 
such as the right to read or sing in services for a fixed period, in her case two months. This 
form of punishment might also be directed at those who have ‘sinned’ by committing 
adultery, drinking or smoking.
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organising role and her Spanish origins. As well as meeting in Estelí, the groups 
that are linked together through the regional nucleus occasionally assemble in 
meeting houses within particular villages.
The participants I knew in Gualiqueme looked forward to regional meetings 
as an exciting event, as it can be a somewhat rare opportunity to visit the city.9 
They take place over a weekend, beginning at around lunchtime on Saturday, and 
finishing in the early afternoon the following day. Members who have travelled 
from rural areas sleep in the building, for which purpose the group has a supply 
of mattresses and pillows which are spread out on the floors of back rooms as 
people arrive. Travel costs are reimbursed from the group’s funds and meals are 
provided. These, which include meat and cheese, especially in months when cash 
is in short supply, and when many weeks may have passed with no alteration in 
the boiled beans and tortilla eaten daily at home, are a real attraction.
As with those at village-level, regional meetings were generally organised 
around a dual structure. First, a scriptural session which might involve a reading 
and discussion of particular biblical passages, lessons on elements of liberation 
theology’s history and thought given by Camila, and extended presentations 
or performances on a prepared theme given by leading members of the group, 
interspersed with liberation theology hymns. First thing on a Sunday, a mass 
might be performed, with one of the group’s lay leaders or Camila leading 
proceedings, and using tortilla as Communion bread. Subsequently, however, 
attention would be turned to more practical matters and the group would discuss 
financial issues, organisational requirements for upcoming activities, and ideas 
for new projects.
Both village and regional meetings, then, exhibit a clear organisational 
distinction between theological matters and practical concerns. Though 
liberation theology itself generally insists that theology and praxis are inseparable, 
and is committed to the idea that praxis is closely informed by theology, and vice 
versa, my suggestion here is that my provisional term ‘grassroots verticalism’ 
shows up in a different light in relation to each key segment of CEB activity. 
The theological component completely works to construct verticalism as an 
entrenched idea that needs to be examined and confronted. Within the domain 
of the practical organisation of CEB projects, however, a focus on hierarchy 
and personalised assistance can be understood as a pragmatic engagement 
with organisational structures related to forms of top-down funding and the 
channelling of social provision through local leaders, something common to 
CEB activity, NGO practice and state social projects alike.
9 During the main periods of fieldwork in 2011–13, return bus fares to Estelí from Gualiqueme 
cost 80 córdobas (or 110 if an ‘express’ bus was taken between Condega and Estelí). No 
CEB participants had access to any other means of transport. During the same period, 
a day labourer might have been paid between 60 and 120 córdobas per day, depending 
on the nature of the work and whether or not food was provided by the employer; 80 
córdobas without food was the most common arrangement. At the time, US$1 was worth 
approximately 22 córdobas.
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Theological intervention: confronting entrenched ideas
A critical element of the theological component of the CEB endeavour is the 
injunction to rework forms of thought inherited from the Catholic tradition, 
which are viewed as antithetical to liberation. Liberation theologians and critical 
scholars frequently emphasise this model of cultural re-examination. Through 
the encounter with scripture facilitated by CEB activity, religious assumptions, 
cosmological ideas or ethical norms, viewed as working to foster the forms of 
dependency and hierarchy that characterise the traditional Catholic Church 
and the social order of the past, can be examined alongside their possible role in 
reproducing the present-day social conditions underpinning poverty. Through 
this process, it is assumed, authentic political agency among the poor can be 
awakened, precisely to the degree that those old, disempowering forms of 
thought can be confronted, challenged and changed.10
This model of theological-cultural change was also particularly evident in the 
regional meetings in Estelí attended by Gualiqueme residents. Indeed, Camila, 
the group’s coordinator, was at times clearly conscious of needing to temper her 
explicit evaluations of participants’ thinking as part of what she understood as 
a slow, long-term project of cultural change. One regional meeting activity I 
participated in, for example, involved discussing the scientific account of the 
world’s origin in the ‘Latin American bible’. Camila had prepared a handout 
which conveyed a ‘creation’ narrative: modelled upon the biblical creation story, 
it described the origins of the world and the genesis of human life on earth in 
terms drawn from modern science and made reference to biological evolution. 
Camila herself was keenly aware that this modern account stood in stark contrast 
to deeply held understandings among the group’s participants. She commented, 
however, that the biblical stories were just that, stories, and what the scientists 
said about these things were true. She knew that it was difficult for people to 
get their heads around, she said. The biblical stories are of great value, they 
are sacred, she affirmed – but they aren’t true. However, she said, she had no 
intention of pressing that point, because she knew that it would take a long time 
for people’s thinking on those matters to change.
Discussion of the handout was subsequently undertaken in smaller groups, 
with responses fed back to the whole group afterwards. The conversations elicited 
by this activity revealed considerable diversity in the participants’ evaluation 
of this putatively scientific account of creation. In the group I joined, several 
people observed that the narrative in the handout could not possibly be accurate, 
given that it contradicted starkly the account of creation given in the bible. Rosa 
disagreed, arguing that the bible story was itself simply a lie foisted upon people 
by ‘power’, and that it had to do with the ‘God of Fear’. With most participants 
10 See A. Dawson ‘The origins and character of the base ecclesial community: a Brazilian 
perspective’. In the Nicaraguanist literature, Montoya shows how mainstream liberation 
theology’s effort to forge a society without hierarchy sits at odds with the thinking of one 
campesino intellectual. R. Montoya, ‘Liberation theology and the socialist utopia of a 
Nicaraguan shoemaker’.
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in my group, however, this radical interpretation – placing the biblical and 
scientific narratives in stark opposition – did not appear to resonate. Most 
discussants found much more persuasive the idea that, despite the superficial 
differences between the scientific story and biblical creation, they exhibited an 
underlying compatibility. This, they argued, was because it was evidently the 
case that scientists have themselves learned from the bible (se han preparado de la 
biblia) in developing their knowledge. The text in question involved the explicit 
literary device of rewriting the biblical creation story with a scientific account. 
Rather than simply misunderstanding this device, though, it appeared to me 
that, in concluding that science is grounded in biblical insight, the discussants 
worked quite specifically to avoid a stark oppositional framing such as that 
articulated by Camila or by Rosa’s reference to the God of Fear.
Despite acknowledging that transforming long-standing religious thinking 
would be a slow process, sometimes Camila was less forgiving in her evaluation 
of the ideas articulated by participants. In the subsequent month’s regional 
meeting, the group was reading a handout about the 2012 ‘Integral Law against 
Violence Towards Women’, a new law which had strengthened legal protections 
for women in circumstances of domestic violence.11 In the course of discussion, 
one participant made reference to the idea that ‘we’re all born in sin’, an idea 
that many conventional Catholics would consider unproblematic – and which 
was also a frequent theme in village CEB meetings where Camila had not been 
present. Camila’s response to the comment was unequivocal; ‘No, no, no!’ she 
insisted. ‘Nobody, ever, is born already in sin! Not even somebody who had 
been born of a prostitute, a mother living the worst kind of life, no matter what 
the conditions, that baby would be born clean, absolutely clean!’ These kinds of 
ideas, Camila argued throughout the session, were integral to the old ‘Church of 
Power’ to which the liberation theology tradition was opposed, the Church that 
the conservative hierarchy still fought to sustain. She argued that it cultivated 
fear specifically in order to instil passivity among the people and a consequent 
dependency upon the Church itself for the promise of otherworldly salvation.
A clear dynamic was established, then, by this kind of exchange. Certain ideas 
needed to be combated, some of them slowly and gradually, and some of them 
immediately and with force. The project of social transformation promised by 
the popular Church – and the enabling of subaltern political agency that Camila 
presumed it to produce – necessarily depended upon this project of introspective 
examination and religious transformation. The promise it offered depended 
upon participants working to examine these old, entrenched assumptions in the 
light of scripture, investigate their implications and develop a new perspective on 
their old theological commitments. Social change required a change of campesino 
minds still in the grip of the Church of Power.
It is certainly the case that this model of liberationist thinking, which stands 
at odds with entrenched theological assumptions, can find plenty of supporting 
11 For a critical discussion of this law, see A.Z. Miklos, ‘Mediated intimacies: state intervention 
and gender violence in Nicaragua’.
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material within the dynamic of CEB meetings. The striking difference in 
theological tone between village meetings at which Camila was not present, and 
regional meetings where she was able to guide discussions, certainly resonates 
with this model. However, I do not want to focus here on the extent to which 
CEB activity has, so far, succeeded or failed in a project to instil ideological 
and theological change among participants, however that might be understood. 
While this model is very much part of liberation theology’s own theorisation of 
what CEB participation should involve, my argument here is that in evaluating 
verticalist thought among CEB participants, this model potentially obscures 
as much as it reveals. In constructing the aim of CEB activity as overcoming 
‘traditional’ theological ideas – ideas which themselves contribute to social 
inequality and the condition of poverty by cultivating passivity and dependency 
– liberation theology evaluates verticalist thinking within a paradigm that 
opposes conservative tradition to liberatory change.
Grassroots verticalism of the kind articulated by CEB participants in 
Gualiqueme, then, shows up in the light of liberation theology’s own theorisation 
of its activities as exactly this kind of phenomon: the heavy weight of cultural 
baggage. The argument I wish to develop here is that this view of verticalist 
thinking does not correspond to the way Gualiqueme residents themselves 
thought about politics. To do so, I will focus in particular upon one crucial 
aspect of liberation theology’s theorisation of CEB activity. As mentioned 
previously, CEBs are viewed as enabling scripture to become relevant by allowing 
it to be read in the light of everyday problems, thereby facilitating a scripturally 
informed critique of those problems. Critical here is the assumption that the 
problems in question exist apart from and external to the activities of the group 
itself. That problems will need to be confronted goes without saying – this is a 
simple implication of the defining commitment of liberation theology to work 
with ‘the poor’. Liberation theology’s (uncontentious) understanding of poverty 
as a condition of struggle and suffering is integral to this orientation. Poor 
people’s lives are difficult by definition, it is assumed. It is this integral difficulty 
of impoverished existence which is taken to be the vital context – the relevant 
domain of the actual and everyday – which CEB discussions are committed to 
acknowledging, engaging with and confronting.
The radical nature of this commitment in relation to Catholic theology prior 
to Vatican II and Medellín is clear, and is well-appreciated in the literature. 
Vitally important as a critical acknowledgement of the struggles of poverty may 
be, I would argue that in developing an ethnographic analysis of grassroots 
hierarchy, positing the problems of life as an a priori background condition of 
poverty risks passing over the ways in which involvement with CEB activity itself 
has come to be closely bound up with one of the most critical problems faced 
by rural people in Nicaragua in grappling with their conditions of existence. A 
simple observation guides this statement: poverty as a condition of life in rural 
Nicaragua at present cannot be understood separately from the interventions 
which aim to grapple with that condition. Rural Nicaraguans, as the ongoing 
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targets of varied interventions intended to overcome their economic plight – 
interventions themselves premised on a broad range of analyses regarding the 
causes and dynamics of poverty itself – now confront their own conditions in a 
context itself thoroughly conditioned by these interventions.12 CEB institutional 
arrangements, in their close mirroring of NGO methods of distributing and 
administering aid funds, are viewed by participants as one among a range 
of possibilities for gaining distributive material support by performing the 
requirements of being ‘organised’. Examining the social projects integral to CEB 
activity will clarify this point.
CEB social projects
If, for Camila, CEB activity was viewed as facilitating a process of reflection 
whereby hierarchical thinking – assumed to be traditional and politically 
regressive – might be left behind, residents of Gualiqueme participating in the 
group appeared to work from somewhat different assumptions. Indeed, while 
religious interest in the theological and spiritual components of CEB activity 
was clear, these group members primarily described the value of participation in 
material terms, which was closely related to the idea that Camila herself stood as 
a valuable intermediary. The first thing that don Lucas, a senior member of the 
group, mentioned to me about their activities was that their leader, a dynamic 
Spaniard, had access to significant international funds for social projects. 
Time and again, participants pointed out that the group provides a number 
of Gualiqueme youths with scholarships to pursue their secondary studies. As 
with the ovations to ‘don’ Ricardo’s activities in PROOR and the historical 
narratives which imputed the infrastructural development of the village itself 
to the personal benevolence of a liberation theologian priest, discussion of the 
material prospects attendant upon CEB participation were strongly personalised. 
Camila’s work, I was often told, was to go around Spain looking for funding, 
which would go towards the projects that the group arranged. The value of 
CEB activity was frequently depicted as a product of Camila’s own ayuda (help), 
assistance which derived from her position as a foreigner with ties to wealthy 
church organisations abroad.
Central to CEB activity for participants in Gualiqueme are the economic 
and social projects undertaken and funded by the group. The regional group has 
access to a considerable stream of international financing which is deployed in a 
variety of different endeavours, each aimed at providing economic opportunities 
and the possibility of income and security for participants. Decisions about 
how to allocate and spend this money are taken in regional meetings, and 
Camila ensures that participants play a central role in proposing, designing and 
12 A number of studies examine the way in which development discourse has constructed 
the Nicaraguan peasantry as a target for intervention in recent history. See, e.g., Saldaña-
Portillo, The Revolutionary Imagination in the Americas; S. Langley, ‘Revisiting “resistance”, 
“the peasantry”, and liberation/development: the case of Sandinismo in the 1980s’; and 
Montoya, Gendered Scenarios of Revolution.
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implementing the projects in question. At the time of research, active projects 
included natural medicine workshops, in which participants received a wage to 
provide training sessions for other members of the community; the maintenance 
of several cows which had been purchased from the funds and were to be raised 
and sold at a profit; and the provision of secondary-school scholarships. Though 
the aim of projects was generally economic or educational, some projects had 
cultural goals. A series of painting workshops, for example, were also being 
conducted at the time of research.
Initiatives frequently took forms that were familiar to participants both 
from NGO activity and from state programmes. Another project active at the 
time of research was a fondo revolvente (revolving fund), a micro-credit scheme 
which theoretically should have been self-sustaining. Small loans were offered 
to members of the group for a variety of purposes, to be repaid at low interest. 
This kind of community savings scheme was frequently a component of both 
development projects and government programmes. Participants in the Bono 
Productivo, for example, have been required to make contributions that in 
theory will be used in a similar way.
Participants in CEB were able to propose projects of their own design. 
Many of the active projects had emerged from a collaborative decision-making 
process in regional meetings. In line with a commitment to the horizontal, group 
consultation and deliberative decision-making regarding the allocation of funds 
was strongly emphasised, although decisions were not always taken collectively. 
During the period of research, a new project was proposed by several of the more 
senior CEB participants from Gualiqueme. At that time, a severe coffee rust 
epidemic was just beginning to take hold across Central America.13 In the face 
of potentially severe threats to their income should their own coffee fall victim 
to the disease, and alert to the possibility that many farmers in the region might 
need to replant areas of their plantations completely, don Lucas and Samuel 
suggested that it would be an opportune time to undertake a vivero (nursery) 
project in order to grow coffee saplings. On this occasion, the idea was not 
discussed among the group as a whole; Samuel took Camila aside during one of 
the breaks to discuss the idea privately. The group’s plan for Gualiqueme was to 
solicit a loan from the CEB, via Camila, in order to fund the equipment needed 
for the endeavour. The loan (eventually agreed at 6,000 córdobas) would cover 
the cost of purchasing 20,000 plastic bags required for the plants as well as the 
cost of labour needed for the project.14 The original loan would eventually be 
repaid from the profits made from the vivero sales. Coffee plants might sell for 
anywhere between 4 and 10 córdobas, and so if the project were to realise its 
full potential, a decent profit could be achieved. As with the revolving credit 
13 See M. Vidaurre, ‘El café en los tiempos de la roya’, Envío, no. 372.
14 Though there are a range of methods for planting coffee, nursery cultivation has become 
standard. Earth first needs to be dug up and prepared to a fine tilth, which is used to fill plastic 
planting bags. In 2012 a tarea (requirements for a day’s work) generally stood at 500 bags and 
would be paid at 100 córdobas. Achieving that many was a full day’s work for a skilled worker.
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scheme, the design of this nursery project was strongly reminiscent of many 
NGO projects experienced by the residents of Gualiqueme and with its design 
the group was following a familiar institutional model.15
Being organised
The parallels between CEB activity and the organisational structures of NGOs 
and state projects were by no means overlooked by Gualiqueme residents. Indeed, 
the notion of being organised and its implications and potentials were a constant 
topic of discussion and a central point of reference in local analyses of political 
life. When a Sandinista official stated in a local Comite de Liderazgo Sandinista 
meeting – while discussing upcoming government projects – that ‘todo viene por 
medio de organización’ (everything comes through organisation), he echoed a 
sentiment I had heard articulated innumerable times among the villagers. The 
official in question intended this statement to dissuade attendees from applying 
themselves to getting personally involved in the projects. He was asserting that 
everything would be delivered through the proper institutional channels, making 
clear the extent to which direct solicitation is, in fact, employed as a strategy.16 
For Gualiqueme residents, however, being organised had come to represent a key 
political status, upon which viable citizenship was, to a large extent, understood 
to depend. Beneficial forms of political incorporation, and associated material 
support, were broadly understood to be contingent upon this status of being 
organised. Personal and collective advancement were conceptualised as requiring 
the successful achievement of this status. CEB activity was depicted as part and 
parcel of this broad range of distributive political possibility and viewed as just 
one of many ways of realising the state of organisation that might render flows 
of enabling assistance possible.17
Intensive NGO activity in Nicaragua has been central to the emergence of 
this set of associations. Horton informs us that ‘in the post-1990 era, access to 
development aid and projects is often conditioned on demonstrating at least 
15 The literature makes clear that Nicaragua is one of the Latin American countries with 
the highest density of active NGOs. See, e.g., R.N. Gwynne and C. Kay, Latin America 
Transformed: Globalization and Modernity, 205.
16 The proper channels in question were the Gabinetes de Familia, Salud y Vida as well as the 
various agricultural cooperatives active in the area, the institutions of an ‘organised’ citizenry 
as defined by the FSLN. Established in 2013, Gabinetes replaced the earlier form of local 
organisation, the Consejo de Poder Cindadano (Citizen’s Power Council, CPC).
17 Indeed, one village resident, Wilber, noting the social projects available to participants, was 
led to conclude that the CEB was not really a religious group at all. The group was in fact 
an ‘organismo’, he said, using the term by which NGOs are known. Furthermore, Mauricio, 
a senior member of one of Gualiqueme’s Pentecostal congregations, spoke critically of CEB 
activity by comparing with that of NGOs. ‘Christian’ groups should not involve themselves 
in such mundane matters, he insisted, drawing on a definition of Christian which excludes 
all non-Evangelicals. However, CEB participants made similar comparisons with a positive 
ethical valence, asserting that CEB activity was equal in value.
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minimal forms of community organization’.18 And indeed, Gualiqueme has been 
the location of a long series of development projects exhibiting precisely these 
demands. Perhaps most significantly, Ortega’s flagship social programmes since 
2007, such as Plan Techo and the Bono Productivo, have been integral to further 
amplifying associations between the imperative of being organised, a demand for 
subjective transformation and the prospect of accessing social projects. Residents 
of Gualiqueme were intensely interested in these programmes, particularly 
those who sensed they were being excluded from their benefits. Many residents 
perceived these projects to be administered unfairly, and felt the only people able 
to secure any kind of benefit were those directly organised in the local Gabinetes 
de la Familia, formerly CPCs.19
Don Lucas and Samuel, leading participants in the Gualiqueme CEB, were 
deeply concerned about the accessibility of the distributive resources associated 
with Ortega’s post-2007 welfare programmes. At the time of research, they 
were also important members of a group that had caused a political stir locally 
by registering to vote in the adjacent municipality of Telpaneca, despite being 
resident in an area officially part of the territory of Condega. This move was 
motivated by profound discontent both with the leadership of the cooperative 
and the way it had previously administered government programmes such as 
Plan Techo and with the role of the mayor of Condega as an intermediary capable 
of properly channelling the distributive resources of Ortega’s ‘assistentialist’ 
regime. Telpaneca’s mayoress was described as being willing to work hard 
and continuously attract projects for her constituents. It is worth noting that 
this evaluation closely parallels the qualities emphasised in their descriptions 
of Camila’s role as head of the regional CEB grouping. By realigning with 
Telpaneca, this group aimed to overcome the frustrations they had experienced 
in realising the local ideal of being organised as a form of political incorporation.
It is in this context, I suggest, that Gualiqueme residents’ emphasis of 
the value of personalised assistance in relation to CEB activity needs to be 
understood. With Ortega’s distributive politics comprising a central point of 
political reference – and yet with everyday political life frequently characterised 
by an effort to negotiate and overcome obstacles to fully realising the promise 
of incorporation projects such as Plan Techo – CEB activity offers a scenario in 
which the local vision of being organised might be viably fulfilled. In this vision 
social hierarchy stands as a target of solicitation, the exploitation of which offers 
a possibility of security and development. Far from being viewed as antithetical 
to progress, proper negotiation of vertical social forms is held to be integral to the 
possibility of advance. In being receptive to petitioning, and in placing resources 
in the hands of participants to administer as they deemed most appropriate, 
18 L.R. Horton, ‘From collectivism to capitalism: neoliberalism and rural mobilization in 
Nicaragua’, 132. See also D. Chahim and A. Prakash, ‘NGOization, foreign funding, and the 
Nicaraguan civil society’.
19 Among Gualiqueme residents these were mostly perceived to be the same organisation and 
were mostly referred to as ‘CPCs’ rather than the new name.
GRASSROOTS VERTICALISM? 161
Camila – and other liberation theologians active in the area such as Ricardo 
in PROOR – came to stand as model intermediaries of the kind Gualiqueme 
residents like don Lucas and Samuel were striving to secure in relation to state 
projects.
The idea that the value of being organised amounted to the creation of a 
horizontal political culture was therefore far from being what Gualiqueme 
residents meant when they embraced FSLN rhetoric emphasising the importance 
of organisation. The notion that developing peer-to-peer organisational ties 
among fellow campesinos was enough to deal with the problem of poverty 
seemed implausible. Rural Nicaraguans in this relatively well-connected part 
of the country have had abundant exposure to the ways in which foreigners – 
whether NGO staff, internationalistas or liberation theologians – appear able 
to tap into and marshal economic wellsprings deriving from elsewhere. This 
luxury is unimaginable for smallholding farmers and landless rural labourers. For 
Gualiqueme residents, the idea that the most viable solution to local economic 
problems might derive from reforming the immanent structures of campesino 
organisational or cultural life therefore seemed to ignore the developmental 
possibilities of participating in a range of redistributive flows quite evidently 
coming from outside. But likewise, any sense that the hierarchical, vertical 
quality of relationships with figures like Camila was what mattered does not 
seem to capture the sentiments documented here. Rather than an orthogonal 
model depicting elites as standing vertically ‘above’, Gualiqueme residents 
understood Camila and others to offer the prospect of binding them into crucial 
redistributive flows originating elsewhere. The prospect of development here was 
imagined to be possible – not as the product of a shift from the vertical to 
the horizontal – but through the connective work that moral appeals to elites 
promised to perform. If the possibility of development lay elsewhere, the value 
of being organised was taken to lie in organisational methods which served to 
open up channels of involvement with distant, otherwise disconnected, sources 
of economic abundance.
Conclusion
to return to the opening questions of this chapter, it would appear that an 
imagery of verticality, while neatly mapping a view of political transformation 
shared by liberation theologians and many scholarly critics of the FSLN’s recent 
political trajectory, fails to capture an important analytical model, that drawn 
upon when rural supporters of the FSLN discuss current political possibilities. 
Rather than viewing the basic trajectory of desirable political change as being a 
transition from the vertical to the horizontal, Gualiqueme residents cultivated a 
potent sense that abundant developmental resources lay beyond local boundaries. 
In the light of that image, desirable political change appeared to be connected 
with the work of establishing the right kinds of connection with these abundant 
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resources. Instead of verticalism, it might be more appropriate to refer to this as 
a desire for inclusion.
When compared with the orthogonal analytic described above, this imagery 
led to a completely different view of the kind of work that would need to be done 
in order to actively propel desirable change. Liberation theology’s tradition of 
social analysis, in conversation with Latin American dependency theory, posits 
hierarchical thinking as part of an oppressive cultural tradition which renders 
subaltern populations passive and dependent, and which the vital encounter 
with scripture enabled by CEBs promises to challenge and gradually overturn. 
In addition, critical commentaries on Nicaragua’s political trajectory since 1990 
frequently mobilise an evaluative model of history which draws on comparable 
associations, casting desirable progress and the possibility of popular political 
agency as coterminous with the elimination of social hierarchy. When assessing 
the revolution’s legacy in the light of this model, scholars are led to the conclusion 
that Nicaragua’s revolutionary exceptionality has been lost. For Gualiqueme’s 
Sandinista supporters, however, a central change effected by the revolution is 
understood to be connected with how much those in positions of influence and 
power are able to bind campesino lives into broader national and international 
redistributive flows. If anything needs to be worked upon in order to effect such 
change, it is the moral orientation of elites, intermediaries and powerholders. 
As the material above makes clear, the association of vertical thinking with 
the passivity and dependency of a benighted past fails to do justice to how the 
relationships which might realise this connective vision stand as a target of active 
political effort among Gualiqueme residents. Daniel Ortega’s increasing support 
among rural people – and the plausibility for many of them of his claim that 
Nicaragua’s revolutionary exceptionality continues in full force – might therefore 
be understood to reflect a successful effort to play into this desire for inclusion 
in material flows which offer a sense of connection to an abundant elsewhere.
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8. Nicaraguan legacies: advances and setbacks 
in feminist and LGBTQ activism*
Florence E. Babb
Following the 1979 Sandinista Revolution, Nicaragua became known around the world as a small Central American nation that had risen up against a long-entrenched dictatorship and the US imperialism that 
supported it. The 1980s began with high hopes and notable accomplishments, 
including in women’s rights, but later in the decade the US-funded Contra 
War divided the country and eroded the gains of the revolution. During this 
period, lesbian and gay Nicaraguans made their first public appearance after 
clandestine meetings and a brief, but notable, Sandinista effort to stifle their 
political organising. As a number of writers have assessed the meaning of the 
revolution’s legacy for feminism in Nicaragua, my main focus will be on its 
meaning for the LGBTQ community.1 Most analysts agree that the revolution 
had both enabling and limiting effects. It is credited for such advances as having 
mobilised the population to halt the spread of HIV/AIDS, for enabling greater 
* An earlier version of this work was presented as ‘Salir del clóset en Nicaragua: Identidades 
y políticas LGBT durante la revolución’ (Coming out in Nicaragua: LGBT identities and 
politics during the Revolution), Congreso Internacional, ‘Diversidad sexual en contextos 
de guerra’, Dirección de Diversidad Sexual, Secretaria Distrital de Planeación, Bogotá, 
Colombia, Sept. 2015. I am grateful to José Fernando Serrano Amaya and Cristina Rojas 
Tello for their invitation and commentaries. I also wish to thank Karen Kampwirth and 
Victoria González-Rivera for allowing me to read chapters from their manuscript in 
preparation, One Hundred Years of LGBT History in Nicaragua, a much-anticipated history 
of LGBT Nicaraguans over the past century. Shannon Walsh and Karen Kampwirth offered 
their much-appreciated comments on a draft of this work. For the research I conducted 
in Nicaragua from 1990 through to 2010, I received generous support from the Wenner-
Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research, the Fulbright Foundation, the University 
of Iowa and the University of Florida. Finally, I thank Hilary Francis for her invitation and 
encouragement to contribute to this volume.
1 LGBTQ refers to lesbians, gay men, bisexuals, transgender and queer. Although ‘queer’ has 
only recently come into wider use in Nicaragua, later in this chapter I discuss the appearance 
of Operación Queer in Managua. Among those who examine feminism and the legacy of the 
Nicaraguan revolution, see especially K. Kampwirth, Feminism and the Legacy of Revolution: 
Nicaragua, El Salvador, Chiapas, and S. Heumann, ‘The challenge of inclusive identities 
and solidarities: discourses on gender and sexuality in the Nicaraguan women’s movement 
and the legacy of Sandinismo’.
F.E. Babb, ‘Nicaraguan legacies: advances and setbacks in feminist and LGBTQ activism’, in 
H. Francis (ed.), A Nicaraguan Exceptionalism? Debating the Legacy of the Sandinista Revolution 
(London: University of London Press, 2019), pp. 165–78. License: CC-BY-NC-ND.
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security through community support and the creation of women’s police stations, 
and for reducing crime so that we now see far fewer Nicaraguans than other 
Central Americans fleeing north.2 Nonetheless, the Sandinista insistence on 
state-led development resulted in restrictions placed on autonomous initiatives 
for change, including those of gay men, lesbians and other sexual minorities.
This chapter will examine the particular ways in which LGBTQ Nicaraguans 
have mobilised during the last three decades and suggest that Nicaraguan 
‘exceptionalism’ may account for both the positive formation of this social 
movement and for the ambivalence expressed by the Sandinista leadership when 
that movement emerged. Based on my ethnographic research spanning from 
1989 through to the first decade of the new millennium, as well as the rich 
scholarly literature, I trace the way in which Nicaragua broke from its past as a 
Central American ‘backwater’ to play an active part in both national and regional 
LGBTQ culture and politics. Important to this development was the solidarity 
of feminists based in NGOs and social movements that supported sexual rights 
and AIDS education.
Notwithstanding the advances for gender rights, and (to a lesser degree) 
sexual diversity, during the decade when the Sandinistas first came to power, 
setbacks also arose during that time. Indeed, the florescence of civil society 
organisations and autonomous social movements found greater space for 
development in the neoliberal 1990s, though still more challenges have emerged 
in the post-2007 period since Daniel Ortega returned to power. During the 
past decade, the FSLN government has targeted feminists and other left groups 
that are critical of the government’s anti-democratic actions to quell dissent. 
Interestingly, transgender groups and NGOs received somewhat greater 
government support just as women’s rights were diminishing; still, LGBTQ 
Nicaraguans in general have continued to experience persistent homophobia and 
social exclusion. This chapter asks what the legacy of Nicaraguan exceptionalism 
should be considered to be when inconsistent practices and ambivalent outcomes 
around gender and sexual rights are observed in present-day Nicaragua. 
The chapter will then consider the experiences of lesbian and gay and other 
sexual minorities in Nicaragua during the time of the Sandinista Revolution, 
with an emphasis on lesbian feminist centrality. It focuses on the war years, from 
the Sandinista mobilisation through the decade of revolutionary government and 
Contra War (pre-1979 to 1990). The chapter then outlines the background of 
the period during which I conducted research, 1989–2010, a particularly robust 
time for feminist and LGBTQ organising. The third section examines what the 
return of the FSLN government and of Daniel Ortega has meant in relation 
to the LGBTQ community since 2007, with commentary on some recent 
developments. The conclusion compares remarks on Nicaraguan and Cuban 
exceptionalism in relation to LGBTQ populations, and offers a brief assessment 
of how the LGBTQ experience provides a useful lens for illuminating national-
2 For an assessment of women’s police stations and human security in Nicaragua, see S.D. 
Walsh, ‘Advances and limits of policing’.
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level dimensions of change. Ultimately, I hope to shed light on the question of 
Nicaraguan exceptionalism by asking to what degree these recent developments 
may (or may not) be considered legacies of the Sandinista Revolution.3
The emergence of LGBTQ culture and politics 
in the Sandinista Revolution decade, 1979–90
The FSLN (Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional) formed in 1961 to 
confront the long legacy of the Somoza family dictatorship in Nicaragua. The 
Somozas were notorious for their cruel practices, backed by force over decades. 
Surprisingly enough, their politics around women and sexual minorities would 
be rather more liberal. As historian Victoria González-Rivera has shown, the years 
of dictatorship provided some space for an early women’s movement to emerge 
and for gay men and lesbians and others deemed sexually different to live their 
lives.4 After the FSLN had built a mass movement and triumphed in 1979, the 
new Sandinista government’s outlook on sexual difference or diversity was that 
it formed part of the decadent past represented by the Somoza dictatorship, in 
much the same way that homosexuality in Cuba was associated with the Batista 
dictatorship’s bourgeois past. While the new revolutionary leadership quickly 
carried out reforms to benefit women, they did not view sexual minorities as 
worthy of the same attention. 
During the time of the guerrilla movement, awareness existed of gay and 
lesbian participants in the armed struggle, even if this was not spoken of publicly. 
The Sandinistas had built up a mass movement across diverse sectors of the 
population by the late 1970s and their attitude appeared to be that as long as 
gay men and lesbians supported the revolution, their private lives were tolerated. 
I have argued elsewhere that the revolution itself provided the opportunity for 
young people away from family to discover their sexual difference and to act 
on new desires.5 Still, they had to prove their commitment to Sandinismo and 
to keep their sexual orientation to themselves. This policy of ‘Don’t ask, don’t 
tell’, which mirrored the general expectation in Nicaraguan society, continued 
into the 1980s when the Sandinista government was introducing a series of 
3 There are far too many contributions to the literature on feminist and LGBTQ politics, 
culture and history in Nicaragua to do justice to them here. I rely on my own past writing on 
the subject – F.E. Babb, After Revolution: Mapping Gender and Cultural Politics in Neoliberal 
Nicaragua; ‘Out in Nicaragua: local and transnational desires after the revolution’; The 
Tourism Encounter: Fashioning Latin American Nations and Histories – as well as other recent 
writings: V. González-Rivera, Before the Revolution: Women’s Rights and Right-Wing Politics 
in Nicaragua, 1821–1979; Heumann, ‘The challenge of inclusive identities and solidarities’; 
E.K. Hobson, ‘“Si Nicaragua Venció”: lesbian and gay solidarity with the revolution’; C. 
Howe, Intimate Activism: The Struggle for Sexual Rights in Postrevolutionary Nicaragua; K. 
Kampwirth, ‘Organizing the Hombre Nuevo gay: LGBT politics and the second Sandinista 
Revolution’.
4 See González-Rivera, Before the Revolution, and V. González-Rivera, ‘The alligator woman’s 
tale: remembering Nicaragua’s “first self-declared lesbian”’. 
5 See Babb, After Revolution; and Babb, ‘Out in Nicaragua’.
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progressive reforms in the areas of the economy (land reform and state sector 
employment), popular political participation, education and healthcare. Lesbian 
and gay Sandinistas had to be satisfied with keeping a low profile in relation to 
their sexuality – and, in any event, their ‘personal’ and ‘private’ matters were 
viewed as secondary to, and a distraction from, the broad revolutionary struggle.
During the first years of the Sandinista revolutionary government, health and 
literacy brigades, as well as brigades working in the coffee and cotton harvests, 
offered more opportunities for gay men and lesbians to find one another and, 
freed of family obligations, to explore their sexuality. Thus I contend that 
although Nicaraguans often live in large families with little privacy, revolutionary 
participation gave Sandinista supporters new opportunities for self-discovery 
and sexual awakening. Whereas gay historian John D’Emilio has written that in 
western capitalist societies it was the transition from agricultural economies to 
urban, industrial economies that freed young men and women to self-identify 
as gay or lesbian,6 I argue that revolutionary Nicaragua offered a very different 
context for the same sort of self-discovery. In both capitalist societies like the 
United States and socialist-oriented Nicaragua, a key element was that of 
newfound independence and the freedom to escape the prying eyes of family 
and traditional social norms. Testimonies of participants in the revolution relate 
that individuals would find moments in the fields during a cotton harvest or 
evenings free from duties with a literacy brigade to socialise and form romantic 
relationships.7
By the mid 1980s, a group of lesbians and gay men began gathering together 
in private homes to talk for the first time about their own interests and their 
experiences of discrimination and social injustice. At times more than 60 women 
and men gathered, and, significantly, women often outnumbered men. In 1987, 
the government became aware of their organising activities and a number of gay 
men and lesbians were called in for questioning by Sandinista State Security. 
Some 30 of them were briefly detained in prison but they were soon released as 
the Sandinista government sought to avoid the international disapproval that 
would surely follow should it come to light that they were denying rights to 
LGBTQ Nicaraguans. While state intervention quelled gay and lesbian political 
organising in the short term, it was not long before a number of individuals were 
becoming more brazen and coming out publicly.8
One way in which space was opening up for gay and lesbian activism came 
via the state as the government charged the health ministry, then headed by Dora 
6 J. D’Emilio, ‘Capitalism and gay identity’.
7 V. González-Rivera and K. Kampwirth, One Hundred Years of LGBT History in Nicaragua 
(manuscript in progress). See also Thayer’s discussion of lesbian movements in Central 
America, where she notes the space for intimacy created within the context of revolution: 
M. Thayer, ‘Identity, revolution, and democracy: lesbian movements in Central America’.
8 See Babb, ‘Out in Nicaragua’, for more discussion, including references to other sources 
relating to these developments. Note that while I generally refer to LGBTQ Nicaraguans 
in order to be inclusive of diversity, I sometimes refer to gay men and lesbians when the 
historical record suggests that these two groups were most prominently involved.
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María Téllez, a highly respected comandante of the revolution and understood 
by many to be a lesbian, with working to prevent the spread of HIV/AIDS. 
Nicaragua’s model of mass mobilisation around healthcare and education 
facilitated its success in containing the spread of HIV, and several NGOs with 
international funding (including CEPSIDA and Nimehuatzín) began developing 
popular education programmes and workshops on safer sex alongside legal and 
psychological services. Condoms were distributed in gay men’s cruising areas 
and among students and sex workers, and publications addressed a host of issues 
around health and wellbeing.
In 1989, some 50 gay and lesbian Sandinistas, along with their international 
allies, marched openly in Managua’s tenth anniversary celebration of the 
Nicaragua revolution. Gathering together at the Plaza of the Revolution, they 
wore black T-shirts with pink triangles, signalling their readiness to make their 
identities known within the FSLN and the wider society. On that landmark date 
they were empowered to call for recognition of their rights to self-expression 
and to lives free of prejudice. That summer, when I made my first trip to 
Nicaragua, was a momentous time for LGBTQ organising in Nicaragua. Still, 
the broader context of the 1980s in Sandinista Nicaragua needs to be considered. 
Increasingly during that decade, the US-sponsored Contra War was dividing 
the country and undermining efforts to further the revolution’s ambitions to 
transform the society. More resources were devoted to defence rather than to 
social spending and families were torn apart by the ravages of the conflict and 
the loss of life. As pressure built and people longed for the fighting to stop, there 
was little opportunity or will to address social change in terms of the LGBTQ 
population. With the coming of the 1990 elections, most observers expected the 
re-election of Daniel Ortega as president; in retrospect, it was not so surprising 
that he lost to Violeta Barrios de Chamorro of the UNO coalition. The nation’s 
prolonged conflict caused many voters to choose peace, which would come 
only when the United States let up its war of aggression against the Sandinistas, 
expressed through the Contra War.
Postrevolutionary neoliberalism and the rise of  
civil society, 1990–2006
The 1990 election ushered in peace but it also brought a turn to neoliberalism, 
and the harsh structural adjustment measures that came along with it. For many 
Nicaraguans the changes that were introduced produced greater hardship and 
despair.9 With the Sandinistas out of government, civil society and NGOs 
began offering services that were no longer provided by the state. The women’s 
movement, formerly organised through AMNLAE, the ‘women’s branch’ of the 
FSLN, began to establish organisations that were autonomous from the state and 
the LGBTQ community found a space as well, with the two often overlapping. 
Lesbians had a public and well-received ‘coming out’ at the autonomous women’s 
9 See Babb, After Revolution on discourses of development, neoliberalism and the body.
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movement’s ‘Festival of the 52 Percent’ in Managua in 1991. Although this was a 
difficult time of transition in the country, important political openings occurred 
for social movements that were no longer tied to the interests of the FSLN. 
Notably, the NGOs Nimehuatzín and Xochiquetzal were founded by lesbian 
feminists who were devoted to addressing HIV/AIDS and the gay and lesbian 
community, though these NGOs were careful to state publicly that they served a 
broad and diverse clientele of those seeking sex education and sexual rights, not 
just the LGBTQ community.
During my many return trips to Nicaragua in the 1990s, I was fortunate 
to observe and participate in the growing LGBTQ presence in Managua and 
a few other cities in the country.10 In the new neoliberal context, and with the 
rolling back of the progressive reforms of the Sandinista Revolution, a draconian 
sodomy law (Law 204) was instituted in 1992, with the result that Nicaragua 
was subject to the wholesale criminalisation of both gay men and lesbians. This 
repressive move by the government served to galvanise LGBTQ political activism 
and give it international exposure, even as activists needed to exercise caution 
lest they violate the new law. Beginning in 1991, Nicaragua began celebrating 
Gay Pride annually in late June, with a jornada (fortnight) of events, including 
talks and workshops, social events, and often a drag performance and ‘Miss 
Gay’ pageant. That same year, the feminist NGO Puntos de Encuentro began 
publishing La Boletina, which gave regular attention to gay pride and politics. 
Women continued to play a leadership role in the NGOs, in organising events 
and in attracting international funding. In 1993, the NGO Xochiquetzal 
launched the magazine Fuera del Closet, with articles on health, the body and 
LGBTQ lives, to coincide with Gay Pride events.
The distance that lesbians had come in gaining visibility was clear in 1996 
during Gay Pride events. Psychologist and lesbian feminist Mary Bolt González’s 
book Sencillamente Diferentes… had a launch to discuss its theme of lesbian 
self-esteem in urban Nicaragua, which drew a large audience.11 The panellists 
included the lesbian feminist co-director (with Bolt) of Xochiquetzal, Hazel 
Fonseca and the famed comandante Dora María Téllez, and the festive evening 
closed with music by leading singer-songwriter Norma Elena Gadea.
While women have been the protagonists in much LGBTQ organising in 
Nicaragua, they have nonetheless continued to experience exclusionary practices 
in a machista society. Whereas gay bars attract men and offer them public areas 
in which to socialise, women have few such spaces. In one successful effort to 
correct the absence of women and lesbians in much of popular culture, Puntos de 
Encuentro produced a highly regarded and much-watched television series, Sexto 
10 My own coming out during those years coincided with the developments in Nicaragua, 
and I followed them with keen interest.
11 M. Bolt González, Sencillamente diferentes… La autoestima de las mujeres lesbianas en los 
sectores urbanos de Nicaragua.
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Sentido, with both gay and lesbian characters.12 In 1999, a new (though short-
lived) lesbian magazine, Humanas: Por la visibilidad de lesbianas y sus derechos 
humanos, was launched, with the objective of reaching out to Nicaraguan 
lesbians.
Lesbians in Nicaragua throughout the years of the Sandinista revolutionary 
government (and into the new millennium) have benefited from coordination 
with international feminist delegations to the country. As activist Rita Arauz 
expressed during the 1990s, ‘We would always tell our foreign sisters, “Ask about 
the lesbians. Ask for us by name – my name, the names of the others. Remind 
them that we exist, that we’re here and we’re not going away”’.13 Thus sexual 
orientation was identified as a feminist issue, making the Sandinista leadership 
and other Nicaraguans better aware of lesbians’ existence in the country. This 
was furthered by the formation of such lesbian organisations as Nosotras, Grupo 
Safo, Entre Amigas, Grupo Lesbiana por la Visibilidad and the Lesbian Feminist 
Collective.
Lesbian visibility increased in the 1990s, but by the end of the decade, there 
was backlash. In 1998, shock waves were felt throughout Nicaragua when former 
President Daniel Ortega was charged by his adoptive stepdaughter Zoilamérica 
Ortega Murillo with 20 years of sexual abuse, beginning when she was 11 years 
old. While Ortega remained silent and hid behind his parliamentary immunity, 
his wife (Zoilamérica’s mother) Rosario Murillo spoke often and publicly against 
her daughter’s allegation. Appealing to religion and the traditional nuclear 
family, she was quoted as alleging that Zoilamérica’s supporters were motivated 
by their ‘uncertain sexual identity’ into trying to influence her daughter, as well as 
projecting hatred for the opposite sex, rejecting marriage and motherhood, and, 
in general, the values and culture of heterosexuality. This effort to discredit the 
charges against Ortega by implying that lesbians were to blame for influencing 
Zoilamérica with distorted ideas became widespread.14
Post-2006 gains and losses with the return of the  
Sandinista government
Ortega’s animosity towards women who defied social convention and opposed 
him politically was later expressed in the form of a backlash against feminists 
during his electoral campaign in 2006, and into his new presidency. In order 
to appeal to conservative voters, he chose to ally with the conservative Catholic 
12 For an extensive discussion of this television series and of the protagonism of lesbians in the 
struggle for sexual rights in Nicaragua, see Howe, Intimate Activism.
13 Randall, Sandino’s Daughters Revisited, 277.
14 This was not the only instance of politically motivated lesbian-baiting in Nicaragua, but that 
goes beyond the scope of this work. See Hobson, ‘Si Nicaragua Venció’ for an interesting 
discussion of international lesbian and gay solidarity with the Nicaraguan revolution, which 
describes the female masculinity that emerged with the struggle. This image of lesbians in 
Nicaragua, while seductive for many lesbians from the north, may have fed heteronormative 
fears in the country.
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Church and to stand against abortion rights, even in the case of ‘therapeutic’ 
abortion following rape or when a woman’s life was in danger. This extreme 
stance was challenged by feminists, who saw Ortega as an anti-democratic 
opportunist masquerading as a champion of the people.
Once elected, Ortega’s comeback was marked by his targeting of feminists 
and other progressives who stood in opposition to his caudillo (macho/ 
strongman) style of politics. Notably, while shunning feminists, he began 
favouring the LGBTQ community, particularly the trans community, with 
resources and recognition. This may have been an effort to drive a wedge between 
feminists and the LGBTQ community, groups that had long worked together 
on issues of gender and sexuality. Moreover, it seemed to be a way of deflecting 
unwanted national and international attention from his stance on women’s 
reproductive rights. And finally, as argued by González-Rivera and Kampwirth, 
supporting the LGBTQ community was a way to appear ‘modern’ in the current 
Latin American context and in the international arena of human rights.15 Even 
so, as these scholars have expressed, there was ‘more circus than bread’, that is, 
there was greater cultural support than extension of political rights, although the 
infamous Law 204 was repealed and some new anti-discrimination legislation 
introduced in the revised Penal Code in 2007.16
As Kampwirth notes, ‘the FSLN’s new sexual diversity politics is not merely 
a response to international trends, but is also shaped by domestic politics, in 
particular by the history of FSLN-feminist movement relations, and by the 
tradition of clientelism in Nicaraguan politics’.17 Some positive developments 
in recent years include the institutionalised presence of sexual diversity groups 
in every office of the Juventud Sandinista around the country. Furthermore, 
LGBTQ groups have benefited from resources made available by the Centro 
de Estudios Internacionales, headed by Zoilamérica Ortega Murillo (who 
is estranged from her mother, the Nicaraguan first lady). President Ortega 
named long-time activist Samira Montiel as the Procuradora de Diversidad 
Sexual (ombudswoman for sexual diversity) in the office of human rights in 
2009. This may all be a form of ‘pink washing’, that is, using a friendly stance 
towards LGBTQ issues to conceal other more conservative stances, such as 
that on therapeutic abortion rights and the persecution of civil society actors, 
including well-known feminists. Moreover, some activists claim that despite the 
showcasing of LGBTQ concerns, there is little more beyond that as few new 
rights have been extended. Nonetheless, as a result of receiving a degree of state 
support, the LGBTQ community is expected to offer patronage and has lost 
some credibility as an autonomous social movement.
15 González-Rivera and Kampwirth, One Hundred Years of LGBT History.
16 See K. Kampwirth ‘Abortion, antifeminism, and the return of Daniel Ortega: in Nicaragua, 
leftist politics?’; and N. Jubb, ‘Love, family values and reconciliation for all, but what about 
rights, justice and citizenship for women?
17 Kampwirth, ‘Organizing the Hombre Nuevo gay’, 320.
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When Ortega’s government established new policies on family rights and 
protections in recent years, a number of feminists and LGBTQ activists were 
disappointed that the right to marry was not extended to same-sex couples, 
a right that is now expanding in the Americas, including Argentina, Brazil, 
Uruguay, Canada and the United States. Others, however, were not surprised 
and felt that the time was not yet right. When a new Family Code was debated 
in 2012, it was criticised for its exclusion of single-parent households and of 
LGBTQ-headed families. That same year, the Miss Gay Nicaragua pageant 
and the demonstrations against the Family Code were followed by incidents of 
violence, which suggests that despite some recent political gains, there are very 
real limits to Nicaraguan society’s understanding and acceptance of gender and 
sexual difference.18
It is worth noting that in 2013 a collective of artists, academics and activists 
joined together in Nicaragua as ‘Operación Queer’ in order to give more visibility 
to gender and sexual difference. The collective’s impact has been both cultural 
and political as it takes up questions of the body and identity, and of forms of 
exclusion relating not only to gender and sexuality but to social class, ethnicity, 
age, ability and aesthetics. Those in the collective have addressed whether there 
is something like a community among ‘queer’ Nicaraguans, understood to be 
diverse and fluid in its formation. The intellectual sophistication and cultural 
emphasis of Operación Queer should not stand in the way of recognising its 
fundamental political potential as well. As one indication of its ability to push 
LGBTQ Nicaraguans further in their analysis, Operación Queer has addressed 
its own elitism and appears to take a highly self-critical approach; indeed the 
collective acknowledges that, for example, a trans sex worker in the Managua 
market may not be familiar with queer theory, yet nonetheless transgresses 
everyday norms of sexual performance.19
Comparative revolutions and LGBTQ political cultures: 
Nicaragua and Cuba
In discussions of Latin American revolutionary societies, Nicaragua has often 
been compared to Cuba. While their revolutions were two decades apart, 
triumphing in 1979 and 1959 respectively, both had aspirations for social 
transformation based on economic development that was oriented towards 
socialist principles, and both stood up to the United States in order to struggle 
for such an ambitious goal. The two revolutionary societies had hidden histories 
of same-sex sexuality, which at first were attributed to the decadent past of their 
dependent capitalist dictatorships.
18 Kampwirth, ‘Organizing the Hombre Nuevo Gay’.
19 For the discussion of Operación Queer I consulted various websites, including www.
bienalcentroamericana.com/2016/08/08/operacion-queercochona/ (accessed 30 Apr. 2019). 
I also wish to acknowledge helpful conversations with Nicaraguan participants at a summer 
school on ‘The culture of Sandinismo in Nicaragua’, held in Wuppertal, Germany, July 2017.
A NICARAGUAN EXCEPTIONALISM?174
Homosexuality was repressed even among the revolutions’ supporters, 
with Cuba going so far as to imprison gay Cubans for crimes of anti-social 
behaviour and to quarantine those with HIV/AIDS. In more recent decades, 
both Cuba and Nicaragua have introduced more progressive legislation to 
protect the rights of gay men and lesbians. Although Nicaragua has emulated 
Cuba in establishing a Family Code, it has not gone as far in recent years to 
assure the social inclusion of its LGBTQ citizens. Interestingly, in both nations 
the daughter (or stepdaughter) of the standing president – Mariela Castro Espín 
in Cuba and Zoilamérica Ortega Murillo in Nicaragua – has played a key part in 
championing the rights of sexual minorities. Cuba’s government, however, has 
gone further in addressing the needs of these new groups, including paying for 
transgender individuals to have sex reassignment surgery. The neoliberal, and 
patriarchal, tilt of the post-2006 FSLN government makes this level of support 
most unlikely in Nicaragua.
Cuba and Nicaragua have often been considered exceptional cases in 
Latin America, as both have had 20th-century revolutions that received wide 
popular support and altered the course of their histories. In the case of Cuba, its 
reputation for exceptionalism is more clearly deserved, as the nation steadfastly 
maintained its political commitment even in the face of frequent attempts by the 
United States to destabilise the government of Fidel Castro. In contrast to Cuba’s 
half-century of defiance, Nicaragua’s revolutionary government of the 1980s 
lasted only a decade before it was voted out of office. The destabilisation wrought 
by the Contra War was in large measure the work of the United States, which 
achieved its goal through the illegal supplying of arms to counterrevolutionaries. 
Nonetheless, Nicaragua’s achievements during that brief revolutionary period, 
as well as after it, were in a number of ways exceptional.
In the post-1979 decade, Nicaragua accomplished a great deal of progressive 
change on many fronts, whether because of FSLN mobilisation experience, or in 
spite of it. By the end of the 1980s, not only feminists but also LGBTQ activists 
were finding a voice and a political space. Following the Sandinista electoral 
defeat in 1990, autonomous organising of women, including lesbians, and of 
gay men took the path of further movement-building activity. By March 1991, 
Nicaragua played host to a historic gathering of Central American feminists 
at the Montelimar beach resort. Nicaragua was emerging from what many 
considered ‘backwater’ status as a small Central American nation to become a 
regional leader in LGBTQ activism and cultural development.
Even where political rights have not yet been extended, it is notable that 
Nicaraguan culture has become more accommodating of gay and lesbian lives. 
The Gay Pride events during the annual jornada and the campaign for Sexuality 
Free from Prejudice have had an impact, lessening the stigma associated with 
same-sex sexuality. The media and popular culture now reflect greater diversity 
in people’s private lives, in part the result of the hugely successful TV series 
Sexto Sentido. Viewing audiences came to know Angel and Vicki as fully drawn 
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characters, as human beings who were struggling to come out publicly.20 This 
opportunity to ‘know’ gay people and talk about their lives had a profound 
effect on viewers in Managua and beyond. During these years, the language itself 
shifted from using the local and disparaging terms ‘cochones’ and ‘cochonas’ to 
homosexuals or gays and lesbians. Recognising sexual identity as diverse and not 
as ‘unnatural’ has been a big step forward in granting greater dignity to sexual 
minorities in Nicaragua, as elsewhere.21
The Nicaraguan difference? Revolutionary legacies 
and limitations
How do we account for these changes and what can this tell us about the 
wider society? The Nicaraguan experience suggests that the period of social 
mobilisation wrought through the revolution gave lesbians, gay men and other 
sexual minorities who were involved a way of finding one another, and of 
recognising their own sexual difference. Their involvement in the revolutionary 
process also gave them the strategic tools necessary to develop a way of struggling 
for sexual rights. Some of the lessons of the revolution were carried over into 
activism. For example, NGOs supporting LGBTQ rights made use of broad-
based popular education to promote sexual awareness and safer sex; activists 
looked to the grassroots to distribute condoms; and they seized public spaces 
to hold demonstrations and claim visibility, as when they held festive plantones 
(monthly gatherings) in the middle of Managua’s busiest traffic island at 
Metrocentro. Even as they may have employed mobilisation strategies developed 
in the revolutionary setting, however, LGBTQ activists needed to move beyond 
the Sandinista reductionism of inequality to social class differences, to assert 
their sexual, gender and cultural rights, and their demands for social justice.22
To be sure, activists were also influenced by – and influenced – international 
currents in LGBTQ culture and politics. In earlier years, they sometimes had 
to deflect criticism that gay identity and activism were imported from the 
United States or elsewhere, that these were foreign (and contaminating) and 
not truly ‘Nica’. Now that same-sex and queer sexualities and histories are better 
understood in Nicaragua, as elsewhere, it is not deemed necessary to shun 
association with transnational currents of LGBTQ activism. It is well recognised 
that some of Nicaragua’s activists were deeply influenced by years of living abroad 
20 See Howe, Intimate Activism.
21 When I gave a talk at the feminist NGO Puntos de Encuentro in 2003 on the occasion 
of the Gay Pride jornada, a member of the press approached me afterwards and asked if 
homosexuality was ‘natural’. Such uncertainty about sexual identities persists in Nicaragua, 
but today there is arguably greater awareness of the fluidity of sexuality and greater tolerance 
for sexual difference.
22 It is notable that in the discussion of gender and sexual rights in Nicaragua, the focus is on 
the country’s dominant mestizo (mixed race) population, without reference to minority 
indigenous and Afro-descendant peoples. For a broad treatment of the cultural history 
of sexuality by a prominent Nicaraguan feminist, see S. Montenegro, La cultura sexual en 
Nicaragua.
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and brought back with them strategies for winning cultural and political rights, 
and that internationalists living in Nicaragua also contributed to building the 
movement. No longer was this seen as being at odds with the development of 
specifically Nicaraguan ways of ‘doing politics’ and enabling cultural identities 
to flourish.23
At the present juncture, given the ambivalent and contradictory politics of 
the FSLN, it is unclear whether the nation will continue along this path, but 
the state’s neoliberal recognition of individual rights, and its desire to become 
more ‘modern’, may pave the way towards further gains. Moreover, Nicaragua’s 
long-time association with social mobilisation at the popular level suggests that 
it may continue to serve as an example of what can be achieved with or without 
state support. The Nicaraguan Revolution was exceptional in Latin America 
for occurring after the emergence of feminist and gay social movements at the 
international level. This helped to shape the radical change that came about, from 
granting women rights as beneficiaries of land reform to granting more public 
space to lesbians, gay men, bisexuals and, most recently, trans Nicaraguans. 
Lesbians, as women whose sexuality has often been rendered nearly invisible in 
the past, have had an especially difficult challenge to gain recognition of both 
their gender and sexuality, yet they have frequently been the protagonists in 
sexual rights activism. As a result of their social struggle, many Nicaraguans in 
the LGBTQ community have undergone personal transformation and have won 
greater acceptance in daily life, and that in itself is no small accomplishment. 
Nonetheless, the LGBTQ community faces numerous challenges ahead as they 
strive to overcome the historical legacy of a still-heteronormative and sexist 
postrevolutionary society. As such, their recent experience shines a light on both 
the advances and the limitations of this ‘exceptional’ Central American nation.
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9. Conclusion: exceptionalism and 
Nicaragua’s many revolutions
Justin Wolfe
As historians, we do well to remember that what’s new is invariably old. Nicaraguan exceptionalism – particularly framed around the Sandinista  Revolution and its aftermath – is one in a long history of such claims. At 
the very least, we ought to begin with Nicaragua’s early 19th-century declaration 
of its ‘geographic destiny’ – defined by the potential for an interoceanic canal 
across its territory – to become the world’s ‘New Constantinople’.1 By the latter 
half of the 19th century, as Nicaraguan elites surveyed the landscape of instability 
and authoritarianism that had come to define Central America, they boasted 
of Nicaragua, with its regular elections and single-term presidencies, being the 
‘Switzerland of Central America’.2 As the 20th century dawned, Nicaraguan 
exceptionalism shifted from something material or institutional to a quality 
inherent in Nicaraguans, a widespread belief in what Hilary Francis refers 
to as Nicaragua’s ‘revolutionary heritage’. The earliest version of this framed 
the actions of Augusto Sandino’s unrelenting struggle against US military 
occupation. Even if the Great Depression and Roosevelt’s Good Neighbour 
Policy combined to diminish the US appetite for such endeavours, Nicaraguans 
looked to Sandino’s rebellion as the essential element in US withdrawal in 1933.3 
Indeed, that exceptionalism formed the foundation for the FSLN’s origin story 
and trajectory. For, despite the diffusion of guerrilla movements throughout 
Latin America after Cuba’s success in 1959, only the FSLN succeeded in taking 
power to establish a revolutionary regime.4
How, when and to what extent this sense of a distinct heritage radiated across 
Nicaragua is at the heart of the chapters that make up this book. These are not 
1 F. Kinloch Tijerino, Nicaragua, identidad y cultura política (1821–1858).
2 A.J. Cruz, Jr., Nicaragua’s Conservative Republic, 1858–93; C. Cruz, Political Culture and 
Institutional Development in Costa Rica and Nicaragua: World-Making in the Tropics.
3 E. Camacho Navarro, Los usos de Sandino. Jaime Wheelock Román, one of the FSLN’s 
leading intellectuals, worked to position Sandino within a longer history of Nicaraguan 
exceptionalism in Raíces indígenas de la lucha anticolonialista en Nicaragua, de Gil González 
a Joaquín Zavala, 1523 a 1881.
4 T.P. Wickham-Crowley, Guerrillas and Revolution in Latin America.
J. Wolfe, ‘Conclusion: exceptionalism and Nicaragua’s many revolutions’, in H. Francis (ed.), 
A Nicaraguan Exceptionalism? Debating the Legacy of the Sandinista Revolution (London: 
University of London Press, 2019), pp. 179–84. License: CC-BY-NC-ND.
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easy questions to answer, and the works in this collection remind us that the 
history of the Sandinista Revolution is a moving target. It is the revolutionary 
struggle from the founding of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN); 
it is the revolution in triumph from 1979 to 1990; it is the Revolution in defeat. 
It is even, perhaps, the FSLN in resurgent power since 2007. It is also and always, 
all of these ‘revolutions’ in memory. Moreover, despite its relatively small size, 
Nicaragua’s geographic and social diversity suggests even more that we are 
walking within a garden of forking paths.
Much of the richest work published in the aftermath of the Sandinista 
defeat in 1990 wrestled with the Sandinista loss by delving deeper into the 
history of Nicaragua’s social and cultural complexity, too often ignored or 
minimised in the class-reductive analysis of Sandinista leadership. Whether 
it was peasants, indigenous communities or women, scholars revealed people 
whose lives and politics intersected with the revolution in ways that often seemed 
complementary, but which ended up in conflict as these communities’ agency 
butted heads with the FSLN’s vanguardist approach.5 The chapters by Florence 
Babb and José Luis Rocha are particularly apt examples, albeit for different 
reasons. As Babb shows, the FSLN had trouble placing LGBT identities and 
rights within its ideological framework. With land reform, by contrast, the 
FSLN claimed to know better than peasants their needs and desires. What these 
chapters also reveal, and what is displayed in even fuller flower in the chapters 
by Fernanda Soto, David Cooper, Francis and Johannes Wilm, is how the 
Sandinistas provided both an ideological framework and the tools for organising 
newly imagined selves.
In some ways, it has been taken for granted that in creating new, 
revolutionary subjectivities, Nicaragua’s pre-revolutionary selves were more 
straightforward, if not static. In 1985, relying on the dossiers of participants 
in the fighting to oust Somoza, Argentine sociologist Carlos Vilas tried to 
define the ‘social subject’ of the Sandinista Revolution.6 An astute observer 
of contemporary Nicaraguan society, Vilas recognised and engaged with the 
country’s regional variation – for example, that students accounted for 29 per 
cent of the participants from Matagalpa, but only 16 per cent in Masaya. That 
said, his analysis of occupational categories like gentes de oficio and jornaleros 
suggested a fixity not matched by historical experience.7 The departments of 
5 See, e.g., J. Gould, To Lead as Equals: Rural Protest and Political Consciousness in Chinandega, 
Nicaragua, 1912–1979; C.R. Hale, Resistance and Contradiction: Miskitu Indians and 
the Nicaraguan State, 1894–1987; J. Charlip, Cultivating Coffee: The Farmers of Carazo, 
Nicaragua, 1880–1930; J.L. Gould, To Die in This Way: Nicaraguan Indians and the Myth of 
Mestizaje, 1880–1965; E. Dore, Myths of Modernity: Peonage and Patriarchy in Nicaragua; 
J. Wolfe, The Everyday Nation-State: Community and Ethnicity in Nineteenth-Century 
Nicaragua.
6 C.M. Vilas, ‘El sujeto social de la insurrección popular: La Revolución Sandinista’, 20 (1) 
(Jan. 1985): 119–47.
7 Gentes de oficio is a category which includes skilled, self-employed workers in a range of 
occupations, such as craftsmen, plumbers, mechanics, carpenters, tailors and barbers. 
Jornaleros means day-labourers.
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Chinandega and Carazo, for example, registered the highest degree of rural 
proletarianisation in the 1970s and consequently, Vilas noted, emerged as ‘the 
departments where the political work of the FSLN began earlier with agricultural 
workers’.8 The histories of their proletarianisation and what these meant for their 
political subjectivity, however, led these departments to have distinct experiences 
of the revolution in power and in post-1990 politics.9
Even in areas that seemed more homogenous, like the ‘agricultural frontier’ 
of Nueva Segovia, a teasing out of historical details further reveals the complex 
dynamics of the revolution. Lynn Horton’s extraordinary study of the revolution 
and counter-revolution in the Segovian region of Quilalí explores the diverse 
entanglements within the Segovias. Quilalí had a diverse, yet highly unequal, 
distribution of land, a reality exacerbated in the 1970s by ongoing eastward 
migration into a zone with little resemblance to the undeveloped frontier of 
the 1950s. The FSLN’s failure to understand these existing divisions, and the 
dreams of autonomy that drove frontier migration, made it nearly impossible 
for them to perceive what attracted some peasants to the revolution, and what 
enraged those who joined the Contras.10 As Francis, Soto and Cooper show, the 
intersection between agency and institutionalisation remained crucial not just 
in the aftermath of the FSLN’s electoral loss in 1990, but even with the FSLN’s 
return to power in 2007.
For many of the authors in this collection, new forms of political organisation 
and participation constitute another key legacy of the revolution. The 20th 
century saw a number of major developments of this kind in Nicaragua, the 
first under the dynastic rule of the Somoza family, the second under the FSLN 
– often with striking parallels. Under US occupation, the Nicaraguan military 
was replaced with Guardia Nacional, which not only concentrated power in 
the hands of the Somozas, but created a truly viable national armed force in 
Nicaragua for the first time, one that both forged the culture of its members and 
established a new regime of policing (albeit, as Robert Sierakowski notes, highly 
corrupt and ineffective) across the territory.11 Sierakowski argues that an equally 
dramatic shift in the culture of policing attended the revolution’s creation of 
the Sandinista Police, one that initially persisted with its transformation into 
the post-1990 Nicaraguan National Police.12 Following his return to power 
in 2007, however, Daniel Ortega initiated a campaign of political favouritism 
8 Vilas, ‘El sujeto de la insurrección popular’, 135.
9 See, e.g., Gould, To Lead as Equals, 292–6; Charlip, Cultivating Coffee, 220–8; Wolfe, 
The Everyday Nation-State, 205–6. See, too, Karen Kampwirth’s critique of the fixity of 
these categories in Women and Guerrilla Movements: Nicaragua, El Salvador, Chiapas, 
Cuba,138–45.
10 L. Horton, Peasants in Arms: War and Peace in the Mountains of Nicaragua, 1979–1994.
11 R. Millett, Guardians of the Dynasty; K. Walter, The Regime of Anastasio Somoza, 1936–1956; 
R. Grossman, ‘“The Blood of the People”: The Guardia Nacional’s Fifty-Year War against the 
People of Nicaragua, 1927–1979’, 59–84.
12 A useful comparison ought to be made with the Sandinista Popular Army and its transition 
into the Nicaraguan Armed Forces.
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that undermined the police’s institutional independence and converted it into a 
partisan tool of coercion.
The leadership of Anastasio Somoza García brought other substantial 
changes to Nicaraguan society, notably consolidating politics within a populist 
framework that built upon the anti-caudillo campaign of the US occupation 
and bureaucratising the state under his leadership.13 Together, these transformed 
Nicaraguan political culture, especially in coffee and cotton zones as well as in 
urban centres throughout the country. Recent scholarship has contended it was 
these that held the Somocista state together, and more so than the Guardia’s 
repression. As Jeffrey Gould argues in his ground-breaking study of campesinos 
(farmers) in Chinandega, ‘Workers and peasants largely accepted the Somozas’ 
variant of populism and its corresponding rules of the game, but, at the same 
time, they shaped and transformed Somocista populism.’14 Victoria González-
Rivera’s research on women’s politics within the Somocista state reveals similar 
shifts in political culture.15 Indeed, growing resistance to the dictatorship was 
frequently framed in terms of its opposition, not in the revolutionary language 
of the FSLN but rather in their own experience of Somocista development. The 
difficult road for land reform, detailed by Rocha, and in food policy, analysed by 
Christiane Berth, reveal the Sandinista’s blind spot to the depths of Somocista 
political culture. That said, as Rocha’s work indicates – and so, too, that of Babb, 
Cooper, Francis, and even Soto – the revolution provided new institutional tools 
and practices that have lasted long beyond the FSLN’s defeat in 1990.
In his oft-cited work on the post-Second World War defeat of fascism 
and the collapse of Soviet communism in the late 1980s, Francis Fukuyama 
argued for the emergent hegemony of neoliberal republicanism.16 Fukuyama’s 
thesis on ‘the end of history’ recognised a profound shift in the global balance 
of power. In this shift, the United States consolidated political and economic 
predominance through its assumption of the role as the ‘last superpower’ 
together with the intensified position of economic organisations like the World 
Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organization in 
which the US held a nearly unchecked leadership role. The world has proved 
itself to be more complex than Fukuyama imagined. His focus on a totalising 
‘common ideological heritage of mankind’ led him to dismiss whatever kinds of 
‘strange thoughts occur to people in Albania or Burkina Faso’, for their failure 
to be of world-historical importance or influence.17 Since the late 1990s, it has 
become clear that Nicaragua (and Latin America more generally) adjusted to 
13 Walter, The Regime of Anastasio Somoza; M. Gobat, Confronting the American Dream: 
Nicaragua under U.S. Imperial Rule. Caudillo can be translated as ‘strongman’.
14 J.L. Gould, To Lead as Equals: Rural Protest and Political Consciousness in Chinandega, 
Nicaragua, 1912–1979, 293.
15 V. González-Rivera, Before the Revolution: Women’s Rights and Right-Wing Politics in 
Nicaragua, 1821–1979.
16 F. Fukuyama, ‘The end of history?’, The National Interest, 3–18.
17 Ibid., 9.
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these dramatic changes in quite diverse ways, producing an array of left- and 
right-wing governments, each often responding to questions of environment, 
race and ethnicity, and global capitalism in ways hardly imaginable in the 1970s. 
Still, Nicaragua has continued to participate as a subordinate in the global 
capitalist system. Its economy has grown in recent years – with higher and more 
consistent rates of growth than most of Latin America since 2009 – but, it is still 
focused on roles long familiar to the Global South: agro exports, maquiladoras18 
and tourism. After returning to power, the FSLN began to develop a series of 
social programmes framed in revolutionary rhetoric, but which are, as Francis 
and Berth show, more attuned to neoliberal expectations and ties of political 
clientelism, and far from universal. That said, rates of extreme poverty have 
declined considerably over the last decade, fuelled especially by increases in 
income among the poorest in the country, growth in the agricultural sector, 
robust commodity prices and foreign aid from Venezuela. Long-term instability 
in prices, environmental concerns and the crisis in Venezuela, however, raise 
serious questions about the Sandinistas’ ability to sustain these economic 
advances. What is more, despite its ballyhoo-ed social programmes, social 
investments remain too low to effect meaningful redistributions of wealth or 
opportunity.19
Most of the authors in this collection argue that an exceptional sense of self-
empowerment and grassroots organisational capacity represent the key legacies 
of the Sandinista Revolution. Since 2007, these have played out against the 
backdrop of growing FSLN popularity and its consolidation of power. Still, 
there is a fragility to the constellation of forces that have made this possible. 
The Sandinistas have raised expectations while also limiting dissent. How will 
Nicaraguans respond if meaningful social transformations fail to materialise? 
Will the revolution’s legacy lead to greater inclusion? Or, perhaps, serve as the 
springboard for change when the economy inevitably stumbles.
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In recent years, child migrants 
from Honduras, Guatemala and El 
Salvador have made the perilous 
journey to the United States in 
unprecedented numbers, but their 
peers in Nicaragua have remained at 
home. Nicaragua also enjoys lower 
murder rates and far fewer gang 
problems when compared with her 
neighbours.
Why is Nicaragua so different? 
The present government has 
promulgated a discourse of 
Nicaraguan exceptionalism, 
arguing that Nicaragua is unique 
thanks to the heritage of the 1979 
Sandinista revolution. This volume 
critically interrogates that claim, 
asking whether the legacy of the 
revolution is truly exceptional. An 
interdisciplinary work, the book brings 
together historians, anthropologists 
and sociologists to explore the 
multifarious ways in which the 
revolutionary past continues to shape 
public policy – and daily life – in 
Nicaragua’s tumultuous present.
